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INTRODUCTION
THE FREE BLACK IS NOTHING
When we got about half way to St. Michael’s, while the constables having us in 
charge were looking ahead, Henry inquired of me what he should do with his 
pass. I told him to eat it with his biscuit, and own nothing; and we passed the 
word around, “Own nothing” and “Own nothing!” said we all.
FREDERICK DOUGLASS , The Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass
OWNING NOTHING
A deep abyss, or a terrifying question, engenders the declaration “Black 
Lives Matter.” The declaration, in fact, conceals this question even as it 
purports to have answered it resolutely. “Black Lives Matter,” then, carries 
a certain terror in its dissemination, a terror we dare to approach with un-
certainty, urgency, and exhaustion. This question pertains to the “meta-
physical infrastructure,” as Nahum Chandler might call it, that condi-
tions our world and our thinking about the world. “Black Lives Matter” is 
an important declaration, not just because it foregrounds the question of 
unbearable brutality, but also because it performs philosophical labor — it 
compels us to face the terrifying question, despite our desire to look away. 
The declaration presents a difficult syntax or an accretion of tensions and 
ambiguities within its organization: can blacks have life? What would 
such life mean within an antiblack world? What axiological measurement 
determines the mattering of the life in question? Does the assembly of 
these terms shatter philosophical coherence or what metaphysical infra-
structure provides stability, coherence, and intelligibility for the declara-
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tion? These questions of value, meaning, stability, and intelligibility lead 
us to the terror of the declaration, the question it conceals but engages: 
what ontological ground provides the occasion for the declaration? Can 
such ground be assumed, and if not, is the declaration even possible with-
out it? “Black Lives Matter” assumes ontological ground, which propels 
the deployment of its terms and sustains them throughout the treacheries 
of antiblack epistemologies. Put differently, the human being provides an 
anchor for the declaration, and since the being of the human is invaluable, 
then black life must also matter, if the black is a human (the declaration 
anchors mattering in the human’s Being). But we reach a point of terror 
with this syllogistic reasoning. One must take a step backward and ask 
the fundamental question: is the black, in fact, a human being? Or can 
black(ness) ground itself in the being of the human? If it cannot, then on 
what bases can we assert the mattering of black existence? If it can, then 
why would the phrase need to be repeated and recited incessantly? Do the 
affirmative declaration and its insistence undermine this very ontological 
ground? The statement declares, then, too soon — a declaration that is re-
ally an unanswered (or unanswerable) question. We must trace this ques-
tion and declaration back to its philosophical roots: the Negro Question.1 
This question reemerges within a world of antiblack brutality, a world 
in which black torture, dismemberment, fatality, and fracturing are rou-
tinized and ritualized — a global, sadistic pleasure principle. I was invited 
to meditate on this globalized sadism in the context of Michael Brown’s 
murder and the police state. The invitation filled me with dread as I antic-
ipated a festival of humanism in which presenters would share solutions 
to the problem of antiblackness (if they even acknowledged antiblackness) 
and inundate the audience with “yes we can!” rhetoric and unbounded op-
timism. I decided to participate, despite this dread, once students began 
asking me deep questions, questions that also filled them with dread and 
confusion. I, of course, was correct about my misgivings. I listened to one 
speaker after the next describe a bright future, where black life is valued 
and blacks are respected as humans — if we just keep fighting, they said, 
“we’re almost there!” A political scientist introduced statistics and graphs 
laying out voting patterns and districts; he argued that blacks just did not 
realize how much power they had (an unfortunate ignorance, I guess). If 
they just collectively voted they could change antiblack police practices 
and make this world a better place. The audience clapped enthusiasti-
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cally; I remained silent. Next, a professor of law implored the audience to 
keep fighting for legal change because the law is a powerful weapon for 
ending discrimination and restoring justice. We just needed to return to 
the universal principles that founded our Constitution, “liberty, equal-
ity, and justice!” (I thought about the exception clause in the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the Three- Fifths Compromise, and the way the sharecrop-
ping system exploited the Fourteenth Amendment in order to reenslave 
through contract. I continued to sit in silence.) The audience shouted and 
applauded. I felt a pit in my stomach because I knew what I had to do; it 
was my time to step up to the podium — it was my nihilistic responsibility. 
I told the audience there was no solution to the problem of antiblackness; 
it will continue without end, as long as the world exists. Furthermore, all 
the solutions presented rely on antiblack instruments to address anti-
blackness, a vicious and tortuous cycle that will only produce more pain 
and disappointment. I also said that humanist affect (the good feeling we 
get from hopeful solutions) will not translate into freedom, justice, rec-
ognition, or resolution. It merely provides temporary reprieve from the 
fact that blacks are not safe in an antiblack world, a fact that can become 
overwhelming. The form of antiblackness might alter, but antiblackness 
itself will remain a constant — despite the power of our imagination and 
political yearnings. I continued this nihilistic analysis of the situation 
until I heard complete silence. 
A woman stood up after my presentation and shouted, “How dare you 
tell this to our youth! That is so very negative! Of course we can change 
things; we have power, and we are free.” Her voice began to increase in 
intensity. I waited for her to finish and asked her, “Then tell us how to end 
police brutality and the slaughter of the youth you want to protect from 
my nihilism.” “If these solutions are so credible, why have they consis-
tently failed? Are we awaiting for some novel, extraordinary solution — 
one no one had ever imagined — to end antiblack violence and misery?” 
Silence. “In what manner will this ‘power’ deliver us from antiblackness?” 
How long must we insist on a humanity that is not recognized — an insis-
tence that humiliates in its inefficacy? “If we are progressing, why are black 
youth being slaughtered at staggering rates in the twenty- first century — 
if we are, indeed, humans just like everyone else?” People began to re-
spond that things are getting better, despite the increasing death toll, 
the unchecked power of the police state, the lack of conviction rates for 
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police murdering blacks, the prison industrial complex and the modern 
reenslavement of an entire generation, the unbelievable black infant mor-
tality rate, the lack of jobs for black youth and debilitating poverty. “This 
is better?” I asked. “At least we are not slaves!” someone shouted. I asked 
them to read the Thirteenth Amendment closely. But the intensity of the 
dialogic exchange taught me that affect runs both ways: it is not just that 
solutions make us feel good because we feel powerful/hopeful, but that 
pressing the ontological question presents terror — the terror that onto-
logical security is gone, the terror that ethical claims no longer have an 
anchor, and the terror of inhabiting existence outside the precincts of 
humanity and its humanism. Ontological Terror engages this question 
and the forms of terror it produces.2 
The event also put the metaphysical infrastructure into perspective 
for me. Two philosophical forces were colluding (and at times conflicting) 
to orient the solutions proposed and the audiences’ responses, and both 
presented “free black” as a concept with meaning: black humanism and 
postmetaphysics. I use these two terms to docket a certain posture toward 
metaphysics — and the ontological ground metaphysics offers. Black hu-
manism enters into romance with metaphysics. It appropriates schema-
tization, calculation, technology, probability, and universality — all the in-
struments of metaphysical thinking — to make epistemological, ethical, and 
ontological claims concerning blackness and freedom. Freedom is possible, 
then, because metaphysics provides it with ontology; from there, all sorts 
of solutions, policies, and practices emerge to address antiblackness. Scien-
tific reasoning, technological innovation, and legality are tools black hu-
manists use to quantify suffering, measure progress, proffer universal nar-
ratives of humanity, and reason with antiblack institutions. All problems 
have solutions for black humanists, and their task is to uncover the solution 
the problem conceals, as this uncovering equates to an eradication of the 
problem. Black humanism relies on an eclectic approach to antiblackness — 
Hegelian synthesis, Kantian rationalism, Platonic universals/idealism, Car-
tesian representation, and empiricism. In short, black humanists lay claim 
to the being of the human (and the human’s freedom) through metaphys-
ical thinking and instruments. 
Postmetaphysics, in contrast, attempts the surmounting or twisting 
[verwunden] of the ground and logic of metaphysics.3 It insists that meta-
physics reproduces pain and misery and restricts human freedom. Rep-
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resenting the human as an object of scientific thinking (e.g., biology, 
economics, law) destroys the spontaneity and uniqueness of the human — 
things that make the human special. The ground, then, upon which meta-
physics relies is problematic, and this ground must be destroyed (i.e., 
twisted) and deconstructed (i.e., displaced) to free the human. Postmeta-
physics would advocate for a self- consumption of this ground through 
hermeneutical strategies, unending deconstructions, and forms of plu-
rality (such as hermeneutic nihilism). The post is rather a misnomer, if 
we think of post as an overcoming [überwunden]; the postmetaphysician 
will never overcome metaphysics. A residue will always remain, but the 
postmetaphysician hopes to reduce this metaphysical residue to render it 
inoperative. The postmetaphysician understands antiblackness as a prob-
lem of metaphysics, especially the way scientific thinking has classified 
being along racial difference and biology. The task of the postmetaphysi-
cal project is to free blacks from the misery metaphysics produces by un-
dermining its ground. Hermeneutical strategies, which contest ultimate 
foundations, would question the ground of race (racial metaphysics) and 
its claim to universal truth. 
Black humanism and postmetaphysics, however, leave the question of 
being unattended as it concerns black(ness). Both assume being is ap-
plicable and operative — black humanism relies on metaphysical being 
and postmetaphysics relies on multiple interpretations or manifestations 
of being. In other words, the human’s being grounds both philosophical 
perspectives. Although postmetaphysics allows for a capacious under-
standing of the human and Being, it still posits being universally as it con-
cerns freedom; no entity is without it, even if it manifests differently, or 
as difference, if we follow Deleuze. This is to suggest that both discourses 
proceed as if the question of being has been settled and that we no longer 
need to return to it — the question, indeed, has been elided in critical dis-
courses concerning blackness. Ontological Terror seeks to put the ques-
tion back in its proper place: at the center of any discourse about Being. 
Ontological Terror meditates on this (non)relation between blackness 
and Being by arguing that black being incarnates metaphysical nothing, 
the terror of metaphysics, in an antiblack world. Blacks, then, have func-
tion but not Being — the function of black(ness) is to give form to a ter-
rifying formlessness (nothing). Being claims function as its property (all 
functions rely on Being, according to this logic, for philosophical pre-
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sentation), but the aim of black nihilism is to expose the unbridgeable 
rift between Being and function for blackness. The puzzle of blackness, 
then, is that it functions in an antiblack world without being — much like 
“nothing” functions philosophically without our metaphysical under-
standing of being, an extraordinary mystery. Put differently, metaphysics 
is obsessed with both blackness and nothing, and the two become syn-
onyms for that which ruptures metaphysical organization and form. The 
Negro is black because the Negro must assume the function of nothing 
in a metaphysical world. The world needs this labor. This obsession, how-
ever, also transforms into hatred, since nothing is incorrigible — it shat-
ters ontological ground and security. Nothing terrifies metaphysics, and 
metaphysics attempts to dominate it by turning nothing into an object of 
knowledge, something it can dominate, analyze, calculate, and schema-
tize. When I speak of function, I mean the projection of nothing’s terror 
onto black(ness) as a strategy of metaphysics’ will to power. How, then, 
does metaphysics dominate nothing? By objectifying nothing through 
the black Negro. 
In this analysis, metaphysics can never provide freedom or humanity 
for blacks, since it is the objectification, domination, and extermination 
of blacks that keep the metaphysical world intact. Metaphysics uses blacks 
to maintain a sense of security and to sustain the fantasy of triumph — the 
triumph over the nothing that limits human freedom. Without blacks, I 
argue, nothing’s terror debilitates metaphysical procedures, epistemolo-
gies, boundaries, and institutions. Black freedom, then, would constitute 
a form of world destruction, and this is precisely why humanism has failed 
to accomplish its romantic goals of equality, justice, and recognition. In 
short, black humanism has neglected the relationship between black(ness) 
and nothing in its yearning for belonging, acceptance, and freedom. The 
Negro was invented to fulfill this function for metaphysics, and the hu-
manist dream of transforming invention into human being is continu-
ally deferred (because it is impossible). Ontological Terror challenges the 
claim that blacks are human and can ground existence in the same being 
of the human. I argue that blacks are introduced into the metaphysical 
world as available equipment in human form. 
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METAPHYSICS, HEIDEGGER, AND DESTRUKTION 
Black thinking, then, must return to the question of Being and the relation 
between this question and the antiblack violence sustaining the world. It is 
my contention that black thinking is given a tremendous task: to approach 
the ontological abyss and the metaphysical violence sustaining the world. 
Ontological Terror suggests that black thinking cannot be overcome — 
we will never reach the end of black thinking or its culmination, unlike 
the end of philosophy describing postmetaphysical enterprises.4 In other 
words, postmetaphysics has broached the question of being and has com-
menced the destruction [Destruktion] of the metaphysical infrastructure, 
which systemically forgets being. Postmetaphysics, then, is a project of 
remnants, as Santiago Zabala suggests. After we have used hermeneutics, 
deconstruction, rhizomes, and mathematical sets to devastate metaphys-
ics, we are left with ontological rubble — a trace of metaphysics and a re-
constructed being. Postmetaphysics, then, must ask, “How is it going with 
Being?” Or what is the state of Being in this contemporary moment, and 
how does the world remain open to Being’s unfolding and happening (as 
well as its withdrawal and abandoning of Dasein)? “How is it going with 
Being?” is the fundamental question of our era, according to postmeta-
physics; only the twisting and severe rearranging [verwunden] of meta-
physics can usher this question into the world.
Both metaphysics and postmetaphysics, however, have forgotten the Ne-
gro, just as they have forgotten Being — to remember Being one must also re-
member the Negro. The Negro Question and the Question of Being are in-
tertwined. Postmetaphysical enterprises reach a limit in destruction, since 
it is the Negro that sustains metaphysics and enables the forgetting of Be-
ing (i.e., metaphysics can forget Being because it uses the Negro to project 
nothing’s terror and forget Being). In a sense, the global use of the Negro 
fulfills the ontological function of forgetting Being’s terror, majesty, and 
incorrigibility. The consequence of this is that as long as postmetaphysical 
enterprises leave the Negro unattended in their thinking, it inadvertently 
sustains metaphysical pain and violence. This, I argue, is why we will never 
overcome [überwunden] metaphysics because the world cannot overcome 
the Negro — the world needs the Negro, even as the world despises it. 
This is, of course, a Heideggerian approach to the thinking of Being 
and Nothing. More than any other philosopher, Heidegger pursued meta-
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physical violence and the question of Being relentlessly, and for this rea-
son I find his philosophy indispensable and necessary. Ontological Terror 
thinks with and against Heidegger, since I believe Heidegger’s destruc-
tion of metaphysics can assist black studies in the tremendous task of 
thinking Being and blackness, as Grant Farred has suggested.5 Heidegger’s 
Destruktion covers a wide range of philosophical issues, and it is not my 
objective to address all of these complexities; my interest is the relation 
between Heidegger’s critique of metaphysical violence, available equip-
ment, and the task of remembering as it concerns blackness. What I hope 
to broach in this book, with all the aporias such as broaching encounters, 
is that the Negro is the missing element in Heidegger’s thinking (as well as 
in that of those postmetaphysicians indebted to Heidegger, such as Jean- 
Luc Nancy, Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, and Gianni Vattimo). If, as 
we learn in Being and Time, Dasein uses tools to experience its thrown- 
ness in the world (establishing its facticity) and to develop its unique proj-
ect oriented toward the future (projectionality), the Negro — as commod-
ity, object, slave, putative backdrop, prisoner, refugee, and corpse — is the 
quintessential tool Dasein uses. The use of the Negro metaphysically and 
ontologically, as a tool, is what black thinking is tasked with pursuing. 
Thus, black thinking (and postmetaphysics) must ask the unasked ques-
tion “How is it going with black being?” Without broaching this question, 
all forms of destruction are just reconstitutions, since the world continues 
to use the Negro (as black and nothing) to forget Being and the sadistic 
pleasure of this forgetfulness. 
I shared this argument with a good friend at a conference, and he po-
litely whispered to me, “You know Heidegger was sympathetic to Na-
zism, don’t you?” I immediately whispered back, “Even more reason for 
black studies to read and engage him!” Heidegger might well be the most 
influential philosopher of the twentieth century, since the question of 
Being resides at the crux of every philosophical enterprise, and he raised 
this question relentlessly. For me, this means that we cannot escape 
Heidegger; his Destruktion of Being has left its trace on all our think-
ing — whether we admit it or not. We cannot escape Heidegger because we 
cannot escape the question of Being. If the trace of Heidegger has left an 
indelible impression, despite the attempts to purge him/his thought, con-
temporary thinking still bears the abhorrent, the unforgivable, the disas-
ter, the devastation. The question, then, is not just whether Heidegger was 
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a Nazi (or antiblack for my purposes), but what his critique of metaphysics 
can teach us about systemic violence and devastation.6 Turning a blind 
eye to Heidegger will not resolve anything, although affect might make 
us feel ethically enlightened. Confronting/engaging Heidegger, I argue, 
helps us understand the relation between black suffering and metaphys-
ics, slavery and objectification, antiblackness and forgetfulness, thinking 
and remembering. (Heidegger’s philosophy, in many ways, can be read as an 
allegory of antiblackness and black suffering — the metaphysical violence 
of the transatlantic slave trade.)7 To broach the insatiable question “Why 
are blacks continually injured, degraded, pulverized, and killed?” would 
require, then, an understanding of metaphysical violence and pain — since 
black suffering is metaphysical violence, the violence of schematization, 
objectification, and calculative thinking Heidegger spent his entire pro-
fessional career exposing. Perhaps Heidegger was really talking about 
black(ness) and black suffering all along. 
BLACK NIHILISM AND ANTIBLACKNESS 
A mentor once asked me a terrifying question: why are blacks hated all 
over the world? Stunned, I remained silent, but the question remained 
with me. This book, in many ways, is a return to my mentor’s question, a 
question that might lack any sufficient answer, but a question that must 
be presented nonetheless. We can call this hatred antiblackness: an ac-
cretion of practices, knowledge systems, and institutions designed to im-
pose nothing onto blackness and the unending domination/eradication 
of black presence as nothing incarnated. Put differently, antiblackness is 
anti- nothing. What is hated about blacks is this nothing, the ontologi-
cal terror, they must embody for the metaphysical world. Every lynching, 
castration, rape, shooting, and murder of blacks is an engagement with 
this nothing and the fantasy that nothing can be dominated once and for 
all. Therefore, unlike Heidegger, nothing is not a cause for celebration in 
my analysis; it is the source of terror, violence, and domination for blacks. 
Heideggerian anxiety transforms into antiblack violence when Dasein 
flees the anxiety nothing stimulates and projects it as terror onto blacks. 
The unfolding of Being for Dasein, through the aperture of nothing, is 
predicated on the imposition of nothing’s terror onto blacks. This is why, 
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I argue, the world needs blacks, even as it tries to eliminate them (this is 
the tension between necessity and hatred). 
Ontological Terror insists, then, that Heidegger’s Introduction to Meta-
physics, for example, be read to understand the antiblack strategies the 
world employs to avoid nothing (as Heidegger says, “The world wants 
to know nothing of nothing”) and its terror — how Dasein deals with its 
“own oppression by its own nothingness,” as Oren Ben- Dor might call it.8 
Dasein’s freedom is contingent on avoiding this nothing metaphysically — 
even though Heidegger would insist that nothing provides the opening 
for a new thinking about Being. Thus, calculative thinking, as I will ar-
gue in chapter 3, is a strategy for imposing nothing onto blacks. In un-
derstanding the particular way metaphysics oppresses, we get a better 
understanding of antiblackness as metaphysics. Antiblackness provides 
the instruments and framework for binary thinking, the thinking of being 
as presence (e.g., the obsession with physicality and skin complexion), the 
objectification of Being (one only needs to think of slave ledgers as the 
extremity of Heidegger’s metaphysical nightmare, for example), and tech-
nocratic oppression (e.g., racial surveillance, police warfare equipment). 
The aim of postmetaphysicians, then, is to weaken metaphysics; this is 
the nihilistic strategy of the enterprise — to first weaken philosophy and 
its rigid foundations. Nihilism is important because it undermines the 
metaphysics, which sustains extreme forms of violence and destruction. 
But it reaches its limit when antiblackness is left unchecked. 
The Italian nihilist Gianni Vattimo has revived and developed the 
philosophical tradition of nihilism in gravid ways that speak to contem-
porary threats of annihilation and destruction. His project is important 
because it permutes the thought of Nietzsche and Heidegger, and in do-
ing so, it not only offers an important critique of modernity but also puts 
this critique in the service of a politico- philosophical imagination — an 
imagination that conceives of the weakening of metaphysical Being (ni-
hilism) as the solution to the rationalization and fracturing of humanity 
(the source of modern suffering or pain). In short, this project attempts 
to restore dignity, individuality, and freedom to society by remembering 
Being (proper Being, not metaphysical Being) and allowing for the neces-
sary contextualization and historicization of Being as event.
In The End of Modernity (1988) and Nihilism and Emancipation (2004), 
Vattimo reads Heidegger’s destruction of ontology as a philosophical com-
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plement to Nietzsche’s declaration of the death of God. Both Nietzsche 
and Heidegger offer trenchant critiques of metaphysics, and by reading 
them together, he fills in certain gaps — in particular, the relationship be-
tween metaphysics and social rationalization, foundations and ontology, 
and sociological philosophy and thinking itself. We can understand both 
Vattimo’s and Heidegger’s projects as the attempt to capture the relation-
ship between what we might call metaphysical Being (fraudulent Being as 
object) and Being (in its proper contextualized sense). This relationship, 
indeed, has been particularly violent and has produced various forms of 
suffering. This suffering is the essence of metaphysics, or what Vattimo 
would call “pain,” and it is sustained through the will to power, violence 
(e.g., physical, psychic, spiritual, and philosophical), and the destruction 
of liberty. The metaphysical tradition has reduced Being (an event that 
structures historical reality and possibility itself) to an object, and this 
objectification of Being is accomplished through the instruments of sci-
ence and schematization. The result of this process is that Being is for-
gotten; the grand aperture that has provided the condition for relation-
ality for many epochs is now reified as a static presence, a presence to 
be possessed and analyzed. In this sense, we lose the grandeur of Being 
and confuse it for being, the particularity of a certain epoch. The nihil-
ist, then, must overcome the oblivion of Being through the weakening of 
metaphysical Being (what Vattimo will call “weak thought”). Vattimo re-
covers Heidegger’s term Verwundung (distorting acceptance, resignation, 
or twisting) as a strategy to weaken metaphysical Being, since the nihilist 
can never truly destroy metaphysics or completely overcome it (überwun-
den). This strategy of twisting and distorting metaphysics helps us to re- 
member and re- collect [andenken] the grandeur of Being (Ge- Schick as 
the ultimate gathering of the various epochal presentations of being)9 and 
to place metaphysical Being back in its proper place as a particular man-
ifestation of this great historical process. Only by inserting our present 
signification of Being into the grand gathering of Being (Ge- Shick) can we 
properly contextualize our own epoch — the epoch of social rationaliza-
tion, technocracy, metaphysical domination.10
For the black nihilist, however, the question is this: will the dissolu-
tion of metaphysical Being that Vattimo and Heidegger advance eliminate 
antiblack violence and redress black suffering? What would freedom en-
tail for black objects (as distinct from the human that grounds Vattimo’s 
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project)? Antiblackness becomes somewhat of an unacknowledged inter-
locutor for Vattimo: “Philosophy follows paths that are not insulated or 
cut off from the social and political transformations of the West (since the 
end of metaphysics is unthinkable without the end of colonialism and Eu-
rocentrism) and ‘discovers’ that the meaning of the history of modernity 
is not progress toward a final perfection characterized by fullness, total 
transparency, and the presence finally realized of the essence of man and 
the world.”11
Vattimo adumbrates a relationship between metaphysics and colonial-
ism/ Eurocentrism that renders them coterminous. If, as Vattimo argues, 
“the end of metaphysics is unthinkable without the end of colonialism and 
Eurocentrism” — which I will suggest are varieties of antiblack violence — 
then traditional nihilism must advance an escape from antiblackness to 
accomplish its agenda. Furthermore, if philosophy follows paths created 
by sociopolitical realities, then we must talk about antiblackness not just 
as a violent political formation but also as a philosophical orientation. 
The social rationalization, loss of individuality, economic expansionism, 
and technocratic domination that both Vattimo and Heidegger analyze 
actually depend on antiblackness.
Ontological Terror opens a path of black nihilistic inquiries. The objec-
tive, here, is to trouble the ontological foundations of both postmetaphys-
ical and black humanist discourses. In chapter 1, I argue that the question 
of black being constitutes a proper metaphysical question, and this ques-
tioning leads us into the abyss of ontology: blackness lacks Being (which 
is why we write being under erasure in relation to black). Unlike human-
ists and postmetaphysicians, I argue that Being is not universal or appli-
cable to blacks. Now, some might offer the rejoinder that everything has 
Being — even an object.12 It is here that I will introduce a distinction be-
tween ontology and existence, one that Fanon insisted in Black Skin, White 
Masks. Blacks have an existence in an antiblack world, but ontology does 
not explain this existence, as Fanon argued. Furthermore, we might also 
gain clarity from Heidegger’s rereading of Greek philosophy. He suggests: 
For the Greeks “Being” says constancy in a twofold sense:
1. Standing- in- itself as arising and standing forth (phusis)
2. But, as such, “constantly” that is, enduringly, abiding (ousia)
Not- to- be accordingly, means to step out of constancy that has stood- 
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forth in itself; existasthai — “existence,” “to exist,” means, for the 
Greeks, precisely not- to- be. The thoughtlessness and vapidity with 
which one uses the words “existence” and “to exist” as designators for 
Being offer fresh evidence of our alienation from being and from an 
originally powerful and definitive interpretation of it.13
My presentation of black existence, then, reworks this Greek understand-
ing of existence as non- being (or more precisely “not- to- be”), according 
to Heidegger (since this Greek presentation of the human’s being, I will 
argue, has already excluded the Hottentot, the black thing). To allow Be-
ing’s unfolding, or to be, is the melding of standing- forth and abiding, 
or enduring, such standing. In an antiblack world, such standing forth, 
or emerging/becoming, is obliterated, and this is what we will call the 
“metaphysical holocaust” — the systematic concealment, descent, and 
withholding of blackness through technologies of terror, violence, and 
abjection. To exist, as black, is to inhabit a world through permanent 
“falling” (in the Greek ptosis and enklisis). David Marriott might describe 
this as an interminable fall, in which 
there is neither event nor becoming; indeed the falling figures [black 
being] do not come to their end, nor is there any possibility of destina-
tion . . . these falls are unending, and precisely because they fall into 
nothing . . . these falls inaugurate nothing but waiting, a sort of non-
event, an event of nothing which both calls for and annuls repetition.14
To be, according to Heidegger, is to become, to emerge and move within 
Being- as-event. But what happens when such becoming does not occur? 
When the event of Being does not stimulate a productive anxiety of actu-
alization, but gets caught in a repetition of event- less demise and nothing-
ness? To inhabit such a condition is to exist as perpetual falling, without 
standing- forth, without Being. This, then, is the devastation of the meta-
physical holocaust: black being never becomes, or stands forth, but exists 
in concealment, falling, and inconsistency. When I say, then, that blacks 
lack being but have existence, I mean that they inhabit the world in con-
cealment and non- movement (this is the condition of objects, despite the 
work of object-oriented ontologists who project humanism onto objects). 
Thus, the task of black thinking is to limn the devastating distinction be-
tween “existence” (inhabitation) and “being.” 
14 introDuction
What is black existence without Being? This is the question black 
thought orbits — the question that emerges through urgency, devasta-
tion, or the declaration “black lives matter.”15 It is a question that, per-
haps, cannot be answered adequately — or any answer resides outside the 
world, in an unimaginable time/space horizon. My objective, then, is to 
build a way into an abyss — without recourse to the metaphysical finality- 
teleology of an answer. (Even the term existence is inadequate to describe 
what is black being, as it still retains metaphysical resonance.) The lack of 
language and grammar to describe what preconditions Being makes the 
enterprise a difficult one — inevitably encountering explanatory impasse. 
We, however, attempt to undermine metaphysics as we deploy it. 
The concept “nothing” provides a paradigmatic frame for describing 
this black thing without ontology. For nothing constitutes a mystery or 
ontological exception. We cannot reduce it to Being completely, but it is 
something outside metaphysical ontology (and at its very core), and, at the 
same time, it is what enables Being (humans experience Beings unfold-
ing through the anxiety nothing presents in death or the breakdown of 
symbolic functions/meaning). What is nothing? This metaphysical ques-
tion undermines itself from its very deployment, since it debilitates ev-
ery copula formulation. Heidegger argued that the metaphysical copula 
formulation (what is) provided the frame for our metaphysical domina-
tion of Being, but nothing is precisely what lacks isness, by providing it 
with its condition of possibility. To claim, as I do throughout this book, 
that black being is nothing is to read the ontological puzzle of blackness 
(the unanswerable copula query) through the puzzle of nothing. There is 
no coincidence, then, when philosopher David Alain or Afro- pessimist 
scholars argue that black is nothing. Blacks are the nothing of ontology 
and do not have being like those beings for whom the ontological ques-
tion is an issue (i.e., human being). In chapter 1, I read Hortense Spillers, 
Frantz Fanon, Sylvia Wynter, Ronald Judy, and Nahum Chandler through 
and against Heidegger to present this ontological puzzle. Even though it 
can never be answered apodictically, since this would mean the death of 
the world, my presentation will lead to more questions, complications, 
impasses, and silences; this is unavoidable when broaching the question 
of black being. Philosophy lacks a grammar and a tradition to explain ac-
curately the Negro Question. Thus, Ontological Terror wrestles or tarries 
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with critical traditions designed to exclude black(ness), including, most 
of all, Being and ontology. 
PARADIGM, HISTORY, AND THE FREE BLACK
The term free black carries tension within its structure; it brings two 
disparate grammars into collusion and produces an ontological catastro-
phe. The term black is precisely the puzzle, the great abyss, of something 
outside the precincts of ontology. It is a metaphysical invention, void of 
Being, for the purpose of securing Being for the human. It has something 
like existence but no recourse to the unfolding of Being or the revela-
tion of its withdrawal. It is nothing — the nonhuman, equipment, and the 
mysterious. Freedom, however, is the site of this unfolding for the hu-
man; it is the condition of caring for Being and embracing its withdrawal 
and unfolding.16 Freedom, in other words, is a (non)relation to Being for 
Dasein — it propels its project (projectionality) into the world. Freedom 
is ontological. As Heidegger insisted in his critique of Kantian freedom 
(metaphysical causality), “The question concerning the essence of human 
freedom is the fundamental question of philosophy, in which is rooted 
even the question of being . . . freedom is the condition of the possibility 
of the manifestness of the being of beings, of understanding of being.”17 
Humanism often conflates freedom with liberty, rights, and emancipa-
tion, but this conflation undermines the ontological ground, which makes 
any claim to freedom possible. In other words, reducing freedom to polit-
ical, social, or legal conceptions leaves the question of being unattended. 
Freedom exists for Being — it enables the manifestation of Being through 
Dasein. Our metaphysical notions of freedom also reduce antiblackness 
to social, political, and legal understandings, and we miss the ontological 
function of antiblackness — to deny the ontological ground of freedom 
by severing the (non)relation between blackness and Being. What I am 
suggesting is that our metaphysical conceptions of freedom neglect the 
ontological horrors of antiblackness by assuming freedom can be attained 
through political, social, or legal action. This is a humanist fantasy, one 
that masks subjection in emancipatory rhetoric.18
“Free black,” then, stages an impossible encounter: between the on-
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tological (non)relation and the mysterious abyss of nothing. Put differ-
ently, it expresses a Hegelian desire of synthesis between “two warring 
ideas,” as Dubois might call it. We might, then, envision the encounter 
as a form of war, an ontological disaster from which various forms of 
antiblack violence emerge. “Free Black” is a grammatical and syntactical 
battlefield upon which dead bodies — Trayvon Martin, Renisha McBride, 
Michael Brown, among countless others — are displayed. We can also call 
this disaster the “metaphysical holocaust,” as Frantz Fanon describes it. 
It is the systemic and relentless wiping out of black cosmologies, histo-
ries, and frames of reference/orientation. The metaphysical holocaust is 
violence without end, violence constitutive of a metaphysical world. It is 
a “violence that continuously repositions the Black as a void of histori-
cal movement,” as Frank Wilderson describes it.19 This void and stasis of 
temporal linearity is precisely the nothing blacks incarnate. The term free 
black, then, is the syntactical reflection of the metaphysical holocaust, the 
violence between the terms free and black that is unresolvable. 
Throughout this book, I use the term free black in two ways: (1) as a 
philosophical concept capturing the continuous metaphysical violence 
between black being and human being/ontometaphysics and (2) as a par-
ticular historical figure that allegorizes metaphysical violence. Thus, the 
free black here is both philosophical allegory and historical figure. But, 
the problematic that the latter presents (i.e., the free black as historical 
figure) is that such a figure does not exist. It is impossible for any black to 
be free in an antiblack world. 
The term free black is a misnomer for describing a historical condition, 
or particularity, of blackness, since the ontological relation is severed. It is 
precisely this misnomer, a taxonomic necessity of sorts for historiography 
and legal studies, that is of interest to me. The struggles and challenges 
that free blacks experienced in antebellum society were really ontological 
problems. The free black presents or forces confrontation with the Negro 
Question. It is through the free black that the Negro Question emerges 
with ferocity. Can black “things” become free? What is the status of such 
beings? These questions are not merely legal questions or questions of 
legal status, but primarily ontological questions, I argue. The debates con-
cerning free black citizenship were deceptive in that antebellum society 
mobilized them to answer the ontological question, “How is it going with 
black being?” Has the metaphysical world evolved such that blacks can 
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ground existence, indisputably, in the being of the human? Thus, it made 
little difference whether one was born free, received the “gift” of freedom 
from a master, purchased freedom, resided in the North or South; the 
ontological question, the Negro Question, remained. The intransigence 
of the question and its continuity across diverse space and temporalities 
is what concerns me. For we might look to the historical figure of the free 
black to understand the birth of the proper metaphysical question, since 
society could not resolve the tension between human freedom and black 
objects. As Maurice S. Lee suggests, philosophical perspectives on black-
ness and metaphysics were articulated in many ways before the Civil War 
(in particular the literary form for him).20 My objective here is to read the 
Negro Question as a philosophical site of anxiety, terror, and metaphys-
ical sensibilities. 
Although engaging the historiographical figure “free black” (the in-
vention of the historiographer), this book is not intended to contribute to 
historiography; rather, my objective is to question the ontological ground 
or metaphysical infrastructure upon which such historiographies pro-
ceed.21 Antebellum free- black historiography is rich with archival discov-
eries, and to this my research is indebted. But we reach a problem with 
historical narration, or what the historiographer does with the archival 
material retrieved. Historiographical narration is not a philosophically 
neutral enterprise; it is loaded with philosophical presumptions, primar-
ily metaphysical humanism. As Possenti asserts, “it is precisely meta-
physics that keeps watch over history; not because it engulfs or digests 
history as irrelevant, but because it can direct history toward its goal.”22 
It often proceeds without broaching the ontological question — or taking 
the historian Ira Berlin’s phrase slaves without masters seriously.23 When 
historian Dr. John Hope Franklin remarks, “The free negro as a subject for 
historical treatment abounds in elusive and difficult problems,” I under-
stand these problems not just as archival but also as an inherent problem 
of narrating within a humanist framework.24 The research acknowledges 
tension between blackness and freedom (freedom often described as a set 
of liberties and rights, not an ontological position) but resolves this ten-
sion into a synthesis of metaphysical humanism — that is, blacks are still 
human, even though they experience captivity and systemic discrimina-
tion. What ground enables the historiographer to make such a claim or 
presume apodictically this black humanity? The research carries a philos-
18 introDuction
ophy of universal humanism into its reading and narration practices. His-
toriography reinforces philosophical humanism. It is precisely these pre-
sumptions that Ontological Terror intends to unravel. I bring the Negro 
Question to historiography to suggest that the metaphysical holocaust 
destabilizes such humanism.25 We need to imagine an antimetaphysical 
historiography (a thinking against metaphysics), one that proceeds from 
the puzzle of black being and confronts the ontometaphysical question. 
Thus, my objective in this book is to introduce an ontological compli-
cation that exceeds, but also engenders discriminatory law (mandatory 
emigration laws in Southern states, for example), surveillance, and phys-
ical brutality (the free black whipped just like the slave) of free blacks. 
These antiblack tactics have been well documented, as it concerns the 
disciplining and subordination of free blacks. What has been neglected, 
however, is an analysis of what exactly happens to blacks once emanci-
pated, or free — the transubstantiation between property and something 
else. Did the black become a human once free? If we answer in the affir-
mative, does the freedom paper undermine the being of the human, given 
that without it, such claim to humanity cannot be sustained? Are “mas-
terless slaves,” as free blacks have been called, still property — property 
of whom? What determines the distinction between human masters and 
masterless slaves? Is emancipation ontological creation, and what enables 
the malleability of black being? These questions, questions still remain-
ing, build a path into a discussion of ontological complications the free 
black presents. Ontological Terror broaches these questions to illumine 
something more sinister about the condition of black being, a condition 
that impacts all blacks in an antiblack world, not just the antebellum free 
black. The historical singularity of free blacks knots together a deep phil-
osophical conflict between Being, blackness, and freedom — it is an ex-
traordinary paradigm for black thinking. My hope is that historians, phi-
losophers, and theorists will consider the free black, much more than an 
anomalous population, a speculative frame within which the foundations 
of humanism and metaphysics in general are challenged. 
Furthermore, my concern is not to fetishize agency or will. It is cer-
tainly the case that those beings we call “free blacks” experienced the 
world through bonds, courage, despair, friendship, and hope. These can-
not be denied, but I do not think these render these beings human or an-
swer the metaphysical question in the affirmative. No matter the bond, 
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the act of courage, the indefatigable fortitude, or the institutions estab-
lished, the metaphysical holocaust remains consistent. No political action 
has or ever will end it — it is necessary for the world. Thus, if we bundle 
certain capacities into something we call “agency,” this bundle does not 
undermine metaphysical violence or the exclusion of blackness from Be-
ing. The existence that provides the condition for something we might 
call “agency” is not human ontology and not freedom. Our desperation 
to incorporate blacks into a narrative of humanistic heroism often results 
in a disavowal of the problem of ontology, which engenders the condition 
against which the courageous fight in the first place. Black thinking, then, 
must explore what existence without Being entails. Free blacks do not 
inhabit the world in the way the human does — historiography proceeds 
as if the problem of existence has been resolved. It has not.26 My focus, 
here, will be on the condition of the metaphysical holocaust or its man-
ifestations and not on individual narratives of free blacks. That work is 
certainly important, too, but in this project I want to read the archive to 
understand an ontological condition of execration. 
Ontological Terror confronts both the ontological puzzle (metaphysi-
cal holocaust) and the historical figure we call “free black” through a par-
adigmatic approach. In The Signature of All Things, Agamben describes 
the paradigm as not obeying
the logic of the metaphorical transfer of meaning but the analogical 
logic of the example. Here we are not dealing with a signifier that is 
extended to designate heterogeneous phenomena by virtue of the same 
semantic structure; more akin to allegory than to metaphor, the para-
digm is a singular case that is isolated from its context only insofar as, 
by exhibiting its own singularity, it makes intelligible a new ensemble, 
whose homogeneity it itself constitutes. That is to say, to give an ex-
ample is a complex act which supposes that the term functioning as a 
paradigm is deactivated from its normal use, not in order to be moved 
into another context, but on the contrary, to present the canon — the 
rule — of that use, which can not be shown in any other way.27
A paradigmatic approach uses the structure of allegory — juxtaposing 
two singularities — for the purpose of illumining a new ensemble of re-
lations, or what we can call “paradigm.” The singularity must be deacti-
vated, meaning it must be momentarily extracted from its usual context 
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and conceptualized in another way. The deactivation is necessary because 
we can only understand or illumine the paradigm by extracting, deacti-
vating, and juxtaposing the singularity, or example. It is a paradoxical fig-
ure: both example and other than example. Ontological Terror approaches 
the problem of black as nothing through a paradigmatic juxtaposing of the 
free black and the critique of metaphysical violence Heidegger and others 
(including Agamben and Jean- Luc Nancy) present. Since nothing is also 
a paradox, both outside Being and as an opening for Being, one could 
only approach it through a set of allegories. In other words, we can never 
fully understand nothing with our metaphysical instruments, even with 
the most rigorous destructive or deconstructive procedure — something 
of nothing always escapes. Ontological Terror deactivates the antebellum 
free black (and the general concept free black) to set it alongside meta-
physical violence to illumine the paradigm of black nothingness or on-
tological terror. The free black, then, serves as a historical allegory for 
metaphysical violence, and metaphysical violence serves as an allegory for 
the tension between free and black that the historical figure free black ex-
periences. My objective is not to rob or neglect the singularity of the free 
black — although the category itself is under suspicion — but to demon-
strate how this singularity is much more than traditionally thought by 
historians. 
Given this, my objective in Ontological Terror is also to address what 
I consider a form of philosophical antiblackness: the neglect of black ar-
chives. Rarely, if ever, do nihilistic or postmetaphysical philosophers engage 
black archives. A philosophy of history or a philosophical anthropology 
very often proceeds with an archive (i.e., Homo sacer, Nazi concentration 
camp, Greek polis) to illumine a paradigm. The choice of archive is also 
a philosophical statement; it reflects what body of knowledge is worthy 
of philosophical examination and what experiences contribute more to 
thinking than just singularity. Black archives are often reduced to mere 
singularity, perhaps an interesting singularity, but never taken up para-
digmatically. Or as Alexander Weheliye cogently states the problem, there 
is “a broader tendency in which theoretical formulations by white Euro-
pean thinkers are granted conceptual carte blanche, while those uttered 
from the view point of minority discourse that speak to the same ques-
tions are almost exclusively relegated to the jurisdiction of ethnographic 
locality.”28 As distinguished philosopher Tommy Curry has argued, “Tra-
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ditionally, in philosophy, the only limitation of philosophical concepts is 
the extent to which the conceptualize- er imagines; however, when the 
task placed before whites entails a philosophical encounter with the real-
ities of Blacks, philosophy is suddenly limited — incarcerated by the white 
imagination’s inability to confront its corporeal reflection.”29 Ontological 
Terror confronts philosophy’s vapidity when confronted with blackness. 
Furthermore, the fact that post- metaphysics claims to destroy metaphys-
ics, but leaves the triumph of metaphysics unattended (antiblack violence) 
is disturbing and befuddling (especially when Vattimo claims that de-
stroying metaphysics is unthinkable without addressing Euro- centrism). 
What this reveals to me is that antiblackness is a juggernaut that must be 
fought on many battlefields — including philosophical formations. 
Thus, I read postmetaphysics alongside the free black archives (such 
as The African Repository, freedom papers, and The Census of 1840) in 
order to illumine the philosophical richness of the black experience in 
an antiblack world. 
ITINERARY 
The book builds upon the arguments that blacks incarnate nothing in a 
metaphysical world and that the world is both fascinated with this noth-
ing and terrified of it. Antiblack violence is violence against nothing, the 
nothing that unsettles the human because it can never be captured and 
dominated. Blacks, then, allow the human to engage in a fantasy — the 
domination of nothing. By projecting this nothing as terror onto blacks, 
the human seeks to dominate nothing by dominating black being, to erad-
icate nothing by eradicating black being. The free black, as the conceptual/ 
embodied intersection between nothing and blackness, is absolutely es-
sential to a metaphysical world desperate to avoid the terror of nothing. 
The book proceeds by engaging the projection and terror of this nothing. 
As I have mentioned before, the field of free black historiography is ca-
pacious, and there are numerous issues to investigate. I proceed, here, 
by choosing four fields of inquiry, in which the free black presents on-
tometaphysical problems: philosophy, law, science/math, and visuality. I 
chose these fields to demonstrate what Foucault might call a polymor-
phous relation.30 By this, I mean that philosophy, law, science/math, and 
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visuality constitute intersecting vectors of terror for black being — each 
producing and sustaining the destruction of black being in its own way, 
but accomplishing the same objective (i.e., severing of the flesh or the 
metaphysical holocaust). I hope to demonstrate that ontological terror 
unites these diverse fields, and the proper metaphysical question (i.e., 
“What is black being?/How is it going with black being?”) constitutes the 
vehicle of movement between the fields. Ultimately, I suggest that these 
fields expose a deep problem: given the failure of postmetaphysics to twist 
[verwunden] antiblackness severely and black humanism’s romance with 
metaphysical schemas of humanity and freedom, black thinking can only 
ask a metaphysical question, the question that remains after destruction. 
In chapter 1, “The Question of Black Being,” I present the Negro Ques-
tion as what Heidegger would call a “proper metaphysical question.” The 
aim is to understand how the problem of metaphysical blackness and the 
concept of nothing converge on the Negro as a way of resolving the ten-
sion. I read Hortense Spillers, in particular, as an ontometaphysician who 
describes metaphysical violence as the “severing of the flesh.” In reading 
Spillers through and against Heidegger, I intend to show how the trans-
atlantic slave trade realized the horror Heidegger dreaded and sought to 
destroy in Introduction to Metaphysics, Being and Time, and The Question 
Concerning Technology, among others. But Spillers also questions the pro-
cess of Destruktion, I argue, because no such twisting, or reconfiguring, 
of metaphysics is possible for blackness — the ontological relation is sev-
ered permanently — no recourse to Being is possible.
In chapter 2, “Outlawing,” I present two notions of law: the Law of Being 
(the law of abandonment determining the relation between the human 
and Being) and the being of law (the metaphysical instantiation of law 
as rights, amendments, judicial opinions, legislations). Building off post-
metaphysical work, I argue that the being of law is subordinate or sub-
ject to the Law of Being — ontic distortion conceals this fact. Turning to 
Dred Scott, freedom papers, and emancipation, I suggest that the legal 
problems free blacks presented to antebellum society were not merely 
problems for the being of law (the restriction of rights, liberties) but a 
deeper problem with the Law of Being (the nonrelation between blackness 
and Being). In other words, the reification of black being in materiality 
(freedom papers), the terroristic space of emancipation, the uncertainty 
of what free black constituted legally were all symptoms of ungrounded 
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black being. The being of law merely reflects the exclusion of blacks from 
Being and into a space of ontological terror.
In chapter 3, “Scientific Horror,” I think through the way scientific 
and mathematical thinking relies on blacks to explore nothing. It is both 
a horror and a fascination and perhaps the only way science can contend 
with nothing. The chapter reads the writing of Samuel Cartwright, Ben-
jamin Rush, and the Census of 1840 as philosophical discourses hiding 
behind epidemiology, vital statistics, and neurology. The aim is to strip 
through scientific presentations to expose the metaphysical obsession 
with blackness as nothing. 
In chapter 4, “Catachrestic Fantasies,” I argue that nothing is visual-
ized through fantasies and catachresis (the lack of a proper referent), thus 
enabling boundless fantasizing about blacks. I turn to illustrated journal-
ism and the artwork of Edward Clay as visualizations of black as noth-
ing. The question “What is black being?” is answered in different ways 
through different illustrations. I suggest that philosophy relies on fantasy 
to make philosophical statements when it reaches its limits of rationality 
and proofs. Because the free black is nothing, one can only approach this 
philosophical puzzle with fantasies. I turn to Lacanian psychoanalysis be-
cause it provides a frame for understanding fantasy, nothing, and projec-
tion in a way I think is productive. The aim is to think of psychoanalytic 
theory allegorically as it relates to black being. I also find it productive 
in thinking about the unconscious fantasies of humans and the way that 
black- as- nothing centers these fantasies. In short, the chapter is about 
human fantasizing of a catachrestic entity through illustrated journalism. 
The coda, “Adieu to the Human,” argues that the metaphysical holo-
caust and its question are still with us. Police shootings, routinized hu-
miliation, and disenfranchisement are symptoms of this unending war. 
Part of the aim, then, is to dethrone the human from its metaphysical 
pedestal, reject the human, and explore different ways of existing that 
are not predicated on Being and its humanism. This is the only way black 
thinking can grapple with existence without Being.
This book begins and ends with a question: “How is it going with black 
Being?” This structure reminds us that temporal linearity and narratives 
of progress are deceptive ontologically. Time rebounds upon itself in a 
space of ontological terror — there is only temporal circularity or black 
time, an abyss of time. I challenge linearity (the invention of metaphysics 
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and historiography) throughout this book by defying chronology (I, in-
deed, have an irreverence for it). Thus, I begin in one period and move to 
another and then back again, or I begin with the antebellum period and 
move to the Civil War and back again. This strategy, I hope, will demon-
strate that no matter the time period, the metaphysical question remains. 
Our obsession with chronology and linearity is no more than a humanist 
fantasy of resolution and movement, which I hope to unravel. I also reject 
the humanist fantasy (or narcissism) that anything humans have created 
can be changed. Some creations are no longer in the hands of humans, for 
they constitute a horizon, or field, upon which human existence itself de-
pends. Antiblackness is such a creation. Thus, chronology provides no re-
lief with its obsession with change concerning antiblackness. What many 
proponents of the agency thesis (i.e., we have power to change anything 
we create) are actually doing is comparing different forms of antiblack-
ness and neglecting the terror that antiblackness remains as a consistent 
variable, despite variations in form. Variations in antiblackness do not 
signal progress; rather, they are ontic distortions of the underlying onto-
logical problem — blacks lack Being. 
We can begin our paradigmatic investigation and end our introduc-
tion with a literary allegory, one demonstrative of ontological terror. In 
Edward P. Jones’s Pulitzer Prize – winning novel The Known World, we 
encounter ontological terror. 
The scene begins with Augustus, a free black man, returning home 
from a business transaction by wagon. Patroller Harvey Travis, the sym-
bol of the law, stops Augustus in a routine inspection of the wagon. Travis 
has stopped Augustus many times before and knows that Augustus is a 
free black and, as such, has the right to travel and the freedom of move-
ment. Travis demands Augustus’s freedom papers, although he’s read 
them many times and basically has them memorized. When Augustus in-
sists that it is his prerogative to travel as a free person, Travis sardonically 
replies, “You ain’t free less me and the law say you free.” Travis expresses 
animus about Augustus’s refusal to act obsequiously before white people, 
to assert a right he does not indeed possess. As Augustus continued to 
assert his freedom, Travis began to eat the freedom papers. Starting at the 
bottom right corners, he chewed and swallowed them. After eating the 
freedom papers, Travis mockingly retorted, “Thas what I think of your 
right to do anything you got a right to do.” Travis licked his fingers in sat-
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isfaction and wiped his mouth. “Right ain’t got nothing to do with it,” he 
said. “Best meal I’ve had in many Sundays.” 
Oden, one of Travis’s companions, laughed at him and said, “I wouldn’t 
want to be you in the morning when you have to shit that out.” Travis re-
sponded, “I don’t know. It might make for a smooth run off. Couldn’t be 
no worse than what collard greens do to me.” Darcey, a kidnapper of free 
blacks, purchases free blacks from Travis and sells them as captives for a 
handsome profit. Travis explains to Darcey that his timing is fortuitous 
because he has “a nigger who didn’t know what to do with his freedom. 
Thought it meant he was free.” Travis sells Augustus to Darcey. Unable to 
prove his freedom, Augustus becomes the property of Darcey, instantly 
losing the very rights he was so certain freedom ensured. 
Augustus thought that his freedom paper meant he was free, but as 
Travis demonstrates, this freedom was not freedom at all. What exactly 
does Travis consume when he eats the freedom papers? Consumption al-
legorizes the metaphysical holocaust — reducing the free black to a reified 
object (freedom paper) and it can be eaten (e.g., put between a biscuit and 
swallowed, as Frederick Douglass instructed) or destroyed at any time or 
place. Consumption is both a form of domination and sadistic pleasure, 
as Vincent Woodard would describe it.31 We, then, must investigate the 
manner of consuming black flesh and not just the body, consuming the 
flesh as consuming the primordial relation itself. Ontological Terror ex-
poses the insatiable appetite of antiblackness.
ONE
THE QUESTION OF BLACK BEING
This essent, through questioning, is held out into the possibility of nonbeing. 
Thereby the why takes on a different penetration.
HEIDEGGER , Introduction to Metaphysics
A question whose necessity is so fundamental that it must be unasked — the 
question of the meaning of black being, the question of the meaning of (black) 
things. We study in the sound of an unasked question. Our study is the sound 
of an unasked question. We study the sound of an unasked question.
FRED MOTEN , “Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh)”
BUILDING A WAY 
One must ask a certain question of black being,1 a question that opens us 
onto a horizon of representational and conceptual crisis. This question 
emerges within a context of urgency: the intensity of black suffering, spir-
itual and physical deprivation, political demoralization, and the prolifera-
tion and permanency of necropolitical agendas. The question, its urgency, 
and the crisis that it engenders recycle historically in various guises, and 
in each (re)incarnation, it demands an address — an address that seems 
impossible, since the discursive material we use to formulate an answer 
is also called into question. Hortense Spillers meditates on certain facets 
of this redoubling problematic when she suggests that in any investigation 
of black being, “we are confronted by divergent temporal frames, or beats, 
that pose the problem of adequacy — how to reclaim an abandoned site of 
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inquiry in the critical discourse when the very question that it articulates 
is carried along as part of the methodological structure [or metaphysical 
structure], as a feature of the paradigm that is itself under suspicion, while 
the question itself foregrounds a thematic that cannot be approached in 
any other way.”2 The “unasked question,” as Fred Moten would call it, is 
this “abandoned site of inquiry.” My objective in this chapter is to return 
us to the abandoned, arid ontometaphysical space — the space and place 
of the question in ontometaphysics.3 I use the unasked and unanswerable 
question to “build a way,” as Heidegger would describe it, through the 
treacherous terrain of ontometaphysics and antiblackness.4
What follows is a tracing of this question through the discourses of 
ontometaphysics and the paradigm of the free black. My propositions at-
tend to the important function of the Negro, or black being, in ontometa-
physics: (1) The Negro is the incarnation of nothing that a metaphysical 
world tries tirelessly to eradicate. Black  being is invented precisely for 
this function ontologically; this is the ontological labor that the Negro 
must perform in an antiblack world. (2) The Negro is invented, or born 
into modernity, through an ontometaphysical holocaust that destroys 
the coordinates of African existence. The Negro is not a human, since 
being in not an issue for it, and instead becomes “available equipment,” 
as Heidegger would call it, for the purpose of supporting the existential 
journey of the human being. Black being is the evidence of an ontological 
murder, or onticide, that is irrecoverable and irremediable. The condi-
tion of this permanent severing between black being and Being is what 
I call the “execration of Being.” In this sense, Being does not withdraw 
from the Negro, as it does from the human, for what withdraws can re-
emerge. Instead, Being curses black- being by creating an entity unintel-
ligible within the field of ontology. (3) The Negro Question that becomes 
the obsession of antebellum culture (“What do we do about our free 
blacks?”) masks the ontological stakes involved in answering the ques-
tion, since what the question is really about, as I propose, is what we do 
about the nothing that terrorizes us, that destabilizes our metaphysical 
structure and ground of existence. The terms free and black do not just 
present political problems of citizenship, rights, and inclusion, but also 
present serious ontological problems, since the boundaries of ontology — 
between human and property and freedom and unfreedom — are thrown 
into crisis with the presence of the free black. Ultimately, I propose that 
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the Negro Question is a proper metaphysical question, since the Negro 
is black and black(ness) has always been a terror for metaphysics. These 
propositions unfold through an engagement with different ontometa-
physical discourses in the black radical tradition alongside and against 
Heidegger, since Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics, as the disavowal, 
forgetting, and contempt of Nothing assists us in understanding how 
metaphysics engages the nothing that it despises but needs (the tension 
between hatred and necessity). I, however, depart from Heidegger, since 
black being is not human being (or Dasein) but available equipment, 
equipment in human form, that Heidegger does not consider because of 
his Eurocentric perspective. 
BLACK, NOTHING, AND THE NEGRO 
We can consider the Negro Question a proper metaphysical question. 
Heidegger reminds us that every metaphysical question always grasps 
the whole of the problematic of metaphysics. A proper question emerges 
within a context of urgency, but the investigation of the context and the 
question itself destabilizes the entire edifice within which the investiga-
tory procedure is carried out, since the answer becomes a symptom of a 
larger problem. It is this larger problem (the “whole of the problematic of 
metaphysics,” as Heidegger calls it) that the proper question is designed to 
address through a series of questions that, as they unfold, open the hori-
zon of an empowered thinking. The proper question exposes an abyss, a 
black hole within the ontometaphysical tradition and its attendant dis-
courses or, as Nahum Chandler aptly describes it, “the black in the white-
ness of being, in the being of whiteness.”5 The philosophical conditions 
that enable the tradition are themselves brought forward, questioned, and 
thrown into relief. To present a proper metaphysical question of black 
being, however, our question, and procedure, must align with the phil-
osophical instruction of Hortense Spillers to “strip down through lay-
ers of attenuated meanings, made an excess in time; over time, assigned 
a particular historical order, and there await whatever marvels of [our] 
own inventiveness.”6 The objective of this question and our questioning is 
precisely to strip through layers of metaphysical baggage and attenuated 
meaning as they violently encrust over deep time and history. We can 
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describe the whole problematic of black being, then, as the aggregate, or 
collection, of these burdensome layers, which are traumatically imposed 
during the initiation of the transatlantic slave trade. But since “a genuine 
question is not done away with by finding an answer to it,” according to 
Heidegger, the question remains as a feature of our own inventiveness. 
In other words, the question remains at the heart of black being. And 
we must ask this question, since there is no getting rid of it, despite the 
marvelous power of our inventiveness. We can think, then, of Spillers’s 
protocol of stripping through layers of attenuated meaning as the cor-
rection to Heidegger’s Eurocentric Destruktion, or the “destructuring of 
the history of ontology,” as he describes it in Being and Time. This is to 
say the destructuring of metaphysics must address the concealment of 
the Negro — buried deeply beneath layers of metaphysical violence. Our 
questions bring us to this concealment, within the history of ontology, as 
that kernel of antiblackness sustaining both metaphysics and ontology.7
The question has been with black being, as a constitutive feature 
of it, since black being was invented — since modernity gave birth to it 
through dispossession and abjection. We have grappled with this funda-
mental question for centuries, in various forms. Dubois asked a variation 
of this question: “What does it mean to be a problem?”8 This is, indeed, a 
proper metaphysical question, since it requires us to strip through layers 
of pulverizing meaning to arrive at a kernel of (non)meaning, or mean-
inglessness, as the answer to the question of black being. The question 
that Dubois presents, “What does it mean to be a problem?,” is both a 
metaphysical riddle and a formulation of black being — black being is this 
riddle. The question of black being must, then, start with the ontology of 
the problem. To be a problem is the being- ness of blackness. It is this prob-
lem that will preoccupy our concern here — the question of black being as 
the problem of ontometaphysics (put differently, we can rewrite Dubois’s 
question as “what does it mean to be the problem of ontometaphysics?” 
What is the condition, or inhabitation, of this problem?). It is impossible 
to uncouple black being from this problem. Exactly how does one be a 
problem? Or “inhabit” a problem, as Nahum Chandler might suggest is 
the riddle of blackness in modernity. When Hortense Spillers suggests 
that the black body is “reduced to a thing, to being for the captor,”9 we 
can understand this being as the problem itself. Black being embodies 
an ontometaphysical problem for the captor. Black being becomes a site 
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of projection and absorption of the problem of metaphysics — a problem 
that the captor would wish to ignore or neglect by imposing it onto black 
being. Thus, black being is not only necessary for involuntary labor and 
pornotroping, but also necessary ontologically; it inhabits the problem 
of metaphysics.10 This inhabitation is the space and place of the Negro 
Question — our proper metaphysical question. 
Thinkers from the antebellum period presented this problem as the 
“Negro Question.” The question of the Negro is precisely the question of 
this problem. For Sylvia Wynter, the Negro Question cannot be a proper 
object of knowledge, given that the ruling episteme does not accommo-
date this strange being.11 Thus, the question itself and the metaphysical 
problem that it carries are positioned outside the frames of epistemology 
and its attendant discourses. For Wynter, the Negro is that being, or more 
accurately entity, that is excluded from the discourse of man and its over-
representation of being otherwise. The problem that the Negro Question 
opens up is this position outside of man. We can present a reformulation 
of this proper metaphysical question, following Wynter: why does this 
outside position constitute a problem for the whole of metaphysics (and 
its paradoxical answer)? This problem is spatialized as the outside, which 
preconditions the metaphysical architecture of man, the privileged inside. 
But given that this outside position is actually an intimate aspect of the 
inside, since it provides the inside’s condition of possibility, the problem is 
at the heart of the ontometaphysics of man. Black being is the absent cen-
ter of the whole of metaphysics, and it, cartographically, constitutes the 
paradoxical inside/ outside position of metaphysics. This begins to provide 
a path of investigation toward this proper metaphysical question. Why 
is black being a problem? Why is this problem constitutive of an inside/
outside paradox? Answering these questions, however, inevitably leads 
to more questions, or what I will call a fundamental question: How is it 
going with black being? 
In his Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger presents the question 
“How is it going with Being” [Wie steht es um das Sein?] to indicate that 
this question is the fundamental question, even more fundamental than 
“why are there beings at all instead of nothing?”12 The importance of this 
question resides in the philosophy of the remains of Being, as Santiago 
Zabala has persuasively argued.13 Since being has become “just the sound 
of a word, a used- up term,” Heidegger argued that we must destroy, or dis-
the Question oF bLack being 31
mantle, the structure of metaphysics to renew a forgotten relation to Be-
ing, not as presence or object, but as the opening of existence itself — what 
Heidegger will later call “appropriation.”14 Thus, the proper metaphysical 
question “How is it going with Being?” emerges after the destruction, or 
dismantling, of metaphysics; and after we have worn out the term, we must 
re- member Being by recollecting the fragments — the ontological pieces 
left after the destruction. “How is it going with Being?” is a way of inquir-
ing about the status of Being after it has been thoroughly dismantled — 
what is left? Ontological investigations must now start with this funda-
mental question, according to Heidegger, to contend with the being abuse 
that has plagued the philosophical tradition from Plato onward. Reading 
Heidegger through Spillers, then, we could suggest that the task of De-
struktion is to strip through layers of attenuated meaning, made in excess 
through the procedures and practices of metaphysics. The Heideggerian 
enterprise here is postmetaphysical to the extent that it urges us to twist 
metaphysics and instigate its self- consumption. This postmetaphysical 
movement marks the end of philosophy as we know it and inaugurates a 
thinking otherwise [Andenken] to arrive at a more fruitful understanding 
of the relation between Being and Dasein. “How is it going with Being?” 
dockets an uncovered or re- membered relationship between Dasein and 
Being, and it is the task of philosophy to illumine it. 
If the aim of this postmetaphysical enterprise is to urge us to twist 
metaphysics to ask a more appropriate ontological question (i.e., the move 
from what is being to How is Being, as event and happening), it assumes 
that the metaphysics of being, its ontic science, has been settled and we 
can now get over metaphysics (even though we are still entrapped). Black 
being, however, does not easily afford this postmetaphysical movement, 
since the metaphysical question of black being—what is it?—has not been 
resolved, and thus, the ontological question, if one can be truly posed, 
what is the relationship between black being and Being (or How is it go-
ing with black being?) is an unanswerable one (which, again, is why we 
must continually write black being under erasure). Put differently, the 
problem with the Negro Question is that we can never truly arrive at an 
appropriate ontological question, since black being is not ontological, but 
something other, something that lies outside of epistemology and ontol-
ogy. This makes the Negro Question unanswerable on the register that 
Heidegger proposed for Dasein. The Negro Question is situated on a plane 
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within/without metaphysics, but also outside the precincts of ontology. 
The space and place of the Negro Question are a problem for the whole of 
metaphysics, but a problem that provides the condition of possibility for 
human being to ask its fundamental question, “How is it going with Be-
ing?” The unpresentability of the Negro Question is the necessary ground 
for Dasein’s ontological presentation.
To suggest that black being constitutes the problem at the center of on-
tometaphysics, in the form of an unanswerable question, is to suggest that 
Heidegger’s Destruktion relies on the indestructibility of antiblackness in 
modernity. Metaphysics can only be dismantled for Dasein because a pri-
mordial relationship between it and Being exists that metaphysics cannot 
pulverize, even though it tries with science, schematization, and technol-
ogy, according to Heidegger.15 Thus, the dismantling or destruction of 
metaphysics is really the opening of a primordial relationality between 
Dasein and Being. But even though we can destroy metaphysics, in terms 
of twisting it and instigating its self- consumption [verwunden], we can 
never completely destroy it; a remainder or remnant will always persist 
within the very heart of the destructive enterprise. This remainder, this 
intransigent entity, is indestructible and, in fact, structures the project of 
destruction. It is indeed a paradoxical formulation that destruction de-
pends on the kernel of indestructability at its core, but when we consider 
that something must remain for the philosophical enterprise to continue, 
then we understand that this remainder keeps the destructive movement 
going — it is its metaphysical fuel. I would also present another audacious 
claim and suggest that black being is the name of this indestructible ele-
ment because black being’s function within metaphysics is to inhabit the 
void of relationality — relationality between it and Being and relationality 
between it and human- being- ness and the world itself.16 Thus, we must 
reconceptualize black being ontometaphysically as pure function and not 
relation (put differently, black being emerges in modernity primarily to 
inhabit this treacherous position as function, which enables human be-
ingness to engage in its projectionality into the world and to restore its 
forgotten relationship with Being. In a word, black being helps the human 
being re- member its relation to Being through its lack of relationality. The 
essence of black being, like the essence of technology, is to open up an un-
derstanding for Dasein, it is always being for another. Black being, then, is 
precisely the metaphysical entity that must remain for the postmetaphys-
the Question oF bLack being 33
ical enterprise of freedom (the loosening up of metaphysical strictures) to 
occur for human beingness (or Dasein). This indestructible remainder is 
a problem for metaphysics, since it retains the trace of objectification that 
restricts complete freedom for Dasein, but it is also the answer to meta-
physics, given that it serves as the catalyst for the self- consumption that 
engenders greater freedom, if not complete freedom, for Dasein. But this 
formulation presents more questions, proper metaphysical questions, that 
chart the course to the abyss of metaphysics, which is black being: why is 
black being indestructible? Why has metaphysics been unable or unwill-
ing to dismantle its remainder? How do we articulate the problem of black 
being, which is the problem for the whole of metaphysics? 
Alain David provides a guide through these difficult questions in his 
philosophical meditation “On Negroes.” David poses a proper metaphysi-
cal question of his own: why are Negroes black? I describe this as a proper 
metaphysical question because the juxtaposition of black and Negro in 
his inquiry (Negroes are black, as a copula proposition) opens us onto a 
paradox of black being understood through the Negro. I would formulate 
this paradox as this, following David: the Negro is the excess of form 
in an antiblack world, but also the interruption of form, the formless, 
given that the Negro is blackness within metaphysics. What could this 
mean? For David, metaphysics encounters a crisis. On the one hand, it 
attempts to move beyond form, the specificity of beings into the realm of 
Being (the formless); on the other hand metaphysics cannot seem to free 
itself completely from anthropologizing metaphysics, of a metaphysics 
that organizes ontological imagining around differences of race and skin 
complexion; thus, the purported formless, indifferent field of ontometa-
physics is predicated upon anthropological differences, and this interplay 
between formlessness and form is what David would call “race.” For him, 
“race is that hyperbole of form affirming itself over against that which 
would prevent form. Race is like a transcendental condition of the onto-
logical argument.”17 When it concerns the Negro (as black being), then, 
the distinction between the indifferent metaphysician and the anthropol-
ogist obsessed with difference collapses. But the collapse, I would argue, 
is necessary given the function of black being, of the Negro. The question 
“Why are Negroes black?” can be approached through the metaphysical 
question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” for David. It is 
the status of this nothing that preoccupies the metaphysician, since, ac-
34 chapter one
cording to David, it is this nothing that interrupts form for metaphysics. 
Nothing occupies the paradoxical position (as Heidegger also argued in 
his Introduction to Metaphysics) of indexing formlessness, the breaking of 
metaphysics, at the same time conceptualized through metaphysical form 
(as a something). This leads David to appropriate a childhood riddle for 
philosophical purposes and ask: what is nothing while being something? 
The answer to this riddle is black for David:
Black means nothing, nothing means black. Or, rather, nothing does not 
exactly mean black, since in nothing positivity is erased. Why is there 
something rather than black? According to this formulation, “black” 
is something, and yet, as I’ve said it is nothing. Nothing other than 
dazzlement. Light itself. And this black that is nothing, without this 
nothing being nothing, is the something that prevents any something 
from belonging to the whole. One must, then, wonder what this posi-
tivity is that, inscribed in the nothing — an inscription of the nothing — 
converts the nothing into its enigmatic nuance of black.18
Black, here, is not the color black, but is the index of formlessness, 
since color would assume a sensible form within metaphysics.19 Despite 
indexing this formlessness, black assumes form as a something: posi-
tivity. The function of this something that is also a nothing is designed 
to “prevent any something from belonging to the whole,” as David ar-
gues. In other words, this something serves as the precondition for the 
whole itself, as its inclusive exclusion (or excluded inclusion); its func-
tion is to fracture the whole through its exclusion, which constitutes the 
center — the absent center. Black is the something that is also nothing, a 
nothing that cannot be adequately captured within the precinct of meta-
physics, but a something upon which metaphysics depends. But David 
also wonders “what [is] this positivity that, inscribed in the nothing — an 
inscription of the nothing — converts the nothing into its enigmatic nu-
ance of black?” How, then, is nothing converted into black? How does that 
which interrupts metaphysical form (its grammar and conceptualization) 
appear as form, as a translation from the ineffable to the conceptual or 
worldly? 
These inquiries return us to David’s proper metaphysical question: 
why are Negroes black? He suggests that this question could be reformu-
lated as “How does the interruption of form appear as form?” Although 
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David reaches a limit with this metaphysical question, since the philo-
sophical exercise reaches a limit — of both meaning and knowledge (and 
he begins a discourse of what he calls “imaginary Negroes” to make sense 
of the senseless)—I would propose a response to David’s inquiry: the Ne-
gro is black precisely because, within an antiblack world, the Negro is 
forced (through forms of terror and violence) to inhabit the position of 
black within metaphysics and to provide form for the formlessness of the 
interruption (which is why we can call the Negro “black being”). If, as 
Heidegger insists, metaphysics attempts to transform everything into an 
object so that it can dominate and control it, nothing would become an-
other object that metaphysics desires to dominate — an ultimate object. 
How does metaphysics transform nothing into something, so it can dom-
inate this nothing? Through the Negro — it gives a form for the formless, 
but a form that perplexes and threatens. Perhaps this is why Negroes, 
historically and philosophically, have served as the “intermediaries be-
tween animal and man,” as David describes it. The Negro is the interstice 
of metaphysics, the formless form between man and animal, property and 
human, whose purpose is to embody formlessness as a corporeal sign. 
As an intermediary, its position within metaphysics is paradoxical, as an 
excluded inclusion, an untranslatable entity without a proper referent (a 
catachresis within metaphysics). As Ronald Judy argues, “The Negro can-
not enable the representation of meaning, [since] it has no referent.”20 
The Negro, then, is pure function; this function is to be black, but a 
being that is not (or Fanon’s n’est pas).21 And this is why the invention of the 
Negro is so essential to metaphysics. When, for instance, Afro- pessimists 
assert that black(ness) is unbearable or that black suffering is illegible, it 
is a way of articulating blackness as function — black being as pure func-
tion, metaphysical utility, nothing more. It is the function of bearing the 
nothing of metaphysics, black as formless form, that is unbearable and 
also the crux of black suffering. The world is antiblack because it despises 
this nothing, this nothing that interrupts its organization of existence, its 
ground of intelligibility and certainty (which is why antiblack violence is 
a global problematic). Returning to Wynter, we can understand why the 
Negro Question can never serve as a proper object of knowledge, since the 
Negro, as black being, constitutes a nothing, a formless form, that episte-
mology cannot accommodate — nor can ontometaphysics. 
How does metaphysics provide form for this formlessness, form as 
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knowledge? This has been the task of postmetaphysical thinking (from 
Heidegger onward) to encourage a thinking outside of metaphysics in 
order to open up a horizon of the unknowable — unknowable within the 
grammar and logic of metaphysics (a philosophy against the dominance 
of form). But (post)metaphysical thinking has forgotten the Negro, much 
like man has forgotten Being. This forgetfulness is necessary, since to 
re- member or integrate the Negro would require a contention with this 
dreaded nothing. Vattimo suggests that “the end of metaphysics is un-
thinkable without the end of colonialism and Eurocentrism.”22 I would 
argue that colonialism and Eurocentricism are antiblack strategies for 
attempting to obliterate, and to forget, dreaded nothing — since black 
bodies, cultures, and existence are assigned this unbearable formlessness 
within modernity. Put differently, the human cannot re- member Being (or 
its primordial relationship with Being as Dasein) without re- membering 
the Negro. The Negro is invented precisely to absorb the terror of this 
nothing, of the interruption of time and space, within modernity. This 
is why it is unthinkable to end metaphysics without ending the various 
systems of antiblackness within the world. Antiblackness and its tech-
nologies of destruction are designed to obliterate nothing: nothing as 
formlessness, nothing as interruption, nothing as black, and, ultimately, 
nothing as the Negro. 
But our original, proper metaphysical question, “How is it going with 
black being?,” opens up the dread of this nothing in an antiblack world. The 
world and its institutions must mute this question, rendering it absurd and 
irrational, to sustain the whole of metaphysics (or the world itself, as black 
nihilism would assert). This question is the fundamental formulation of 
proper inquiries that have guided our thinking: “Why is the Negro black?” 
“Why is there something rather than nothing?” “What does it mean to be 
a problem?” The question “How is it going with black being” exposes the 
problem of metaphysics, the problem with “black” and “nothing” because it 
compels thinking about the function, status, utility, and necessity of black 
within an antiblack world. It forces us to entertain the strange juxtaposi-
tion between being and black(ness), between formlessness and form col-
liding on the existence of the Negro. The disruptive question that Dubois 
posed, then, “What does it mean to be a problem?,” invites us to consider 
the unbearable suffering of inhabiting this problem for metaphysics — 
what metaphysics despises, what it hates. What it means to be a problem 
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is to exist as an intermediary between form and formlessness, animal 
and man, property and human, and nothing and something — to “strad-
dle Nothingness and Infinity,” as Fanon would say. What it means to be 
a problem is that this being (being as a problem) renders both “meaning” 
and “being” impossible and inadequate. The Negro is the limit of both 
meaning and being and embodies ontological terror (the terror of the 
nothing within an antiblack world). Moreover, it means that one must 
embody a nothing that the world works tirelessly to obliterate — which 
means that the violence directed toward the Negro, black being, is gratu-
itous and will never end as long as metaphysics remains (and postmeta-
physics admits that it is impossible to destroy metaphysics. We can only 
twist it, but there will always be a remainder). It means, to rephrase the 
perspicacious insight of Hortense Spillers, “The [world] needs [the Negro], 
and if [the Negro] were not here, [‘it’] would have to be invented.” 
THE INVENTION OF THE NEGRO  
AND THE NECESSITY OF BLACK BEING 
What is this Negro? Negro as black being; Negro as nothing. We return 
endlessly to this metaphysical question and the tension of the copula (the 
“is- ness” of a [non]being) that sets the metaphysical inquiry into motion. 
Perhaps this question cannot be answered with apodictic certainty, since 
the Negro is neither a proper object of knowledge nor a proper referent 
(catachresis). What we can propose, however, is that function, or utility, re-
quires an instrument, and instruments are invented for the purpose of ful-
filling the agenda of utility. I have suggested thus far that the Negro serves 
the function of embodying metaphysical nothing(ness) for modernity — 
a weighty, burdensome, and dangerous function. The world needed a be-
ing that would bear the unbearable and live the unlivable; a being that 
would exist within the interstice of death and life and straddle Nothing 
and Infinity. The being invented to embody black as nothing is the Negro. 
An antiblack world desires to obliterate black as nothing — nothing as the 
limitation of its dominance — so that its schematization, calculation, and 
scientific practices are met unchecked by this terrifying hole, nothing. 
With the Negro, metaphysics can triumph over this nothing by impos-
ing black(ness) onto the Negro and destroying the Negro. The Negro is 
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invented precisely to be destroyed — the delusion of metaphysics is that it 
will overcome nothing through its destruction and hatred of the Negro. 
The Negro, then, is both necessary and despised. 
But it is important to remember that this Negro, the cipher of meta-
physics, is the invention of a desperate world. The Negro is not a human 
being that is simply mistreated, but is, instead, an invention designed to 
embody a certain terror for the world. I say this because thinking in this 
way will require us first to discard naturalism and the conflation of hu-
man being with black being. This is a difficult task because of the ruse of 
resemblance (the Negro looks human, so must be one). But as Lindon Bar-
rett taught us, modernity produces “anthropomorphic uncertainty” by 
which “racial blackness overwhelmingly disappoints the modern resem-
blance of the human, signaling instead the unleashing of the inhuman 
that specifies the ‘human’ population of the modern state.”23 Biological 
and visual resemblance does not render the Negro a human being — these 
are nothing more than ontic illusions. Ontologically and metaphysically, 
the Negro is anything but human. Hortense Spillers might call this an 
“altered human factor.” In describing the transport of Africans to Eu-
rope, she suggests that they embodied a radical otherness and alterity 
for the European self. “Once the ‘faithless,’ indiscriminate of the three 
stops of Portuguese skin color, are transported to Europe, they become 
an altered human factor. . . . The altered human factor renders an alterity 
to European Ego, an invention, or ‘discovery’ as decisive in the full range 
of its social implications as the birth of a newborn.”24 Once on European 
soil (and in the hold of the ship), the African ceases to exist and instead 
becomes “other,” an alteration of humanity. Something new emerges with 
the transport of the African. The African becomes black being and se-
cures the boundaries of the European self — its existential and ontological 
constitution — by embodying utter alterity (metaphysical nothing). Meta-
physics gives birth to black being through various forms of antiblack vio-
lence, and this birth is tantamount to death or worldlessness. The inven-
tion, emergence, and birth of black being are not causes for celebration, 
however, since this invention is pure instrumentality and function (not 
the existential freedom, self- actualization, or sacred natality of Hannah 
Arendt and Jean- Luc Nancy, for example).25 Black being follows a different 
trajectory than the celebrated human being of metaphysics and ontology. 
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Its birth is death — death as nothing, death as the Negro, death as black-
ness, death as the abyss of metaphysics. 
It is also important to reiterate that black being and African existence 
are not synonymous, although we might argue that African existence is 
transformed into black being through violence, transport, and rituals of 
humiliation and terror. Bryan Wagner clarifies the distinction:
Perhaps the most important thing we have to remember about the 
black tradition is that Africa and its diaspora are older than blackness. 
Blackness does not come from Africa. Rather, Africa and its diaspora 
become black during a particular stage in their history . . . blackness is 
an adjunct to racial slavery . . . blackness is an indelibly modern condi-
tion that cannot be conceptualized apart from the epochal changes in 
travel, trade, labor, consumption, industry, technology, taxation, war-
fare, finance, insurance, government, bureaucracy, communication, 
science, religion and philosophy that were together made possible by 
the European system of colonial slavery. . . . To be black is to exist in 
exchange without standing in the modern world system.26
To “exist in exchange without standing” is pure instrumentality, a be-
ing that is not human being, but something other, something unlike what 
modernity had known before. The disjuncture between being and black 
being is the gulf of metaphysical and ontological violence. Black being, 
then, does not originate from Africa but is invented in a (non)temporality 
that we might call the transatlantic slave trade. Put differently, African 
existence is an identity, whereas black being is a structural position or in-
strumentality.27 Identities circulate within the symbolic of humanity; they 
are discourses of the human (or genres of man, if we follow Sylvia Wyn-
ters). Identities provide symbolic covering for the human and differentiate 
his/her existence, or mode of being, from other human beings. A struc-
tural position, on the other hand, ruptures the logics of symbolic identity 
and constitutes function or instrumentality. Black being is a structural 
position and not an identity because it exists, or is invented, precisely as 
an anchor for human identity (human self adequation); the anchor is an 
inclusive exclusion and subtends human identity but is not incorporated 
into it. To be positioned structurally and not symbolically means that 
structural existence is a preconditioned instrument for the maintenance 
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of the symbolic — the symbolic here meaning the signs, symbols, and re-
lationalities of the world itself. A structural position is pure use value (or 
function), and it lacks value outside its utility and the antiblack symbolic 
that determines the matrix of value (axiology). This, of course, is in con-
tradistinction to human being, whose ultimate value resides outside the 
matrix of symbolism and into the esoteric or the horizon of Being- as- 
event. Black being is the zero- degree position of nonvalue but, paradox-
ically, is all too valuable because it enables the very system that excludes 
it (it is valued because of its utter valuelessness). Thus, black being is not 
birthed into presence through the generosity of Being, contrary to the ge-
nealogy of human being articulated by Heidegger and Jean- Luc Nancy, for 
example; black being is introduced as the execration of Being; its ultimate 
withholding of generosity, freedom, and care. 
Moreover, the distinction between African existence and black being 
is the site of onticide, or a murderous ontology. What I am suggesting is 
that black being is the execration of Being because it emerges through a 
death sentence, through the death of African existence (“existence” is the 
best we can do grammatically because of the double bind of the copula 
formulation inherent in language). Black being is the evidence of an onti-
cidal enterprise. Ronald Judy describes this as “thanatology.” In describing 
the coming- into- being of Equiano (an African captive transformed into 
black being, or the Negro), Judy suggests that the death of African mate-
riality and the African symbolic body (or existence) provides the condi-
tion of possibility for the transformation. In short, black being emerges 
through the murder of African existence and not its generosity: 
The death that is emancipating is the negation of the materiality of 
Africa. Writing the slave narrative is thus a thanatology, a writing of 
annihilation that applies the taxonomies of death in Reason (natural 
law) to enable the emergence of the self- reflexive consciousness of the 
Negro . . . writing the death of the African body is an enforced abstrac-
tion. It is an interdiction of the African, a censorship to be inarticulate, 
to not compel, to have no capacity to move, to be without effect, with-
out agency, without thought. The muted African body is overwritten 
by the Negro, and the Negro that emerges in the ink flow of Equiano’s 
pen is that which has overwritten itself and so become the representa-
tion of the very body it sits on.28
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Judy’s argument here is that the Negro is thought to gain a sense of 
subjectivity by displaying Reason through writing, since writing is pre-
figured as the ultimate sign of Reason, and Humanity, within an antiblack 
symbolic order. But to gain this subjectivity, this Negro- ness, he must first 
kill the African body (African existence). But, I would argue, if reason 
and humanity are the purported payoffs for a murder, then the Negro 
has indeed been defrauded. For displaying reason through writing (slave 
narratives and otherwise) has not folded the Negro into the family of the 
human [Mitsein] or rendered him a subject — there is nothing the Negro 
can do to change its structural position. Writing, reading, philosophiz-
ing, and intellectualizing have all failed as strategies to gain inclusion 
into human beingness (despite the hopeful insistence of black human-
ists). Instead, the Negro remains the nothing that metaphysics depends 
on to maintain its coherence. With the death of African existence, the 
Negro, or black being, is indeed nothing or no- thing that translates into 
any recognizable ontology. To say that the Negro is nothing is also to say 
that the Negro lacks ontological ground. The human being grounds its 
ontology in the beautiful relation between Being and Dasein (or the “space 
of existence,” as Heidegger would call it). Black being, however, lacks any 
legitimate ground, outside the oppressive logics of use value, for its being. 
Since it emerges through the execration of Being and not the gift of Being, 
it can lay recourse neither to Being nor to a primordial relation (since this 
primordial relation has been annihilated or murdered as the condition of 
its existence). 
I would also suggest that the Negro is not responsible for this murder. 
Metaphysics (or the world and its symbolics) systemically murders this re-
lationality, so that to be born black within modernity is to have always 
already been the material effect of an ontological murder. In other words, 
antiblackness is the systematic and global death of this primordial rela-
tion, and whether the Negro attempts to write him/herself into existence 
or not, this death has already occurred. When it comes to the Negro, sub-
jectivity is a fraudulent hoax or ruse.
What do I mean by the “execration of Being”? I simply mean the death 
or obliteration of African existence. This obliteration provides the nec-
essary condition for the invention of the Negro, or black being — black as 
metaphysical nothing or groundless existence. One anchors one’s exis-
tence in this primordial relation, but the Negro is precisely the absence of 
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such relationality, a novelty for modernity (or a “new ontology,” as Frank 
Wilderson would describe it). The Negro is born into absence and not 
presence. We can also describe this death of a primordial relation as a 
“metaphysical holocaust,” following Franz Fanon and Frank Wilderson. 
For Fanon, “Ontology — once it is finally admitted as leaving existence 
by the wayside — does not permit us to understand the being of the black 
man . . . the black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the 
white man . . . his metaphysics, or less pretentiously, his customs and the 
sources on which they are based, were wiped out because they were in 
conflict with a civilization that he did not know and that imposed itself 
on him.”29
Ontology provides intelligibility and understanding for the human be-
ing because she is embedded in a primordial relation with Being (as free-
dom and care). We can describe the entire field of ontology as the history, 
evolution, and maintenance of the various customs and resources that 
the human being needs to secure this relation. But “ontology . . . does not 
permit us to understand the being of the black man” because ontology is 
intended to preserve the customs and resources of human beingness and 
not black being. We will always experience tensions, contradictions, and 
impasses if we attempt to gain intelligibility for black being from a field 
that excludes it by necessity — because blackness is outside ontology as 
this nothing but most intimately situated within ontology as its condi-
tion of possibility (its inclusive exclusion). Ontology, then, does not pro-
vide the resources to understand this paradoxical thing — blackness is the 
abyss of ontology.30 But what is worse is that the customs and resources 
that once served as grounding for African existence were wiped out. This 
wiping out of the ontological resources to ground this primordial relation 
is the thanatology or onticide of African being.31 This metaphysical holo-
caust is the execration of Being — it is a particular process of producing 
black being through the murder of African existence.32
The execration of Being also conveys Being’s curse and denouncement 
of the Negro as black (I would also suggest that the pseudo- theological 
term Hamitic curse is a variation of this execration in a different register). 
Rather than thinking of Being as having abandoned us and that this aban-
donment can be addressed through temporality, thinking anew, and a 
renewed relation (as is the position of Heidegger and neo- Heideggerians), 
the execration of Being is beyond abandonment. It indexes the oblitera-
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tion of the relation to Being and the absolute irreconcilability between the 
Negro as black and Being. Thus, the nothing that black being incarnates is 
not a celebratory portal or opening up onto Being for blacks — as if reject-
ing metaphysical thinking will reunite us, as it were, with Being as noth-
ing.33 This only works for the human (and the “black is not a man” within 
an antiblack metaphysics, as Fanon insists).34 The essence of black suffer-
ing, then, is this very execration, to inhabit permanently the “zone of non-
being,” as Fanon might call it. This zone is a spatiotemporality without a 
recognizable name or grammar within the philosophical tradition. The 
problem of black being is precisely the inhabitation of an execrated con-
dition. This is the new ontology that modernity brings into the world — a 
being that is not one (available equipment in the guise of human form). 
Black being is paradoxical — it is a metaphysical entity that is invented 
to illumine something beyond metaphysics, a nothing that metaphysics 
hates and needs. Within the Negro, metaphysics wages its war against the 
nothing that terrorizes its power and hegemony. 
This, again, explains why the Negro is black, to return to Alain David’s 
proper metaphysical question. The Negro is black because the Negro is 
the physical manifestation of an ontological puzzle: black as nothing. The 
field of ontometaphysics does not have the resources to explain nothing; 
in fact, it works earnestly to forget and avoid it. This is because the field of 
ontometaphysics is really the imposition of metaphysical prerogatives and 
investments. Given this arrangement of resources, nothing is not a proper 
object of knowledge within ontology as metaphysics because it cannot 
be explained through its episteme (put differently, the incorporation of 
nothing would destabilize the metaphysical episteme). Or, to echo Fred 
Moten, “Blackness and ontology are unavailable for one another.”35 This 
is to suggest that the problems of nothing are transposed onto the Negro, 
since it is embodied nothing within an antiblack world.
When Fanon suggests that the civilization “imposed itself” on the Ne-
gro, I interpret this to mean that the imposition is an ontometaphysical 
imposition; the Negro does not have ontological resistance because of 
the metaphysical imposition of black and nothing. Furthermore, we can 
describe the “two frames of reference,” as Fanon would call it, within 
which the Negro has had to place himself as “nothing” and “black” in an 
antiblack world. This imposition is the execration of Being or the meta-
physical holocaust that produces black being. For nothing and the terror 
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that it brings to metaphysics can only manifest itself through this holo-
caust; and this wiping out is not an event of the past, but is a condition of 
the world. The world needs it to continue. Antiblackness is the name for 
the continuous destruction of this primordial relation and the structural 
position of the Negro as black and nothing.
Hortense Spillers also proffers a phenomenological iteration of this 
metaphysical violence that is very useful to think alongside Fanon’s meta-
physical holocaust and the imposition of black and nothing:
But I would make a distinction in this case between “body” and “flesh” 
and impose that distinction as the central one between captive and 
liberated positions. In that sense, before the “Body” there is the “flesh,” 
that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape con-
cealment under the brush of discourse or the reflexes of iconography. 
Even though the European hegemonies stole bodies — some of them 
female — out of West African communities in concert with the African 
“middleman,” we regard this human and social irreparability as high 
crimes against the flesh, as the person of African females and males 
registered the wounding. If we think of the “flesh” as a primary narra-
tive, then we mean its seared, divided ripped- apartness, riveted to the 
ship’s hole, fallen, or “escaped” overboard.”36
Although Spillers borrows the concepts of “flesh” and “body” from the 
traditions of phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and theology, she repur-
poses them to understand the modern invention of black being. I would 
suggest that “flesh” and “body,” read through this register, are philosoph-
ical allegories, or metaphors, for the execration of Being. The flesh, here, 
is the primordial relation that antiblackness works tirelessly to destroy. 
For Spillers, the flesh is a “primary narrative.” This primary narrative is 
the grounding of African existence, the various customs and resources 
that provide the proper understanding of this existence — what is wiped 
out during the metaphysical holocaust that we can call the “transatlantic 
slave trade.” The body, however, emerges from the ashes of this holocaust. 
It is not strictly corporeality (or physicality), but the signification of noth-
ing that the black body comes to mark in an antiblack symbolic (or, as 
Spillers describes it, “a category of otherness”). Thus, high crimes against 
the flesh are the murderous operations that set modernity into motion 
and produce the black body (or black being); these crimes are murders 
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that the discourses of crime and punishment can only approach, but re-
main unintelligible within its precincts. These crimes are ongoing, and 
since the guilty party is the world itself, redress or justice is impossible. 
The flesh, the primary narrative, is the ground of an African existence 
that is irrecoverable within an antiblack world — it is “seared, divided 
ripped- apartness, riveted to the ship’s hole,” or “escaped overboard.” This, 
in essence, is the execration of Being. It is the primordial relation between 
the African and Being that is ripped apart, seared, and severed; this oblit-
erated relation is the high crime against the flesh. We come to another 
understanding of black being: it is the offspring of an obliterated primary 
narrative that we can call the flesh. Spillers’s “flesh” and Judy’s “African 
body” are thus synonymous articulations of this primordial relation. 
In this schematic, the body is a metaphor for instrumentality or abject 
use value. Spillers suggests that this body “is reduced to a thing, to being 
for the captor.” With the death of African existence (the flesh) an oppres-
sive mode of existence is imposed on the Negro. This existence is unlike 
human being. The human being’s mode of existence is to be for itself, and 
this being for itself is the structure of care between Dasein and Being. 
Black being is invented, however, precisely to secure the human’s mode 
of existence. Reading Spillers’s metaphysical schema through Heidegger’s, 
we could suggest that the black body or this “thing, being for the captor,” 
is invented to serve as the premier tool or equipment for human being’s 
existential project (and I would argue that this equipment is not equiva-
lent in form to the human, even if the structure of tool- being, as Graham 
Harman would call it, provides a general explanatory frame).37 In other 
words, the mode of existence for black being is what Heidegger would call 
“availableness.” Availableness is “the way of being of those entities which 
are defined by their use in the whole.”38 To exist as “a thing, being for the 
captor” is to inhabit a mode of existence dominated by internecine use and 
function. Black being, then, is invented not just to serve the needs of eco-
nomic interest and cupidity, but also to fulfill the ontological needs of the 
human. This thing is something like Heidegger’s equipment — an object 
that when used with such regularity becomes almost invisible, or trans-
parent, to the user (blackness is often unthought because the world uses it 
with such regularity; antiblackness is the systemization of both the use of 
blackness and the forgetting/concealment of black being). Utility eclipses 
the thing itself. We must, then, understand antiblackness as a global, 
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systemic dealing with black bodies, as available equipment. Heidegger 
considers dealings the way the Being of entities, or equipment, is revealed 
phenomenologically through the use of this equipment. Antiblack deal-
ings with black bodies do not expose the essential unfolding, or essence, 
of the equipment; rather, the purpose of antiblack dealings is to system-
ically obliterate the flesh, and to impose nothing onto that obliterated 
space — care and value are obsolete in this encounter.39 Therefore, equip-
ment structure is predicated on the premier use of blacks within the net-
work of equipment. In other words, black use cuts across every equip-
mental assignment, making it the ultimate equipment. Why does black 
equipment cut across all assignments, and why is it the tool Dasein relies 
on to commence its existential journey? We might say the answer to these 
difficult questions is that the essence of black equipment is nothing — 
being is not there. If Heidegger assumes that equipment will reveal its being 
through its usage, then he did not anticipate the invention of the Negro — 
equipment in human form, embodied nothingness. Using black equip-
ment reveals existence but not being (existence as non-being for Greek 
philosophers, according to Heidegger in Introduction to Metaphysics). 
This puzzle is what black philosophy must investigate, must think through, 
to understand the continuity of antiblackness. 
Spillers describes black being as a “living laboratory,” and we can con-
ceptualize this laboratory as the source of availableness for modernity. A 
living laboratory is a collection of instruments for carrying out ontologi-
cal experimentation, or the construction of the human self. Black beings 
constitute this irresistible source of availableness for the world. Saidiya 
Hartman meditates on the ontological utility of black being for the hu-
man when she states:
The relation between pleasure and the possession of slave property, in 
both the figurative and literal senses, can be explained in part by the 
fungability of the slave — that is, the joy made possible by virtue of the 
replaceability and interchangeability endemic to the commodity — and 
by the extensive capacities of property — that is, the augmentation of 
the master subject through his embodiment in external objects and 
persons. Put differently, the fungability of the commodity makes the 
captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection 
of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values; and, as property, the dis-
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possessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body 
since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign 
of his power and dominion.40
Instruments, tools, and equipment are interchangeable/replaceable; 
this is starkly different from human being, whose existential journey in 
the world renders it incalculable and unique. When I suggest that black 
being is pure function or utility, I mean precisely the way this being is 
used as a site of projection for the human’s desires, fantasies, and onto-
logical narcissism. The body that Spillers presents is a necessary invention 
because it is through the human’s engagement with instruments (tools 
and equipment) that the human comes to understand the self. To be for 
the human is to serve as the empty vessel for the human’s reflection on 
the world and self. In short, what I am suggesting is that black being is 
invented as an instrument to serve the needs of the human’s ontological 
project. This use, or function, exceeds involuntary labor and economic 
interest. It is this particular antiblack use that philosophical discourse has 
neglected. The Negro, as invention, is the dirty secret of ontometaphysics. 
If we follow Heidegger’s understanding of the human being as Dasein 
(being there) and thrown into the world, then black being emerges as a 
different entity: the Negro is precisely the permanence of not being there 
[Nicht Da Sein], an absence from ontology, an existence that is not just 
gone away (as if it has the potential to return to being there) but an exis-
tence that is barred from ever arriving as an ontological entity, since it is 
stripped of the flesh.41 To assert that black being is not of the world is to 
suggest, then, that black being lives not just outside of itself, but outside 
of any structure of meaning that makes such existence valuable. Black 
being is situated in a spatiotemporality for which we lack a grammar to 
capture fully. Spillers’s body, then, is the symbolic and material signifi-
cation of absence from Being. To be black and nothing is not to serve as 
an aperture of Being for the Negro; rather, it is to constitute something 
inassimilable and radically other, straddling nothing and infinity. The Ne-
gro is the execration of Being for the human; it is with the Negro that the 
terror of ontology, its emptiness, is projected and materialized. This is the 
Negro’s function. 
Inventing the Negro is essential to an ontometaphysical order that 
wants to eradicate and obliterate such ontological terror (the terror of 
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the nothing); and since ontometaphysics is obsessed with schematization 
and control, it needs the Negro to bear this unbearable burden, the exe-
cration of Being. To return to our proper metaphysical question “How is 
it going with black being?,” we can say that neither progressive legislation 
nor political movements have been able to transform black being into hu-
man  being, from fleshless bodies to recognized ontologies. Spillers also 
seems to preempt the question when she states, “Even though the cap-
tive flesh/body has been ‘liberated,’ and no one need pretend that even 
the quotation marks do not matter . . . it is as if neither time nor history, 
nor historiography and its topics, show movement, as [the flesh] is ‘mur-
dered’ over and over again by the passions of a bloodless and anonymous 
archaism, showing itself in endless disguise.”42 This onticide, the death of 
the flesh/African existence, continues impervious to legal, historical, and 
political change. This is to say that the problem of black being, as both a 
form of ontological terror for the human and a site of vicious strategies of 
obliteration, remains. To ask the (un)asked question “How is it going with 
black being?” is to inquire about the resolution of the problem of black 
and nothing, ontometaphysically, as it imposes itself onto the Negro. The 
answer to the Negro Question, then, is that the ritualistic and repetitive 
murder of the flesh, the primordial relation, is absolutely necessary and 
indispensable in an antiblack world. And as long as the world exists, this 
murder must continue. 
THE FREE BLACK AS A PARADIGM  
OF ONTOLOGICAL TERROR 
If the essence (the essential unfolding) of politics is nothing political, as 
Miguel de Beistegui has argued, then we must look elsewhere for this es-
sence, this center of politics that engenders various organizations of exis-
tence.43 The essence of the political (and the law, as I will argue) brings us 
back to the question of ontometaphysics; for if we follow the thinking of 
postmetaphysical thought, then politics is an ontic articulation of Being 
itself — perhaps a structure through which the human inhabits a particu-
lar relation with Being through care. This is to suggest that the question 
of Being is at the very heart of politics; rather than thinking of politics as 
disinterested in ontology, it is necessary for us to resituate politics as a 
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premier ontological enterprise — although politics will disavow and sup-
press such interests. Antebellum politics is no exception. The various de-
bates about black citizenship, freedom, and slavery in the nineteenth cen-
tury are deceptively philosophical — deceptive precisely because a surface 
reading of these issues can present them as merely part of the evolution 
of politics, its bloody and contentious process. But to suggest that the 
question of Being is at the very heart of these debates is to suggest the 
essence of these debates must return us to the question of Being itself. 
Furthermore, the question of black being, the problem at the center of 
ontometaphysics, is the essence of antebellum politics in the nineteenth 
century. Antebellum politics circulates around the problem of black 
being, the ontological terror that black being is forced to bear in an anti-
black world. Antebellum politics is a structure of antiblackness, designed 
to discipline and obliterate black being. Although we can correctly iden-
tify certain legislation, writing, and political maneuvers as unjust and 
inhumane — one only needs to think of the Dred Scott decision, Thomas 
Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia, or the Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850 — I want to understand this injustice as absolutely necessary; nec-
essary because black being is the target of gratuitous violence within an 
antiblack world, a violence that is essential to the world itself. Thus, the 
violence that we register as unjust or inhumane — the laceration of the 
whip, the canine patrol, exclusionary procedures, disenfranchisement, 
anti- literacy laws, and routinized humiliation and invasion, for example — 
 are ways a metaphysical organization of existence (antebellum politics) 
contends with black as nothing. 
Nahum Chandler, in his beautiful philosophical meditation X: The 
Problem of the Negro as a Problem for Thought, would describe ante-
bellum politics, law, and culture as resting on a certain “metaphysical 
infrastructural organization” that is often “not so recognized and is far 
less often thought.”44 Any discussion of a historical subject, white sub-
ject, and especially the Negro is enabled by this infrastructure, which 
bears the weight of the culture in question and its devastating violence. 
In other words, this metaphysical infrastructure already presumes cer-
tain pure ontological positions, and these positions enable the unjust and 
inhumane. Chandler would argue that the Negro brings into relief the 
problem of purity — since its ontological constitution presents a problem 
for thought. Purity, then, constitutes a metaphysical fiction (and a ra-
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cial privilege), and we could argue that ontological terror is precisely the 
threat the Negro poses, as always undoing ontological purity with con-
tamination. But the project of purity, I would argue, is a response to the 
problem of black as nothing — where purity becomes a discourse of this 
nothing, its symptom or materialization. Antebellum culture deploys the 
discourse of purity (and its anxiety concerning amalgamation and inte-
gration) as a cover for the ontological terror at the heart of the metaphys-
ical infrastructure. Put differently, this infrastructure is precarious and 
always at risk by its own invention, black being, stripped of its primary 
narrative (the flesh). This, then, is the double bind of the metaphysical 
infrastructure (or the “whole of metaphysics,” as Heidegger would call it): 
black being is a necessary invention because it bears the nothing, which 
is uncontrollable with metaphysical instruments, but black being is also 
hated because its presence is a reminder that the human being itself is 
a metaphysical fiction — the very ground of humanity is precarious and 
unreliable (or, as Fanon avers, “Man is nothing, absolutely nothing”). It 
is at this tension (between necessity and hatred) that ontological terror 
turns into forms of physical, emotional, and psychic devastation. But we 
must also take very seriously Chandler’s statement that this metaphysical 
structure is “not so recognized and is far less often thought.” This struc-
ture is often not recognized and unthought because we think politics, 
law, and culture on its surface and not its depth (its essence), the struc-
ture upon which it rests — thus, we rarely understand that politics is the 
symptom of this tense metaphysical structure. Ontological Terror is an 
attempt to expose this infrastructure and its presumptions. But to do this, 
we must think otherwise, or, as Miguel de Beistegui argues, we must look 
elsewhere for the essence of politics, law, and culture.45
It is with this strategy of thinking otherwise, of being mindful of the 
metaphysical structure that goes undetected, that I understand the an-
tebellum free black as a paradigm of ontological terror. For at least syn-
tactically, the term free black holds the tension of this metaphysical in-
frastructure: to be free is much more than a legal status (although it is 
often reduced to this); it is an onto- existential condition in which the 
human can engage in its primordial relation (between self, Being, and 
its unique project of care). Freedom, then, is the condition of the free, 
and it indicates a certain ontological orientation in an antiblack world. 
“Black,” however, is the being stripped of this primary narrative, a being 
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that is the target of antiblack violence, since black and nothing become 
synonymous. In an antiblack world, black being can never be free but 
can be emancipated — but emancipation fails to resolve the metaphysical 
problem of black as nothing, which is necessary for anything like black 
freedom to exist. As long as a metaphysical world exists, a world that 
obliterates nothing, blacks will never be free. The free black presents syn-
tactical devastation in that it knots human being with black being and 
freedom with unfreedom. If we read this syntactical chaos as a symptom 
of the tension at the heart of the metaphysical infrastructure (necessity 
and hatred), then we understand that the concept of the free black is a 
problem for thought. One cannot think the free black within an antiblack 
world without resorting to the fantastical and the absurd. 
The free black threatens metaphysical purity by releasing this noth-
ing into the realm of the human — which, of course, is exactly what an 
antiblack world is designed to prevent. This signifier terrorizes, and the 
beings inhabiting the position “free black” also terrorize, as they become 
the materialization of this threat to human being. When I suggest that the 
free black is a paradigm of ontological terror, I do this as an attempt to 
think otherwise, to think the metaphysical infrastructure that often goes 
undetected. Thinking through paradigms provides a strategy for this 
type of thinking. The strategy of the paradigm, according to Agamben, 
is to juxtapose two entities until at a point of concentration, or intensity, 
so that they reveal aspects of each other. Entities within a paradigmatic 
analy sis become allegories of each other. One example, or instance, is 
used to provide insight into another.46 I think about the free black as an 
allegory of the problem of metaphysics and the problem of metaphys-
ics as an allegory of the free black. Thus, although the free black marks 
a particular phenomenological and historical instance (as distinct from 
other forms of black existence), we can read the free black allegorically to 
provide insight into the metaphysical infrastructure that goes unnoticed. 
Free blacks were situated in diverse geographical locations — the up-
per South, the deep South, the North, the Midwest; despite these diverse 
geographical locations and the different forms of antiblack violence each 
location deployed, the problem of antiblackness and the problem of black 
being remained a constant.47 The discourse and debates concerning ante-
bellum free blacks orbit around a tension, an unanswered question, that 
irrupts in forms of paradox and impasse. The Negro Question, then, pre-
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sents itself as a political discourse, one obsessed with black citizenship, 
political inclusion, and rights. But the Negro Question is rooted in a meta-
physical infrastructure that attempts to police the boundaries between 
the white human and its black equipment. This infrastructure is threat-
ened, however, with the presence of the free black, and it is the free black 
that becomes the obsession of this question. Since the free black knots 
freedom with unfreedom and human with nonhuman, the boundary be-
tween the ontological entities (white human and black slave) unravels. 
What I am suggesting is that the political discourse about free black cit-
izenship is the articulation of a metaphysical anxiety, one that threatens 
antebellum culture. Moreover, the Negro Question is, as I have suggested, 
a proper metaphysical question, since at its core it inquires whether black 
being can transform into human being. The free black brings this ques-
tion to the fore in a way that the slave does not. The condition of the slave 
is one of property, the condition of invention and perverse utility. This, of 
course, is what modernity intended for black being — that it would serve 
the world as pure function, property, and use. But the word free in the 
term free black is more than a legal designation; it is an inquiry into the 
metaphysical structure itself. For if black being is brought into the world 
as utility (as Justice Roger Taney would argue in the Dred Scott decision), 
then a free black would index a different mode of black being. Is such a 
different mode of being possible in an antiblack world? The word free ab-
sorbs all these metaphysical inquiries and anxieties.
This is precisely why the free black is such an important paradigm of 
ontological terror: because the free black resituates politics and exposes 
the metaphysical infrastructure. Thus, when Humen Humphrey, the sec-
ond president of Amherst College, writes in The African Repository that 
free blacks “are not looked upon as men, in the true and proper sense of 
the term,” he is responding to the proper metaphysical question: can black 
being transform into human being?48 Following Humphrey, freedom in-
dexes the “true and proper” sense of man; the truth of man can be located 
in his primordial relation to Being. But black being lacks this properness, 
as it marks the execration of Being, and the metaphysical transformation 
that the word free is designed to indicate utterly fails. The free black is a 
problem for an antiblack world in that his challenge to the metaphysical 
structure leaves him without a proper place or any metaphysical position 
that is intelligible.
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This lack of properness and metaphysical truth is a symptom of the 
nothing, for nothing lacks any proper place in metaphysics and cannot 
be understood through its episteme. Black being as nothing, then, will 
always be out of place and improper in an antiblack world. It is the terror 
of the metaphysical infrastructure, and one can never be a true or proper 
man when one bears the weight of nothing. Through this analysis, we can 
understand the anxiety concerning black being, placement, and nothing 
in antebellum culture.
In August 1842, for example, the free black population of Philadelphia 
held a parade commemorating the abolition of slavery in the West Indies. 
An angry mob of white citizens disrupted the parade, attacked partic-
ipants, and commenced to destroy black homes and property. Seeking 
redress through the courts for loss of property and injury, the free black 
population realized that justice within such a context was impossible, 
as the grand jury acquitted the rioters and blamed free blacks for incit-
ing this violence. Robert Purvis, a leader in the free black population of 
Philadelphia, responded to the grand jury’s decision with dismay:49 “The 
measure of our suffering is full. . . . From the most painful and minute in-
vestigation, in the feelings, views and acts of this community — in regard 
to us — I am convinced of our utter and complete nothingness in public 
estimation [emphasis mine].”50 
What sparked the riot, this devastating expression of antiblackness? 
We can locate this eruption of violence at the metaphysical fault line be-
tween necessity and hatred. Black being is both a necessary instrument 
for the human’s self- constitution and an object of ferocious hatred, since 
it bears the nothing of a metaphysical order. In other words, the riot is 
the symptom of a metaphysical problem: the public celebration of black 
freedom sparks a terror in that ontological boundaries are challenged 
and the transformation from black being, as invention/instrument, to 
human being, as free, is not only considered but celebrated. It is also no 
surprise that the grand jury blamed the victims for the riot, since black 
freedom is a form of violence for the human, a violence that must be met 
with extreme force. The riot is a response to ontological terror. “Free,” 
when paired with “black,” is recast as a weapon against the human and 
the metaphysical structure that sustains the human. We are dealing with 
two registers of violence — one is an ontological violence and another is a 
physical form of antiblack destruction. 
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But Purvis’s response to the violence is perspicuous. He is “convinced 
of our utter and complete nothingness in public estimation.” If we read 
this statement as a mere political lamentation, that blacks constitute a 
political cypher (nothingness) within the law and political processes, 
then we limit our understanding of the riot as event. The riot, within this 
reading, is just a form of cruelty or irrational intolerance or a political- 
economic strategy of subjection. With political readings of antiblack 
violence, violence is not gratuitous but must be linked to some type of 
recognizable transgression; when antiblack violence cannot be linked to 
recognizable transgression, it is considered cruel or irrational — a form of 
individual pathology and not systemic necessity. If, however, the essence 
of politics is nothing political, then we might read Purvis’s political com-
mentary as a response to the proper metaphysical question. His answer is 
that black being is nothingness in public estimation. We can understand 
nothingness as the condition (- ness) of bearing nothing in an antiblack 
world. Antiblack violence, then, constitutes the structure of this nothing. 
Black being is always already under attack; peace, within an antiblack 
world, is a fallacy (much like freedom). The metaphysical infrastructure 
that supports the fiction of the white human is sustained by antiblack vi-
olence. The riot is an ontological necessity, not just political cruelty. We 
can understand the grand jury’s decision philosophically: Being black is 
both the cause and effect of violence, and when this being claims freedom, 
extreme violence is always justified and necessary. 
After the egregious Dred Scott ruling, free blacks protested the deci-
sion. But one response to the decision in the Liberator intimates the lack 
of proper place within both politics and law: “[It is] already [a] well known 
fact that under the Constitution and Government of the United States, the 
colored people are nothing, and can be nothing but an alien, disfranchised 
and degraded class [emphasis mine].”51
The nothing that black being constitutes here is what Jared Sexton 
would call a “null status.”52 The alien is precisely this improper position, 
as out of place and, in essence, inhabiting no place within the world at 
all. This, perhaps, is what it means for black being to ek- sist, not just out-
side of one’s self but outside of the world. Degradation and unfreedom 
are the manifestations of this nothing, a status within law and politics 
that is empty — void of the flesh and any substance of biofuturity. Again, 
on one register we could identify this nothing that the “colored people” 
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constitute as the political cypher, a pariah class within an (un)democratic 
arrangement of power; but what undergirds this political reading is an on-
tological reading — since the political reading takes the metaphysical in-
frastructure for granted and builds upon it. In other words, the null status 
that translates into political forms of disenfranchisement and degrada-
tion depends on the exclusion of black being from the realm of humanity. 
The “colored people” are nothing precisely because they are not viewed as 
men in the “true and proper sense,” as Humphrey argued (indeed, noth-
ing could never be a proper man within science and philosophy — only 
a hologram of sorts). The response in the Liberator provides an answer 
to the metaphysical question: the transmogrification between property 
and human, what we would call “freedom” politically, is deceptive; it is 
merely a political procedure that is unable to resolve an ontological prob-
lem. The problem of black being remains, despite the nominal status “free 
black.” Political oppression is a symptom of the metaphysical dilemma of 
knotting black being with human freedom. This conceptualization is so 
threatening and catachrestic that it can only be described as “nothing.” 
But this nothing is not synonymous with nonexistence — once we have 
put existence by the wayside, as Fanon would suggest — but it is an index 
of a lack of ontological resistance. Free in the term free black does not 
restore ontological resistance (the flesh); it relegates black being to the 
abyss of the metaphysical infrastructure, the nothing that preconditions 
politics and law.
The response, then, could also be read as juxtaposing two grammars — 
the political/juridical and the ontological — to articulate the dilemma of 
black being within these two registers of existence. The “alien, disfran-
chised and degraded class” is an index of political violence, but the noth-
ing interposes the ontological register. Neither register provides safe ha-
ven or existential (biofuturistic) possibility for black being. If the human 
can at least make recourse to the ontological, the primordial relation, to 
ground being against political violence, black being is unable to find any 
resolution in the ontological, as the ontological does not provide an expla-
nation for its being — if we follow Fanon. The free black is the sign of a dou-
ble violence, an onticide, on two registers of existence that would provide 
value and meaning for being. This fundamental lack of value and meaning 
is the crisis, or urgency, that the Negro Question is designed to invoke. 
We get a sense of this in another submission to The African Repository: 
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“Introduced among us by violence, notoriously ignorant, degraded and 
miserable, mentally diseased, broken spirited, acted upon by no motive 
to honorable exertions, scarcely reached in their debasement by heavenly 
light the [free blacks] wander unsettled and unbefriended through our 
land, or sit indolent, abject and sorrowful, by the streams which witness 
their captivity.”53
This wandering assumes a metaphorical and literal instantiation, since 
black being, lacking grounding in both ontology and politics/law, moves 
and floats throughout the world, without a proper place or any geography 
that could be identified as home. The free black, unbefriended, indolent, 
“abject,” and “sorrowful,” lacks political constituency that is recognized 
by politics and law (as Justice Roger Taney argued) and is situated in an 
abyss that is “scarcely reached . . . by heavenly light” (i.e., the Negro as 
black metaphysically).
Another author, keen to this movement, describes it this way in The 
African Repository: “They [free blacks] remain as a floating body in our 
midst, drifting, as the census table shows, hither and thither, as the ef-
fects of climate at the North, or foreign emigration at the East, or prej-
udices at the South, repel it from the points. It is an interesting subject 
of investigating to watch the movements of the colored population, and 
ascertain where they are tending and whither they will find a resting place 
[emphasis mine].”54
The “floating body” is an allegorical sign of the nothing that lacks form 
or placement within a political/ontological landscape (a sign of formless-
ness). It floats “hither and thither” in the interstitial crevices of existence, 
without a resting place. A certain liquidity marks the existence of the free 
black, and the Census attempts to capture something that is difficult — 
the problem of black being. The conjoining of the words free and black, 
the domain of the human and the domain of the ontological instrument, 
opens up this problem discursively and presents it as an incessant move-
ment between established properties (or the “in- between” as Nahum 
Chandler would call it). The North, South, East, and West are not only 
geographical regions in the United States, regions that have either barred 
free blacks from entry or made their residence miserable, but also alle-
gories of livability and the world itself. To ek- sist outside oneself and the 
world means that one lacks a space of life, meaning, and futurity. Black 
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being is barred from cartographies of livability in much the same way the 
free black is excluded from states and localities.55 
We must also remember that this floating body is also a form of ter-
ror, ontological terror. For nothing terrorizes the human by rendering 
the metaphysical infrastructure fallible; its claim to truth is secured only 
though tremendous violence — antiblack violence. We can read the dan-
ger that the free black presents to antebellum culture as particular terror 
for the human. A contributor to The African Repository urges readers to 
contend with this danger:
In order to estimate correctly the magnitude of the evil, which will 
come upon us, unless we take steps in time to arrest the danger, we 
need only consider the paid increase of the black population in the 
United States since 1800 . . . the free blacks are also increasing with 
fearful rapidity, especially in the Southern states. We should not shut 
our eyes to the danger until it comes upon us in all its fearfulness, but 
with a wise foresight and manly resolution we should now take the 
necessary steps to avoid it. It is our duty, then, to commence an early 
and energetic and systematic movement to prevent the danger . . . it is 
evident that we must devise some scheme to get clear of the free black 
population, which is becoming an incubus upon all the states. . . . Ten-
nessee at this time, has not a very large free black population, and we 
can, if we will commence in time, get rid of them at but little expense, 
but if we defer the matter much longer the evil will grow upon us in a 
fearful manner.56
This danger assumes a theological and ethical dimension, an evil of 
tremendous magnitude. For the contributor, the increase in the free black 
population is a danger to the nation — black presence and danger assume 
a pernicious interchangeability in this calculus. The objective is for the 
nation to get rid of them before the danger grows. Part of the contribu-
tor’s thinking is embedded in the strategy of relocation — in particular, 
the colonization scheme. Removing the free black presence from U.S. 
soil becomes an ethical and theological imperative, since this presence 
threatens to destroy the nation, a political eschatology in which black-
ness is refigured as the end of days, the end of the order of things. But 
what about the black presence is so threatening? It seems that freedom 
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and blackness are incompatible concepts for many antebellum thinkers; 
in particular, blacks are incapable of bearing the burden of freedom. This 
incompatibility unravels society and produces blacks that are “notoriously 
ignorant, degraded and miserable, mentally diseased, broken spirited, and 
acted upon by no motive to honorable exertions.” What the contributor is 
intimating is that the transmogrification between ontological instrument 
(or equipment) and the human is a destructive enterprise, since it defies 
the function of black being in modernity. Reading the contributor, it is 
almost as if emancipation creates monsters from within the laboratory 
of culture (or what Hortense Spillers would call the “cultural vestibular-
ity”). And the ethical and theological implication of this monstrosity can 
only be captured through the sign of evil. Sylvia Wynter remarks that the 
Negro must stand in for “all that is evil” to provide the axiological and 
theological grounding for the human, along skin difference.57As available 
instrument, without flesh or ontological resistance, the Negro stands at 
the threshold between heaven and hell, a position without any ethical or 
moral equivalent — a nothing within the symbolic of ethics, morality, or 
theology. It is this position, as the wretched threshold, that constitutes the 
evil the contributor imagines. The nation, then, must excise the danger 
to restore itself. What the author describes as an evil is the ontological 
function of black being: to absorb the anxieties, the violation of sacred 
boundaries, and the execration of Being.
In other words, we might formulate a link between the discourse of 
evil and that of the nothing. For nothing is pure execration itself — cursed 
by Being and by God. Having been cursed, the wretched (non)thing of 
metaphysics, stained by blackness, terrorizes moral and ethical boundar-
ies of properness. Because the Negro violates sacred boundaries between 
freedom and humanity, righteousness and whiteness, and blackness and 
abjection, it is evil. Or the Negro is out of place (and without a place) and 
collapses metaphysical meaning, as Julia Kristeva would understand ab-
jection.58 And according to Wynters, this evil cannot serve as a proper 
object of knowledge or, might I add, a proper object of politics and law. 
The condition of the antebellum free black, one in which the technol-
ogies of antiblackness render it an object of hatred, mimes or allegorizes 
the condition of the nothing in an antiblack world as the hated thing that 
must be destroyed at all cost.59 The paradigm between the antebellum 
free black and the (non)metaphysical nothing reaches a point of intense 
the Question oF bLack being 59
intersection and saturation in which the antebellum free black must em-
body the nothing of this metaphysics. Antebellum culture is an instance 
of an antiblack organization of existence, a microcosm of an antiblack 
world; and the anxiety and hatred that it directs against the free black is 
its attempt to contend with nothing in its historical instantiation. The 
free black and antebellum cultures constitute two aspects of a war with-
out end. The war is much more pernicious than antebellum society’s de-
sire to maintain white supremacy and dominance; it is but one global 
example of the obsession with destroying this nothing, manifested as the 
black Negro. 
Citizens of Illinois also expressed similar sentiment in that the situa-
tion with free blacks was so dire that “[they] would take the matter into 
[their] own hands, and commence a war of extermination.”60 A partici-
pant at an Indiana convention was explicit about the necessity of the vi-
olence against the free black: “It would be better to kill them off at once, 
if there is no other way to get rid of them. After all, we know how the 
Puritans did with the Indians, who were infinitely more magnanimous 
and less impudent than the colored race.”61 Extermination and brute force 
are the responses to the terror that is the free black. The terror that in-
terrupts and fractures the metaphysical infrastructure — the formless 
nothing that disturbs the form of the human’s existential meaning and 
grounding — must be removed or eliminated. If we rely on a mere polit-
ical reading of this desire for extermination, we end up in the terrain of 
the irrational and the cruel. But this reading misses the crucial point that 
violence against black being is gratuitous precisely because an antiblack 
world will continuously and relentlessly attempt to eliminate the nothing 
that is the evil, black Negro (i.e., there isn’t a solution or analysis of the 
violence that aligns with political reasoning or calculus). The gratuity of 
violence — in all its manifestations — is an ontological problem.
CODA: THE NEGRO QUESTION
What I have attempted to do in this chapter is to nestle into the philo-
sophical crevices of an “unasked question,” as Fred Moten describes it in 
the opening epigraph. Perhaps the question of the meaning of black being 
is unanswerable because we’ve lacked a philosophical tradition that 
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would provide refuge and clarity — this is the ultimate meaning of on-
tometaphysical homelessness. Given that ontology does not provide the 
resources to understand the being of the black (Fanon) and epistemology 
is unable to present this being as a proper object of knowledge (Wynters), 
the question is a profound conundrum, one that we must continue to 
sing or orbit around. What I have proposed is merely a path toward an 
exploration of this great abyss. The Negro Question, as I have argued, is 
an ontometaphysical question, or as Heidegger has called it, a “proper 
metaphysical question.” For the Negro Question gets at the bottom of the 
ontometaphysical infrastructure, since it is the Negro that, paradoxically, 
both enables and disables such a structure. But if an answer to a proper 
metaphysical question does not do away with the question, then the path 
that I have laid out will produce more questions, more discomforts, and 
more anxieties. This is unavoidable, given the position of black(ness). My 
proposition is this: to approach this abyss, the Negro Question, we must 
first understand the ontological dimensions of terror — for it is this terror 
that sustains the ontometaphysical infrastructure. In an antiblack, meta-
physical world, the object of this terror is nothing. But since nothing itself 
is impossible to target, given that it fractures the ontic sciences and its in-
struments (and is not an apprehensible object through these discourses), 
this nothing must be imposed onto bodies (ontological instruments). 
Black being is the embodiment of this nothing, and it is black being that is 
targeted with an unending violence (gratuitous violence). Antiblackness 
is essentially anti- nothing. Ontological terror, then, is antiblack technol-
ogies, tactics, and practices of nothing eradication. But this enterprise 
attempts an impossible task, and because it is impossible, it will continue 
obsessively after its impossible object (like the Lacanian drive).62 Violence 
against black being will continue until metaphysics itself is destroyed. 
Approaching an ontometaphysical form of terror is a difficult enter-
prise, but I have chosen a paradigmatic approach (following the example 
of Agamben) to lead me in this direction. The antebellum free black is 
important, since (1) the Negro Question has often centered the free black 
as the problem, a problem that must be resolved with forms of violence 
(any analysis of the free black [historical or philosophical] will carry this 
question with it as part of the investigation); and (2) the free black both 
allegorizes ontological terror and itself is an instance of ontological terror. 
Paradigms allegorize an example by taking the example out of its context, 
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but it also brings the allegorical parallel structure to an intense point of 
saturation and intersection, thus rendering the decontextualized example 
an instance of the very thing it is intended to allegorize.63 This, for me, is 
the necessity of the free black, since what emerges from the tension be-
tween the terms free and black is precisely the terror of nothing. The free 
black is catachrestic and imaginary ontologically for antebellum thinkers. 
The semantic confusion masks a more insidious terror — the free black as 
the destabilization of the metaphysical structure. If the human is to main-
tain its fiction of ontological coherence, it must exterminate the problem. 
But extermination is not a solution because, as Frank Wilderson has per-
suasively argued, “Without the Negro, capacity itself is incoherent, uncer-
tain at best.”64 This is the tension between necessity and hatred (and the 
same tension between metaphysics and nothing). Without the Negro, the 
narcissistic coherence of the human being dissolves, but with the Negro 
the terror persists. There is no out to this deadlock. And this is why the 
Negro Question is unanswerable and has often remained unasked philo-
sophically and historically. 
What follows is my attempt to ask the unasked question, a proper 
metaphysical question — which will inevitably lead to more questions. 
Each chapter is a meditation on an aspect of this question through the 
paradigm of the free black. 
TWO
OUTLAWING
In the Weltanschauung of a colonized people there is an impurity, a flaw that 
outlaws any ontological explanation. Someone may object that this is the case 
with every individual, but such an objection merely conceals a basic problem. 
Ontology — once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside — 
 does not permit us to understand the being of the black man. The black man 
has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man.
FRANTZ FANON , Black Skin, White Masks
The essence of law is not legal. . . . The essence of law is distorted in its ontic 
occurrence. . . . The Being of law is the unfolding of law. . . . We need to think 
through the essence of law in the order of Being.
OREN BEN- DOR , Thinking about Law: In Silence with Heidegger 
THE IMPURITY AND THE FLAW 
What will preoccupy our investigation here is the relation, or (non)rela-
tion, between black being, law, and ontology. How exactly does the law 
produce and reproduce forms of terror that are ontological — meaning 
laws that sustain the metaphysical holocaust? As we unravel the layers 
of metaphysical violence occurring over deep time, we realize that law 
emerges as a crucial aspect of this violence. My concern is not a particular 
law, but that all laws are subordinate to a Law. The distinction between 
law and Law is the distinction between metaphysics and ontology that 
will serve as a heuristic guide in this investigation. I have argued that 
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the ontological difference is not an issue for black being, since available 
equipment cannot present a proper ontological question — it lacks Being 
(one must present a proper metaphysical question without any hope of 
ontological explanation). But we use the distinction between metaphysics 
and ontology as a way to understand, to the extent that we can do so, the 
multilayered manifestations of this terror.
Fanon builds a way into this (non)relation when he suggests, “There is 
an impurity, a flaw that outlaws any ontological explanation.” Black being 
is a certain contamination or imperfection within the precincts of on-
tometaphysics. And understanding or explaining this contamination 
(hermeneutics and epistemology, for example) not only is impossible with 
the instruments of ontology (since it does not permit us to understand 
black being) but is also outlawed — prohibited or forbidden. We might 
ask, then, what form of law both forbids ontological explanation and ren-
ders such explanation (and being) contaminated? Fanon adumbrates an 
ontological law, which manifests in other forms of phenomenological- 
existential violence. But ontology must outlaw ontological terror, since 
it presents its field as pure (i.e., Being is impervious to politics, violence, 
and terror), and violence within this field is an incomprehensible con-
tamination. Thinking with the free black, we will investigate this practice 
of outlawing and the challenge it presents to postmetaphysics and black 
humanism. 
Our investigation will propose the following: (1) There is a fundamen-
tal distinction between law (metaphysical incarnation) and Law (the on-
tological dimension). (2) Both the law and the Law outlaw black being, by 
necessity. The prohibition on black being, then, occurs on both the on-
tological and ontic levels. This collusion contaminates ontology, so black 
being is prohibited and is an inclusive exclusion. (3) The free black, as 
paradigm, presents both an allegory and instance of this violence on both 
levels through reification (freedom papers), temporal suspension, onto-
logical insecurity (kidnapping), and a gifted self, which lacks ipseity. (4) 
A fundamental gap between freedom and emancipation exists that black 
humanists have collapsed in their philosophical romance. Black being 
only has access to emancipation, never freedom. Emancipation is an ap-
erture on the domain of terror and not self- adequation. 
Our investigation will proceed by reading Fanon alongside the post-
metaphysical thinking of Heidegger, Nancy, and Ben- Dor to understand 
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the essence of law as nothing other than antiblackness. Fanon presents 
an alternative essence that postmetaphysical legal theorists and philos-
ophers have neglected because it defies explanation. The aim here is to 
trace out the techniques and strategies of outlawing and to demonstrate 
that these tactics and strategies are forms of terror for black being — 
ontological terror. Ultimately, we arrive at the conclusion that the free 
black exists to not exist. 
THE LAW OF BEING AND THE BEING OF LAW
We cannot think the essence of Law without the execration, the nothing, 
of black being. For this execration constitutes an unresolvable exception 
within the order of Being. What is the essence of Law? What is the ex-
ception that black being inhabits? I suggest that these two questions fold 
into each other, almost becoming indistinguishable, and the geometry of 
this enfolding is what Heidegger would call “ontological difference.” In 
other words, the essence of Law and the exception of black being are both 
problems of ontological difference: one a problem of distortion/deferral 
and the other a problem of exclusion (or inclusive exclusion). The question 
of Law is inseparable from the question of black being.
What sustains the law, or provides the condition of law’s possibility, 
is ontological difference itself. We can think of the essence of law not as 
a scientific thing or a metaphysical object of knowledge, but as an un-
folding of Being through law, which mediates through ontic distortion. 
Following Heidegger, we understand that ontological difference is that 
primordial (non)relation between Being and being in which being rep-
resents itself through metaphysical predispositions within the world, pre-
dispositions that forget the grandeur of Being,1 and Being presents itself 
to being against (and through) the distorted screen of metaphysics (i.e., 
the restriction of being as primarily representation, correlation, object, 
and predictability). Ontological difference is sustained through ontic dis-
tortion, since this distortion both conceals Being (enables its withdrawal) 
and occasions Being’s revealing or unfolding. The aim of a postmetaphys-
ical enterprise, then, is to develop strategies to address this distortion so 
that the essence is revealed in its truth. 
Since Being infuses itself into every facet of human existence, onto-
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logical difference and distortion are also issues for law. The metaphysi-
cal predispositions of law — the amendments, regulations, mandates, and 
legislations (what I will call the “being of law”) — distort the Law of Being 
[Dikē]. The Law of Being, or the order and call of Being in relation to hu-
man being, is one of abandonment. Being’s Law is that the human fully 
gives himself to the ban (to exist in unbridled abandonment toward Be-
ing), the order of Being, which is nothing other than abandonment itself. 
I will expound on abandonment further as the argument unfolds, but for 
our purpose here, the point is that law is also a feature of a distorted on-
tological difference: between the Law of Being (ontology) and the being 
of law (law’s metaphysical incarnation as decree, formalist science, leg-
islation). The relation between law’s essence, Being- as- essence unfolding 
through law, and law’s juridical and legislative incarnation is not only the 
precondition for anything like citizenship, justice, freedom, and political 
community to have any existence or meaning at all in the world, but also 
the space of a pernicious terror, what I will call “ontological terror,” from 
which black being as exception emerges. 
Distortion, then, not only conceals Being within the metaphysical pre-
cincts of law, but also conceals the breakdown of the ontological differ-
ence — the terror at the heart of the ontological distinction. What I am 
suggesting here is that we must push the fact of the black- as- nothing to 
its extreme consequence: if the black is available equipment, a body with-
out flesh, then the ontological distinction is not an issue for it (it is only 
an issue for the human). The ontological difference that preconditions 
the human’s freedom and citizenship, for example, is not a difference 
that provides grounding for the black as available equipment. In essence, 
black being is the physical incarnation of distortion, on another register, 
a register that provides the condition of possibility for the ontological 
difference so sacred to postmetaphysicians. The physical black body is a 
distortion and an ontic illusion. This black body, as equipment, cannot 
appeal to Being for grounding, freedom, or futurity, since it emerges as a 
thing for the human to understand ontological difference (by using black 
equipment — both ready- at- hand and present- at- hand — the human un-
derstands his there- ness within the world of objects, his historical place). 
Black being is a distortion to the extent that the black body conceals 
the breakdown of the ontological difference. Black being, as equipment, 
is not ontological but other, something we lack a proper grammar to 
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describe — there isn’t a distinction apart from the metaphysical that can 
protect black being in an antiblack world. Thus, we cannot truly posit 
a fundamental difference between the metaphysical, antiblack body of 
commerce and an ontology beyond, or in spite of, this body. Asserting 
this “beyond” is the aspiration of black humanists and postmetaphysi-
cians, which I believe is flawed. This poses a particular problem for law, 
however, since black being necessitates a perversion of law’s function and 
objective ontologically. 
To understand this function and objective of law, we must return to 
the ontological difference that is an issue for the human. In Thinking 
about Law: In Silence with Heidegger, Oren Ben- Dor understands law 
as a feature of Heidegger’s ontological difference, and from this differ-
ence we can envision an ethics that emerges from the Order of Being. 
Although Heidegger does not write explicitly about law (at least not with 
the metaphysical expectations of legal theorists and lawyers), his insight 
into the Greek word dikē provides an opening onto a postmetaphysical 
analysis of law. Ben- Dor revisits Heidegger’s critique of metaphysical 
thinking through his engagement with Plato’s Republic in the essays “The 
Scope and Context of Plato’s Meditation on the Relationship of Art and 
Truth,” “The Anaximander Fragment,” and “The Limitation of Being” 
(published in Introduction to Metaphysics). According to Ben- Dor, Dikē 
“has three senses, all interconnected: of order [ fug in the German], of 
protection and of justice. [These are] the threefold senses of the essence 
of law distorted in the ontic for- the- most- part being and thinking with 
and through law.”2 Furthermore, Ben- Dor suggests that “Dikē connotes 
the protection offered to the guardian of Being [Dasein] against the harm 
done to it by the entrenched legal,” and this is the “Law of the Being of 
being.”3
Ben- Dor’s philosophical rereading of Heidegger’s work is sophisticated 
and complex, but what I find particularly illuminating, and what I will 
focus on here, is the function of law that he presents. He seems to suggest 
that the function of law — the metaphysical incarnation of it — is to protect 
and enforce the unfolding of Being or the primordial relation between 
the human and Being. This function is distorted, however, by an ontic 
legalism (or science of law), which focuses on calculating injury, objectify-
ing redress, schematizing rights/privileges, and predicting consequences. 
What redress, rights, and consequences all conceal is their fundamen-
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tal relationship to Being. In other words, you have rights to protect and 
sustain your relation with Being against forces designed to pulverize it 
(what we call “injury”). The self that anchors rights discourse, injury, and 
privilege becomes an ersatz, or insufficient, substitute for a (non)relation 
between the human’s there- ness and Being. Returning to this primordial 
function of law, as protecting the unfolding of Being, helps us to sort 
through the seductions of legalism — that is, the proposed legal solutions 
to the problems of injury just sustain it, since these solutions forget Being. 
In short, as read through Heidegger and Ben- Dor, injury is the conse-
quence of forgetting Being and distorting the function of this tool for the 
guardian of Being — to protect and enforce this (non)relation.
I would also suggest, following Heidegger and Ben-Dor, that “Ethics” 
and “Freedom” are two proper names for protecting and enforcing this 
(non)relation. Within the corpus of law, both freedom and ethics orbit 
around the protection of this self (the primordial relation) from the in-
juries of indignity and denial. Or, as Ben- Dor states, “To let Dasein gain 
ground, to let Dasein ground as one with the simple unity of the fourfold, 
is to be ethical. To let Dasein be open towards its unfolding world as the 
grounding of its nearest is ethical. To protect and enforce such ground is 
the essence of law.”4
The law is an ontological instrument. Its purpose is distorted by the 
supremacy of metaphysical imperatives and objectives. But within this 
primordial function, we must tease out another distinction: the Law of 
Being and the being of law. What I have discussed thus far is the being of 
law — the metaphysical instrument designed to protect and enforce the 
Law of Being. The being of law is something akin to the executive agency 
of the Law of Being. Our legislative decrees, policies, and rights are all 
subordinate to the Law of Being. 
ABANDONMENT AND OUTLAWING 
What is the Law of Being? If we think of Law as the order of Being [dikē], 
then we understand this order, not just as a realm or field (e.g., like a polit-
ical order), but also as a command (e.g., an order from a parental figure) of 
its particular saying, demand, or requirement. Perhaps the realm of Being 
is nothing more than this command itself. The Law of Being, then, is the 
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order of Being — what it requires and how this requirement sustains Being 
(since the human is the guardian of Being and Being needs this guard-
ianship, or care, to manifest). But this order is peculiar, and it confounds 
our diurnal (and metaphysical) understanding of a law and the order that 
characterizes law in general. 
What is quite remarkable about Jean- Luc Nancy’s The Birth of Presence 
is his interpretation of the (non)relation between Being, being, and law. For 
the Law of Being is a law that conditions all law (our metaphysical under-
standing of law as this or that decree/legislation as it concerns beings) and 
a law that “gives nothing, but orders.” This order is revealed to be abandon-
ment (the Law of Being is the Law of Abandonment). There is a fundamen-
tal (non)relation between law and abandonment; indeed, abandonment 
preconditions any law and is understood as the law outside of law that 
is itself a law (something akin to an exception that is within and without 
simultaneously). Abandonment is the “not” of law, to borrow Oren Ben- 
Dor’s conception — this “not” escapes simple negativity (i.e., “this is radi-
cally different from that,” a metaphysical formulation), but is the within/
without exception that undergirds our metaphysical understanding of 
law. To return to Nancy, his presentation of abandonment, as the Law of 
Abandonment and the (non)relation between it and being (abandoned be-
ing) presents the condition of law as that which withholds or dissimulates 
itself within being. We can understand Nancy as suggesting the Law of 
Abandonment demands absolute submission to the withdrawal of Being 
through (and within) the there- ness of the human’s being (Being revealed 
through the dissimulation of itself within being — withdrawal). According 
to Nancy:
One always abandons to a law. The destitution of abandoned being 
is measured by the limitless severity of the law to which it finds it-
self exposed. Abandonment does not constitute a subpoena to present 
oneself before this or that court of law. It is a compulsion to appear 
absolutely under the law, under the law as such and in its totality. In 
the same way — it is the same thing — to be banished does not amount 
to coming under a provision of the law, but rather to coming under the 
entirety of the law. Turned over to the absolute of the law, the banished 
one is thereby abandoned completely outside its jurisdiction. The law 
of abandonment requires the law be applied through its withdrawal. 
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The Law of abandonment is the other of the law, which constitutes 
the law.
Abandoned being finds itself deserted to a degree that it finds itself 
remitted, entrusted, or thrown to this law that constitutes the law, this 
other and same, to this other side of all law that borders and upholds 
a legal universe; an absolute, solemn order, which prescribes nothing 
but abandonment. . . . Abandonment respects the law; it cannot do 
otherwise.5
Nancy’s etymological investigation of abandonment presents the term 
as deriving from bandon (bandum, band, bannen), meaning an “order, 
prescription, a decree, a permission, and a power that holds these freely 
at its disposal. To abandon is to remit, entrust, or turn over to such a 
sovereign power, and to remit, entrust or turn over to its ban, that is to 
its proclaiming, to its convening, and to its sentencing.”6 Thus, Nancy 
suggests that the Law of Abandonment orders absolute submission, or 
remittance, to the ban (or law) of Being. This formulation necessitates a 
clarification of what the Law itself entails (we know, thus far, that it re-
quires absolute submission to abandonment, as the withdrawal of Being 
through dissimulation). What is most important for our engagement with 
Nancy is precisely this clarification; for it adumbrates the inseparability 
of law and the human being:
Man is the being of abandoned being and as such is constituted or 
rather instituted only by the reception of the order to see man here, 
there where he is abandoned. To order to see is still an eidetic, or the-
oretical, order. But what it gives the order to see, the there of man, 
offers no idea, gives nothing to be seen . . . a place gives itself to be 
seen, configures itself, but here or there (it is the same, and the other), 
although it imparts places, although it broaches space and outlines its 
schemas, itself remains invisible. Here opens a spacing, clears an area 
upon which being is thrown, abandoned.7
What, then, does Nancy mean with this spacing of the order? If what 
defines the human’s being is Da- sein [being there], then Being unfolds 
through the thrown- ness of the human in that very place (that very there). 
“Man is only ordered as being- there, or to be there — that is, here.”8 Thus, 
the Law of Abandonment orders the human to see this very place (space 
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as there- ness) within which Being unfolds through it. But there is a co-
nundrum: the law demands a seeing of the place of Being’s unfolding but 
this place is invisible — the demand to see what is invisible, as a necessity 
of the order, is what constitutes withdrawal. According to Nancy, this 
constitutes an impossible categorical imperative, an impossibility that 
sets something like Kant’s categorical imperative into motion (i.e., an im-
possible law founds the instantiation of all laws). But why is this place 
invisible? It is invisible precisely because the place where Being unfolds 
is the place where it also withdraws. We are thus ordered to see the place 
of withdrawal that constitutes the human as such. This withdrawal does 
not conform to the metaphysical schema of time/space, so it demands 
obedience to an impossible demand. 
What we can take from Nancy’s diacritical presentation is that all laws 
(i.e., legislation passed by Congress, amendments, decrees) are subordinate 
to an impossible demand to see an invisible space of Being’s withdrawal — 
into the very there- ness that one is thrown. Although one cannot see the 
place, the order to see anyway is the order upon which law gains its eth-
ical ground. To see what is invisible sets the enterprise of law — as both 
protection and enforcement — into motion. 
But what I would like to present is an additional problematic: all seeing 
is predicated upon blindness. Something must remain outside the field 
of vision for the seeing to take place — blindness provides the condition 
of possibility for the sight mandated, even to see the invisible. We can 
also conceive of Nancy’s ban through another perspective, as least etymo-
logically, then. Ban also connotes a covering over or a censuring. When 
something is censured, it provides the condition of possibility for some-
thing else to be seen. Thus, the ban, the Law of Abandonment, not only 
requires the seeing of the invisible, but simultaneously the not seeing, the 
censuring, of the non- place (the always already not there or here). What I 
am suggesting is that the Law of Abandonment is doubled (and conceals 
this doubling). The double function is to see the invisible and not see that 
which never arrived — that which lacked a there- ness through which Be-
ing would withdraw. 
This second, and hidden, order of law is what I will call “outlawing,” 
following Frantz Fanon. It is the demand not to see the nonarrival, which 
Being parasitically relies upon for its own withdrawal. This, I argue, is a 
simultaneous order not to see black being, since it is without a world and 
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lacks a there- ness within the unfolding of Being. Blackness terrifies and 
is terrorized, ontologically, because it lacks a place from which an ethical 
imperative to see can emerge. Following Hortense Spillers, the conse-
quence of this perverse imperative is that “we lose any hint or suggestion 
of a dimension of ethics, of relatedness . . . to that extent, the procedure 
adopted for the captive flesh demarcates a total objectification.”9 Spillers 
also suggests that “[the] undecipherable markings on the captive body ren-
der a kind of hieroglyphics of the flesh whose severe disjunctures come to 
be hidden to the cultural seeing of skin color”10 (emphasis mine). Spil lers’s 
“cultural seeing” is precisely Nancy’s impossible imperative to see, and 
the metaphysical holocaust (destruction of the flesh as primary narrative), 
which censures (bans) blackness out of sight, hides this devastation and 
recasts it as an unseen ontological hieroglyphic within law — unreadable 
and unseen within the Order of Being. Thus, the refusal to see the un-
readable sign of ontological violence (hieroglyphic) is the Order of Being. 
Outlawing is the enforced not seeing and maintenance of onticide — the 
continued destruction of the flesh. This not seeing is a condition of all law, 
both ontologically and metaphysically. Outlawing entails (1) censuring 
the ontological seeing of black being’s holocaust, which continually oblit-
erates there- ness and (2) the not of law, as the outside/inside formulation 
of the imperative. Outlawing is outside law, since it contravenes the ethi-
cal imperative to see the invisible, and also inside law, since it enables and 
conditions this very imperative — the censure is at the very heart of law. 
Outlawing is the exception that determines our legal and ethical norms. 
To push this analysis further, I will suggest that the Law of Being (the 
Law of Abandonment) is antiblackness. Being can only provide a there- 
ness from which to withdraw from an antiblack order or injunction. An-
tiblackness is the place of Being’s historical unfolding, its perverse call to 
the human being. Why is this the case? The human requires equipment 
to re- member its (non)relation to Being, and for modernity, black being 
is the premier equipment of the human’s existential journey through the 
world in his thrown- ness. Without equipment to help the human through 
his existential journey, re- membering Being is an impossible feat. 
In Race, Law, and Resistance, Patricia Tuitt presents an important 
analysis of modern law. Drawing on the groundbreaking work of critical 
race theorists such as Patricia Williams, Cheryl Harris, and Kimberly 
Cren shaw, Tuitt suggests that the slave was a cause of modern law. It is 
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commonplace to assume that the law existed prior to slavery and that 
the slave was merely governed by various codes and regulations. But for 
Tuitt, the slave engenders law. We can understand this engendering as 
the attempt to reconcile the obliteration of the ethical relation (the pro-
duction of equipment in human form) with the ontological function of 
law — to protect and enforce the (non)relation between being and Being. 
Tuitt avers, “If we examine modern law in light of the emergence of its 
doctrine, it can be seen, that the slave existed at its earliest point. To be 
more precise, we can say that the slave was one of the chief causes of 
modern law, alongside animals and inanimate objects such as weapons 
and jewels. The slave was the only human agent among the ‘things’ that 
the law sought to integrate in its dominant conception of contractual re-
lations, and was thus, I would suggest, one of the earliest subjects/objects 
of modern law.”11
Although Tuitt’s analysis presents a humanist desire to reclaim the 
slave as a human agent, despite the fact the law considers the slave prop-
erty alongside inanimate and animate objects, rendering it a subject/object 
(which I believe is a strategy that only yields contradiction and aporias), 
her claim that the presence of the slave engenders law provides insight into 
the relation between law and ontology. Contract law (law of chattel) is per-
haps the hallmark of modern legal development, given the need to regulate 
commerce and specify the rights and entitlement of property holders. But 
this corpus of law emerges because one needs to integrate the slave into 
the world. In other words, contract law conceals an ontological project: it 
uses the discourse of property, chattel, rights, and trade to divide the world 
into human subjects [Dasein], those who are entitled to the protection and 
enforcement of their ontological (non)relation, and the world of things, 
those entities lacking such protection of any relation, but whose existence 
is necessary for the human to operate within the world. The law of chat-
tel performs the work of dividing legal seeing from not seeing. Thus, the 
law of chattel, through the contract form, is predicated upon an ontolog-
ical difference that it disavows (or more precisely forgets): the difference 
between Being (the self that is the locus of rights and entitlement, as a 
stand- in for the ontological [non]relation) and being (the world of objects 
that support this self). 
To read Oren Ben- Dor’s postmetaphysical meditation on law through 
(and against) Patricia Tuitt’s theoretical analysis of contract law, we can 
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suggest that the primary function of chattel law is to protect and enforce 
the ground of the (non)relation — this law is ethical to the extent that the 
rights bestowed to the property holder enable him to project himself into 
the world of things and to re- member Being. The destruction of the flesh, 
the onticide that renders the slave available equipment, is a legal necessity, 
since contract law depends on it — the slave is produced through this very 
violence. Ben- Dor’s suggestion that “the essence of law is not legal” pro-
vides a hermeneutic for reading and interpreting law, as always already an 
ontological enterprise. Taking chattel law, for example, the essence of this 
law is not the regulation of commerce and property rights, but the onto-
logical division the law engenders between the world of things (equip-
ment) and the world of the subject (the being for which Being is an issue 
for it — and thus requires rights to discover this issue). Moreover, this 
legal division is predicated upon both Nancy’s “seeing the invisible” and 
outlawing black being. Ethics and freedom are the ontological discourses 
of law. They perform the crucial work of dividing the world between the 
free (the human) and unfree (the equipment of the human) and between 
humans and available equipment. Again, we lose any hint or suggestion 
of ethics between the human and his equipment (the not there), as Spil-
lers suggests. The law of chattel relies on this loss of the ethical relation 
as a condition of its possibility — if the slave (as chattel) were to arrive in 
the withdrawn place of Being and have that inhabitation protected and 
enforced, the entire edifice of chattel law (a particular feature of modern 
contract law) would crumble. 
Critical legal theorist Patricia Williams argues that contract law “re-
duces life to fairy tale.”12 This is the case, since the contract forges a fan-
tasy (a scenario of relations conceived in the actors’ minds) — it transforms 
imagination into legal obligation. But the contract creates not only the 
structure of relation between actors, but also the object through which 
the relation is sustained. In this case, the black object is constructed, or 
invented, within the vacuum (or hole) this structure produces. Bryan 
Wagner might describe this vacuum in the contract as blackness existing 
“in exchange without being party to exchange.”13 The object is exchanged 
between subjects, but the object itself is not a subject, not a party, within 
the contract. It exists merely within the black hole of the contract, as that 
which allows the structure to exist without a subjective existence itself. 
To exist in exchange is to lack existence outside transaction; existence 
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for black being is ephemeral and tethered to the flimsy temporality of the 
contract structure. We might suggest, after Charles Mills, that an anti-
black contract (a racial contract) is an instrument for dividing the world 
between acting subjects and inactive objects existing only in exchange.14 
Thus, the contract performs important ontological work, and, for this 
reason, it has become central to legal metaphysics. 
Frank Wilderson suggests, “African slavery did not present an ethical 
dilemma for global civil society. The ethical dilemmas were unthought.”15 
The dilemmas are unthought because applying the ethical relation to a 
being that never arrives and is not seen presents a stupefying conundrum 
that ethics is unable to resolve. We lack an ontological procedure or gram-
mar to situate the outlawed in relation to ethics. Our ethics are entangled 
in our ontological commitments. For this reason, black being is unable to 
appeal even to Levinasian ethics — although he desires to escape the vio-
lence of ontology (one might argue this escape is predicated on a misread-
ing of Heidegger, which would mean Levinas leads us right back to Heide-
ggerian ontology). For as Fanon rightly critiques Sartre — which I would 
argue also applies to Levinas — “The white man is not only The Other but 
also the master, whether real or imaginary.”16 In other words, the Other is 
always already constituted by outlawing — the Law of AntiBlackness. There 
isn’t a place in the work of either Heidegger (and neo- Heideggerians) or 
Levinas that is free from antiblackness. Such a place is a ruse. 
In his critique of ontology, Fanon argues that “not only must the black 
man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. Some crit-
ics will take it upon themselves to remind us that the proposition has a 
converse. I say this is false. The black man lacks ontological resistance 
in the eyes of the white man.”17 The phrase in relation opens us onto the 
impossibility of ethics, since ethics would require the very converse of the 
proposition that Fanon refuses. The black must be for the white man, as 
equipment in human form — the ontic illusion of humanity. But this be-
ing is not the being that grounds ethics or ontology; it is an existence un-
translatable into the language of being and ethics (which is why “ontology 
does not permit an understanding of the black man”).18 This is why black 
being is an “impurity, a flaw that outlaws any ontological explanation,” as 
Fanon would argue.19 The procedure of outlawing rests on the severing of 
both the ethical relation and the ontological relation. 
This also returns us to the function of law. If, as Oren Ben- Dor avers, 
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“To let Dasein gain ground, to let Dasein ground as one with the simple 
unity of the fourfold, is to be ethical. To let Dasein be open towards its 
unfolding world as the grounding of its nearest is ethical. To protect and 
enforce such ground is the essence of law.”20
Then outlawing is a departure from this function. Rather than protect-
ing and enforcing an ontological ground (the ethical demand of Being), 
outlawing functions to render black being continuously vulnerable, ac-
cessible, and uncovered. It employs judicial procedures, discourses, and 
technologies to sustain this vulnerability — as it is the precondition for 
the Law of Being. 
What I want to discuss now is certain legal technologies, tactics, strate-
gies, and inventions that perform the work of outlawing, now that we have 
outlined its necessity. It is also imperative to understand that the (non)
place of black being, produced through outlawing, is the emergence of 
ontological terror. Oren Ben- Dor provides a fruitful understanding of ter-
ror: “That which causes terror cannot protect from it. Terror occurs when 
the inexpressible is not allowed to be violently comported towards the 
order of Being. Terror occurs when no protection is offered to Dasein . . . 
when Dasein is not allowed to get its essential ‘dues,’ terror occurs.”21
Terror, for Ben- Dor, is the lack of ontological protection, as one must 
rely on a legalism that just reinforces and produces forms of violation. 
When Dasein does not get its due — its ontological posture — it is exposed 
to violence. This terror, however, can be rectified if this due is provided by 
re- membering the essence of law (as the law of Being). The ontological ter-
ror that I am proposing, however, is a permanent condition of black being 
and the world itself — it is beyond resolution and abandonment. Ben- Dor’s 
terror is situational, but his situational terror feeds off the permanent ter-
ror of outlawing. That which causes ontological terror, then, neither can 
(nor desires to) protect black being from it, nor offers a due that will bring 
it into relation to the Law of Being. The world depends on this terror — it 
is violence without end. As long as the world exists, so will it, by necessity. 
This terror is unlike other formations, since it is “hidden” by the “cultural 
seeing,” if we follow Hortense Spillers. Ontological terror is the blindness 
of being, what it cannot (and refuses) to see, since it conditions sight. My 
argument here is that outlawing — destructive apparatuses, strategies, ra-
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tionales, and technologies of law — produces and sustains this terror. We 
cannot think modern law without this terror; in fact, ontological terror 
provides the very condition of legal thinking (i.e., we are able to under-
stand the distinction between the injured/uninjurable, the free/unfree, 
and the entitled/rightless because of this prior violence). 
Ontological terror opens us up onto the abyss of Being — the exception 
that engenders order. It is through the free black, however, that this terror 
is exposed in all its absurdity and viciousness. For the free black brings 
to the fore the function of the law and the conflict presented when this 
function is applied to black being. The ethical and ontological ground of 
law desiccates. Since law’s ontological function is to shore up the ground 
of the human by not seeing blackness, the slave, through law, has been 
the site of this not seeing. As unfree and rightless, the slave’s place within 
the order of the material world is understood, although fragile (i.e., the 
slave is integrated into the world of things). The free black, however, forces 
an ontological conversation that otherwise would be left unsaid and un-
thought. And this is precisely why the free black serves as an excellent 
paradigm: because it exposes the ontological presumptions of ethics and 
freedom, which masquerade as universal (and it also exposes the univer-
sal as a fraudulent particularity). In other words, the free black presents 
a problem for legal reasoning because such a being is, indeed, a thought 
experiment — since it lacks ontological explanation. The law understands 
black being as an object of the material world, as available equipment. But 
a free black is inassimilable within law and engenders forms of paradox, 
contradiction, and absurdity when the law is forced to think blackness, 
freedom, and ethics together. The free black, then, exposes a double ter-
ror: the loss of the ontological ground that secures law’s freedom and 
ethics for the human and the lack of protection for black being against 
the machinations of antiblack outlawing practices — this is the twin axes 
of this devastating terror. 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER TANEY: ONTOMETAPHYSICIAN 
Hortense Spillers remarks, “[Antebellum] law is compelled to a point of 
saturation, or a reverse zero degree, beyond which it cannot move on 
behalf of the enslaved or the free.”22 This point of saturation, the place 
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where we expect to find the movement of Being, its unfolding through 
law as event [Ereignis] is absent when black being is in question.23 The law, 
rather than serving as an aperture for this movement, becomes a terrify-
ing stasis — or a reverse zero degree. This dreaded geometrical figuration, 
this point, constitutes the irresolvable within the system of legal thinking 
and reasoning. This point of saturation cannot be reduced to mere ontic 
distortion, since this point is the absence of ontological difference — but 
an absence that enables the subject before the law to have movement, to 
bring forth grievance, to seek redress, and to maintain dignity. We might 
also consider this point of saturation the distortion of distortion. In other 
words, the ontic/legal distortion that perpetuates the forgetting of Being 
is predicated on another distortion, or a disavowed concealing. Law must 
conceptualize and outlaw this distortion of distortion (the concealment 
that makes legal concealment possible). Ronald Judy might also call this 
distortion an “interdiction,” in which “a censorship to be inarticulate, to 
not compel, to have no capacity to move, to be without effect, without 
agency, without thought.”24 The distortion, then, serves as an interdiction 
(or a censorship, a ban) on movement — the movement of thought, com-
munication, and legal agency. 
Legal reasoning must conceal this distortion, since the distortion throws 
law into crisis and produces contractions, paradoxes, and absurdities (like 
the Lacanian real rupturing the legal symbolic). For antebellum law, the 
free black incarnates this distortion because this figure foregrounds the 
problem with Being and law — the severing between blackness, ethics, 
and ontology — which the law would want to forget or to resolve through 
property rights. Can black being hold property in itself? Can black being 
constitute a being for itself and not for another? Should black being be-
come an end in and of itself? The free black complicates these questions 
differently than it does for the slave, I would argue. The law uses property 
rights to resolve or answer these questions. Property is property, even if 
this property takes on a human form. The slave is indeed property, and 
the laws of property and propriety are in full effect. Despite the debates 
concerning the immorality of slavery, the rights of the property holder 
trump any appeal to the dignity or natural right one would assert on be-
half of the slave. Put differently, the law’s function is to protect the dignity 
and ontological relation of the human to Being, and property/equipment 
is necessary to fulfill this function — even in distorted form. This is why 
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the law can appeal to rights to resolve the dilemma of the slave. It is only 
the rights of the human, of the property holder, that really matter before 
the law. The slave becomes a means to that end.
The free black, however, presents a quandary of problematics: is this 
free black still property? Does this freedom bring black being into an on-
tological relation to Being? Can the law accommodate black being, which 
is not property? What impact does this have on the human being? One 
must ask these questions of black being because the right in property 
becomes difficult to sustain as a rationale (although the state will claim 
property in the free black; I will discuss this as the chapter progresses). In 
other words, the free black enables the presentation of a proper metaphys-
ical question, which the law is compelled to answer. And since the law 
assumes freedom as a sacred conceptual instrument for its human, it is 
within the law that the question of black being emerges. The law, then, en-
gages in important ontological work — citizen, slave, human, and property 
are not mere issues of legal status, since each term carries ontological pre-
sumptions with it. Thus, the fundamental question before us, at the heart 
of our questioning: do the ontological presumptions encoded in legal ter-
minology change as the status between property and free black changes? 
(Or does a change ever occur?) We might go as far to say that this is the 
reformulation of our question “How is it going with black being?” 
Chief Justice Roger Taney provides an answer to these metaphysical 
questions. His opinion is much more than legalistic rationale; it is also 
philosophical discourse — ontometaphysical labor. For Taney did not just 
set for himself the task of addressing federalism (states’ rights vs. congres-
sional power concerning naturalization/citizenship), but also the func-
tion of black being, the meaning of this freedom, and the ethical (non)
relation between the human and black being. Through Taney, perhaps, 
we find the strongest answer to these metaphysical questions within law. 
Taney uses Dred Scott as a philosophical allegory, or paradigm, to work 
through the ontological presumptions about blackness in an antiblack 
order. The opinion, then, reproduces the master and slave (non)relation as 
Dred Scott becomes a discursive tool (putative equipment, as it were) for 
the ontometaphysical/putative labor of dividing the world into articles of 
merchandise and the human being who uses those commodities. 
Dred Scott is presented as a plaintiff in error. In legal terminology, 
the plaintiff in error submits a writ of error to the court challenging the 
outLawing 79
decision of a lower court. In this case, Scott submits a writ of error to the 
Supreme Court challenging the decision of the Circuit Court. The writ 
of error provides the occasion of presentation for the subject to present a 
grief and seek redress. Etymologically, the term plaintiff originates from 
the Latin plangere (the infinitive verb form), to strike or beat in grief; the 
French plainte (noun), lamentation; and the Middle English plaintiff, a 
complaining person. The term plaintiff carries certain ontological pre-
sumptions with it — the legal subject predicates as a feature of its right 
(i.e., strikes out in grief) and presents this grief, or lamentation, to the 
court. The plaintiff, then, has the right to present, as an aspect of its re-
lation to Being — its attempt to redress any injury hampering its Heideg-
gerian projectionality, its unique project (i.e., life, happiness, and the 
pursuit of property). The transit of grief is foundational to any legal pre-
sentation — grief moves from the complaining person to the adjudicating 
body (the writ) and from the adjudicating body to the complaining person 
(through its decision). This movement creates a circuit of legal reasoning, 
and the law is invested in sustaining the integrity of this circuit. 
But it is also important that Dred Scott is a plaintiff in error. And in the 
case of Scott, this “in error” makes all the difference. The “error” indicates 
much more than the presentation of a writ, but that the presentation it-
self is in error — the presenter is disqualified, and thus the presentation is 
censored or not seen, a presentation disappeared by not seeing. “Plaintiff 
in error,” in this case, conceals a double error, or the error of error, which 
black being foregrounds. From a Heideggerian perspective, this error is 
nothing other than ontic distortion. According to Ben- Dor, “Errancy is 
a necessary part of the process of what it is to be human Dasein, namely 
a creature whose Being is an issue for it, and because it provides some 
openness. Some capacity for oppression by the essence of truth. . . . Er-
ror is counter- essence because in Richtigkeit Man does not yet grasp the 
essence of truth and the truth of essence — namely unification of essence 
and non- essence of truth.”25
Humans depend on error for an opening into Being (since for the hu-
man the ontic is the way through the ontological). Law distorts the es-
sence of truth by making humans believe that ultimate protection relies 
on legal reasoning and rights, when these instruments cause more pain 
by forgetting Being. Put differently, the human will always be in error in 
relation to law because the law distorts the ontic (non)relation.
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The plaintiff, then, is in error — since presenting grief will, in essence, 
cause more grief if Being is not re- membered (the essence of truth). But 
error only works for the plaintiff to the extent that this error is predicated 
on an ontological (non)relation. Error is productive if the (non)relation is 
brought forward in legal thinking. But, as I have argued, the ontological 
difference is not an issue for black being; it cannot rely on Being as es-
sence of truth or the law as an instrument of re- membering. The Heideg-
gerian error, then, conceals another error. When Dred Scott is in error, 
as a plaintiff, it is because he attempts to be seen against an interdiction 
of not seeing, and he attempts to move (grief) against an interdiction 
on movement (ungrievability). His error is not an aperture into Being 
and truth, but the terroristic mark of an outlawed being — one execrated. 
Scott’s error is an error against a fundamental Law (not merely the laws of 
Missouri); he attempts entry into an order that excludes him. 
This error against antiblackness, as fundamental Law, is precisely what 
Taney attempts to articulate in his opinion. Scott errs against the hu-
man’s error — and it is the human’s exclusive right to error that Taney is 
protecting. These ontological issues condense on the term jurisdiction. 
For at the heart of Taney’s concern is whether the Circuit Court had ju-
risdiction to render a decision in the case at all. Plaintiffs must first evince 
that the case presented falls within the jurisdiction of the court — that the 
court could rightfully adjudicate the matter. The Circuit Court allows for 
citizens of different states to sue, and the plaintiff must aver in the plea 
that the two parties are in fact citizens. This is the way Taney sets up his 
argument concerning jurisdiction. It is precisely this oversight that con-
cerns Taney, and he argues that the Circuit Court overlooked the problem 
with jurisdiction because Dred Scott was not a citizen (only citizens can 
present grievance in this court). Ultimately, jurisdiction brings the law to 
a zero- degree point, since the presentation of grief, its movement, is fore-
closed from the very beginning — following Taney’s logic. This foreclosure 
engenders additional foreclosures within the law; for even the concept 
of injury, in this case, is emptied of efficacy because this injury never 
appears before the court. Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks might consider this 
the nexus between law and animality, which produces black muteness, or 
silence, as a feature of this zero- degree point in law.26 Black injury, then, 
is censored — a mandated not seeing — since this injury is outside the ju-
risdiction of the court. And this mandated not seeing preconditions the 
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rights of the legal subject who can be seen (in the place that renders the 
subject invisible). Each refusal to see black injury or to present black grief 
expands the prerogative and rights of the legal subject. We might even say 
the legal prerogative of the human in relation to black being is limitless, 
owing to jurisdiction.
Taney uses jurisdiction not just to correct this oversight, but also to 
perform important ontological work — work that needed to be done. His 
commentary on blackness and history are not extraneous or tangential; 
they are vitally important to the ontometaphysical labor he performs. 
He is both philosopher and judge. For what undergirds citizenship is on-
tological presumptions, which the Circuit Court does not address (per-
haps, ironically, because such philosophizing is outside its jurisdiction). 
“Citizen” not only presumes nationality but also humanity. We might say 
that the courts take this ontological presumption for granted; it enables 
the law to function. Thus, “citizen” is a point of saturation. It condenses a 
host of presumptions, and Taney’s opinion is a painstaking unraveling of 
these presumptions in relation to black being. For Taney, the real error in 
this case was assuming that the ontological presumptions of the citizen 
(humanity and the ethical relation) applied to black being. The question of 
jurisdiction, then, conceals a more egregious distortion: can black being 
present itself to the Law of Being? Is it within the Law of Being’s jurisdic-
tion (the order regulating the human’s relation to Being) to see blackness? 
For Taney, the answer is a resounding no.27 
He begins his ontometaphysical work by dividing the world, making a 
clear distinction between the human and his available equipment (Taney 
calls this division an “impassable barrier”): “A perpetual and impassable 
barrier was intended to be erected between the white race and the one 
which had been reduced to slavery and governed by subjects with absolute 
despotic power . . . and no distinction was made between the free Negro 
and the slave, but this stigma of the deepest degradation, was fixed upon 
the whole race.”
“Citizen” becomes a synonym for the human in this legal rationale, 
and, concomitantly, “Negro” becomes the stand- in for the world of mate-
rial objects, equipment, and merchandise. He situates this division by first 
posing his proper metaphysical question: “Can a negro, whose ancestors 
were imported into this county, and sold as slaves, become a member of 
the political community formed and brought into existence by the Con-
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stitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights 
and privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to the citi-
zen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United 
States in the cases specified in the Constitution?”
Can the imported thing (Negro) gain access to the political commu-
nity? This is the crux of his question. Political community serves a vital 
function because it provides a conceptual apparatus of presenting the 
world of the human, the being with [Mitwelt]. It is within the political 
community that Being unfolds as freedom, rights, and ethics. Unlike 
Jean- Luc Nancy, who would argue that the ontological function of com-
munity is to remain incomplete and open, constantly expanding and re-
fashioning, Taney presents closure and exclusivity as absolutely essential 
to the human. For it is only through this closure that the law can protect 
the vulnerability of the citizen. An open political community threatens 
its very survival, and this is not a finitude that opens the citizen onto 
the horizon of possibility. It is only when the boundaries of the political 
community are strictly delimited and policed that law works in all its 
distortion. 
But we also have the world of material objects (or Heidegger’s Umwelt), 
and no delineation is made between the free and enslaved. The Negro 
is a saturation of abject historicity and worldlessness; the Negro is that 
“thing” whose ancestors were imported and sold. Thus, Taney divides the 
world through disparate grammars: the grammar of the material world, 
imported and sold, and the grammar of the world of humans, the polit-
ical community, rights, privileges, and immunities. The Dred Scott case 
forces a violent collision, or intermingling, of these grammars. And part 
of Taney’s ontometaphysical labor is to untangle these grammars so that 
society may be protected, as Foucault might argue.
Taney continues this division by making a stronger argument about 
the thing and the political community:
They [Negroes] had for more than a century before been regarded as 
beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the 
white race. Either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, 
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and 
that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his 
benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of 
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merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This 
opinion was at that time fixed and regarded as an axiom in morals as 
well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing or supposed to 
be open to dispute; and men in every grade and position in society 
daily and habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits [emphasis 
mine].28
This is part of Taney’s philosophy of history, for Taney turns to his-
torical contexts in England and the modern world to support the onto-
logical presumptions and division he presents. Since the Negro entered 
into modernity as an “ordinary article of merchandise and traffic,” his 
ontological position was fixed and beyond dispute. There is no provision 
in this reading for an ontological transformation of property into human 
being. This, for Taney, is ludicrous and is the philosophical problem with 
emancipation.29 
Taney takes care to assert that the ontological division is not only fixed, 
but also an “axiom in morals.” It is here that Taney introduces an ethics of 
(non)relation. For the axiom in morals translates into the Negro having 
“no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”30 Taney obliterates 
any ethical relation or regulation between the human and black being. 
Since there is no right that the white man is bound to respect, either eth-
ically or morally, not even the right to life or selfhood is protected. Under 
this ethical terror, black being is not protected and is rendered infinitely 
vulnerable to whatever violations the human desires. The law does not 
protect any fundamental right to being for blacks. In fact, under such 
conditions one could only be for the other, as the mechanisms for protect-
ing and sustaining the self are absent. The Negro thing cannot properly 
inhabit the position of the Other — to do so is not only unethical but also 
immoral. Taney closes any philosophical gap we believe we have between 
ethics and morality and brings the two to an intense point of saturation. 
The “ought” and the “should” merge together in an axiom. Perhaps, this is 
one of Taney’s philosophical objectives: to define an antiblack axiomatic. 
The world of black things is deprived of both an “ought” and a “should,” 
and this continued deprivation is both the ethical and moral responsibil-
ity of the human. For the human depends upon it for his private pursuits 
(or Heidegger’s unique project). 
Within this philosophical statement, Taney presents a somewhat par-
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adoxical (non)relation between blackness, law, and existence. We could 
suggest that this formulation is the articulation of nothing in an antiblack 
world:
It is clear therefore, that no State can, by any act or law of its own, 
passed since the adoption of the Constitution, introduce a new mem-
ber into the political community created by the Constitution of the 
United States. It cannot make him a member of this community by 
making him a member of its own. And for the same reason it can-
not introduce any person, or description of persons, who were not in-
tended to be embraced in this new political family, which the Consti-
tution brought into existence, but were intended to be excluded from it 
[emphasis mine].
The prepositional phrase “which the Constitution brought into exis-
tence, but were intended to be excluded from it” conceals an amphiboly. 
For the question upon which this double reading hinges is the modifica-
tion of the “it.” My argument is that the phrase should be read in both 
ways: (1) as a statement of legal exclusion, when the “it” modifies Consti-
tution, and (2) as a statement of ontometaphysics, when the “it” modifies 
existence. Both readings are supplements of each other, since ontological 
execration preconditions legal exclusion. But I want to focus on the onto-
logical reading, which I believe contributes to our understanding of law, 
being, and blackness.
What this phrase, or axiom, as Taney might call it, seems to suggest 
is that the law (Constitution) introduces the Negro into existence, but 
that the purpose of the introduction is nonexistence. Put differently, the 
Negro exists to not exist. Black existence is predicated upon its perpetual 
erasure and obliteration; its existence is this very obliteration — existence 
as erasure. The Law recognizes the black only in its destruction, and this 
destruction is required for legal intelligibility. Thus, something like black 
redress is outside of the law’s jurisdiction to the extent that the aim of re-
dress is restorative, and restoring black being is not only impossible, but 
antithetical to law’s aim (Law is commanded to see the invisible, not to 
see what never arrived). Law can only see blackness by not seeing through 
its fleeting presence in destruction. This not existing is, thus, the condi-
tion of any black existence. This is the dreaded condition of nothing in 
an antiblack world. It must be continuously obliterated for the world’s 
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existence. There is no guarantee of being in law either through ontic dis-
tortion or ontological unfolding for blacks. The axiom Taney presents is 
an attempt to explain a phenomenology without Being. Black being, al-
though appearing phenomenologically as “article of merchandise,” does 
not have being, since it has been outlawed from Being. The commodity 
exists, but not in any sense that matters — not in any sense that necessi-
tates relational ethics and rights. It is an existence that does not exist. 
Being without existence throws existence into crisis.
Taney’s antiblack ethics, then, is enabled by this axiom. The black “has 
no rights which the white man is bound to respect,” since rights are the 
domain of life, being, and relation. Another way of reformulating Taney’s 
statement is that there can be no right that would bring blacks into the 
domain of livable existence — since all rights are designed for this pur-
pose. Thus, Taney’s statement is really about the absurdity that any right 
could ever change the formulation of black existence as nonexistence. 
Any restorative right that we could imagine would destroy the political 
community. Black rights would be the end of human rights. And this is 
precisely why Taney must perform this ontometaphysical labor. The oc-
casion of Dred Scott v. Sandford created a sense of urgency for him. 
The free black, however, remains unthinkable for him, although it cre-
ates the occasion for the philosophical labor. It is easy for Taney to discuss 
the “article of merchandise,” since it belongs to the world of material ob-
jects. The deprivation of freedom ensures that the degraded stigma is un-
moved or challenged. But what about the free black? If the article of mer-
chandise (slave) is virtually indistinguishable from the free black, what 
constitutes freedom? These questions place Taney within a double bind: 
he wants to protect the rights of property holders (slave masters) to dis-
card property (by granting emancipation to the enslaved), but wants to re-
tain the ontological status of property for these beings even after they are 
discarded (since he argues that emancipation does not incorporate blacks 
into the human family). Right rebounds upon itself, and we are left with 
an unthinkable that Taney sidesteps. Again, Taney can only think the 
free black as another feature of property, an aspect of the material world, 
since in his ontological division there is no other place for blacks. He 
must contend with the property that is no longer property — world poor, 
or more accurately, without a world. In other words, Taney is faced with 
the paradox, or enigma, of the nothing. Both inside and outside, inhab-
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iting space but lacking place. And if the slave race has no rights that the 
white man is bound to respect, then the right to property in the self, the 
fundamental right of freedom, is not respected, either. The free black, 
then, cannot exist within Taney’s ontometaphysical imaginary. The lack 
of ethics and relation would undermine any existence of freedom, result-
ing in a nonexistence. 
This is why the free black serves as an excellent paradigm: because it 
brings us to this very space of impasse — which is the location of black being. 
The impossibility of the free black foregrounds the question of black being, 
since one must face the terror of this impasse. Through the free black, we 
understand the ontological determinations of freedom; it is designed for the 
human, and the attempt to integrate blacks into it results in grammatical 
instability and conceptual chaos. The free black exists to not exist as a mere 
speculative instrument, a paradigm, for working through our philosophical 
limits. The free black is a thought experiment. It has no place, ontologically, 
within the world — either as property or as human. It resides in the crevices 
of an active imagination, one designed for philosophical rumination and 
fiction. We have not witnessed (nor ever will) a free black in an antiblack 
world, despite the tomes of historiographical research on the subject. 
What Taney’s ontometaphysical labor and its lacuna illuminate is the 
nonworldliness of the free black. This necessitates an important distinc-
tion, one that Taney broaches but never quite presents: the distinction 
between emancipation and freedom. Emancipation releases blacks into 
an abyss of terror, since freedom will always be impossible in an antiblack 
world (the world, indeed, would end with black freedom). Emancipated 
blacks are not free. Romantic narratives of emancipation collapse the 
distinction — without attending to the ontological presumptions of these 
terms — by just assuming that the black is a human. 
But to return to Taney’s important axiom that blacks “exist to not ex-
ist,” we can put together the pieces of our investigation on the Law of 
Being, the ban (abandonment), black being, and emancipation. The on-
tic, distorted form of law is, nonetheless, subordinated to the Law of Be-
ing at the very essence, or truth, of law. The human exists because Being 
inhabits the place of existence and, paradoxically, withdraws and is re- 
membered in this very place of abandon. This place provides the possibil-
ity for freedom (without it, the human remains enslaved to metaphysical 
domination). The black, however, lacks this place; it is outlawed from the 
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Law of Being and, thus, does not exist ontologically, since Being does not 
unfold. But the non- place of this outlawing is the condition of emancipa-
tion. What I am suggesting is that emancipation and freedom signify two 
different ontological conditions (not merely legal status). Taney used the 
opinion to protect this place of Being’s unfolding — this is what he calls 
“political community.” His refusal, however, to conceptualize a place for 
free blacks is precisely the problem that emancipation absorbs. Rather 
than transforming property into personhood, emancipation outlaws 
blacks from the ontological political community — we lack a grammar to 
describe this (non)place (besides damnation/hell, as Fanon might call it). 
“Free black” is the dreaded syntagm of this ontological terror.31
EMANCIPATION AND FREEDOM 
They are called free Negroes; but alas! What does their freedom amount to? 
What to them is the name, but a cruel mockery? In some respects they are 
even worse off than the slaves . . . they are an oppressed and degraded caste. 
They feel it every day of their lives, and it keeps them down. They are not 
looked upon as men, in the true and proper sense of the term [emphasis in 
the original].
— The African Repository, 1851
Emancipation is precisely this “cruel mockery.” The term free black ex-
plodes into onomastic absurdity and existential cruelty. This presents an 
ontic distortion, which conceals the ontological terror undergirding this 
term. Emancipation, then, is deceptive in that freedom is considered the 
outcome of this process; but this is not the case. Emancipation and free-
dom are antithetical, and the tendency in critical discourse and historiog-
raphy to conflate the terms is problematic. The free black, as paradigm, 
necessitates an unraveling of these terms, since the ontological presump-
tions and objectives are exposed in their terror. 
It is precisely this conflation that frustrates the author of the epigraph, 
and he insists that a free black is an oxymoron. Indeed, what type of free-
dom could blacks have in an antiblack order, especially when this free-
dom leaves blacks even worse off than slaves? Not only does this freedom 
amount to a pernicious form of bondage, but it also leaves these black 
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beings without a proper ontological place, as “they are not looked upon 
as men, in the true and proper sense of the term.” Emancipation is an 
instrument of law, an ontic strategy of distortion. Rather than restoring 
black being, reuniting the body and the flesh, emancipation solidifies this 
fissure. Law, then, lacks a strategy, or tactic, to restore blackness, to trans-
form available equipment into human being. In an antiblack order such a 
restorative enterprise is destructive — since the black object, as nothing, 
must be continuously obliterated. The free black constitutes an ontolog-
ical catachresis in that it lacks any proper referent to capture the being 
without place in the world. The true purpose of emancipation, then, is to 
entrap black being in an abyss of shattered signification, terroristic op-
erations, and irreparable violation. The ontological transformation that 
emancipation promises is deceptive; rather than transforming property 
(being for another) into human (being for itself), it suspends becoming. 
This is the operation of ontological terror. 
Within romantic, humanist narratives (both historiographical and 
philosophical), emancipation is presented as a legal process that restores 
what was taken from the human. The human is presumed as the ontolog-
ical starting point, and emancipation, then, is merely a change in status, 
not a change in ontology. But as Taney’s decision illustrates, the human 
cannot be assumed as the ground for emancipation when it concerns 
blacks. Articles of merchandise are not human, and the transformation 
cannot be restorative. This is precisely why the author of the epigraph 
mocks the very idea of emancipation. Those released from physical bond-
age are “not looked upon as men, in the true and proper sense of the 
term.” Biological resemblance does not guarantee humanity — equipment 
in human form. The human, as I have argued, is an ontological relation 
and not a mere legal designation. The law is unable to transform what 
ontology will not allow. Perhaps, in the final analysis, this was Taney’s 
frustration. The law will fail as an instrument of humanism for blacks. To 
suggest that blacks are not human, however, is not to suggest that blacks 
do not have an existence, but we lack a grammar to describe whatever this 
existence entails. This is the misery of bearing the burden of nothing in 
an antiblack world. 
In her groundbreaking Scenes of Subjection, Saidiya Hartman describes 
postbellum emancipation as “travestied” precisely because the promises 
of liberal individualism were not realized. I would argue that emancipa-
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tion, regardless of metaphysical time schemes and historical temporal-
ities, succeeds in this very travesty. In other words, emancipation never 
intended to fulfill the promises of individual liberalism; in fact, it could 
not. It was unable to transform the nothing of metaphysics into a form of 
humanist value. Individual liberalism becomes a practice of fantasy and 
imagination when blacks become its object. The fantasy of equality and 
the humanist imagination can dream about a world of freedom, justice, 
and equality, but it must continually disavow the nightmare of the meta-
physical holocaust, which continues. Whether we are in the antebellum 
period, the post- Reconstruction period, or the post – Civil Rights period, 
the metaphysical holocaust that obliterates black being and sustains on-
tological terror is unchanging. This, indeed, is a belief that progress is a 
myth, even if the calendar year changes. Emancipation is entangled in the 
myth of progress, temporal change, and freedom dreams. 
Since the human and his freedom are foreclosed as options, blacks are 
thrown into the terroristic space of ontological terror. Emancipation is the 
legal technology of ontological terror; it is the distortion of distortion. On-
tological terror constitutes the strategies, tactics, and technologies that 
sustain the fissure between the flesh and the body (the primary relation), 
the enforced not seeing of black being, and the obliteration of black bod-
ies and cosmologies. It is precisely the space without place that is created 
for beings when the law rebounds upon itself. Put differently, ontological 
terror is the solution to Taney’s conundrum: how do you honor the prop-
erty rights of the human (to discard black property) and, at the same time, 
protect the political community [Mitsein] from the black nothing, which 
would undermine it? Ontological terror resolves the tension to the extent 
that blacks are not “looked upon as men in the true and proper sense.” The 
lack of propriety in a political community is the terror that black being 
endures once emancipated. The political community offers protection for 
the ontological relation, even in distorted form, but without a political 
community blacks are left exposed, without any ontological security. Thus, 
a vicious choice is presented between continued captivity as “article of 
merchandise” or ontological insecurity and terroristic emancipation. This 
is the crux of black suffering, and now the line between these choices has 
blurred to a point of indistinction (or a “zone of indistinction,” as Agam-
ben might call it).
Frank Wilderson, in Red, White, and Black, ponders the reduction of 
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freedom, as an ontological structure, to freedom, as a political experience 
(or “negative freedom,” as philosopher Isaiah Berlin would describe it):
Black slavery is foundational to modern Humanism’s ontics because 
“freedom” is the hub of Humanism’s infinite conceptual trajectories. 
But these trajectories only appear to be infinite. They are finite in the 
sense that they are predicated on the idea of freedom from some con-
tingency that can be named, or at least conceptualized. The contin-
gent rider could be freedom from patriarchy, freedom from economic 
exploitation, freedom from political tyranny (e.g., taxation without 
representation), freedom from heteronormativity, and so on. What I 
am suggesting is that first political discourse recognizes freedom as a 
structuring ontology and then it works to disavow this recognition by 
imagining freedom not through political ontology — where it rightfully 
began — but through political experience (and practice); whereupon it 
immediately loses its ontological foundations.32
Following Wilderson, I would argue that the tendency to reduce free-
dom to a contingent experience is a strategy of romantic humanism, and 
this strategy sets emancipation agendas into motion. If one proceeds from 
the assumption that freedom can be achieved from political action, then 
humanism can distort antiblackness, such that it is no longer a question 
of being, but of action/hard work. The question of black being is never 
broached, since romantic humanism just proceeds as if humanity is uni-
versal (and all humans can engage in political action). But when the ques-
tion of black being is foregrounded, contingent freedom becomes irrele-
vant because freedom is not predicated on any contingent experience but 
on the Law of Being. And this Law cannot be transformed or revised with 
political action. In other words, we reach the inefficacy of political expe-
rience, contingency, and emancipation when freedom is unmoored from 
these terms — since it is the idea of freedom that provides an idealistic/
mystic power for these terms. Emancipation deceptively tethers itself to 
freedom so that ontological questions are not broached — emancipation 
occurs when freedom fails. 
Emancipation does not resolve the ontological problem that black be-
ing presents to the world. This is why the condition of slavery continues 
after emancipation. The legal distinctions between slave and free only 
matter within a romantic narrative in which emancipation is synony-
outLawing 91
mous with freedom and freedom is reduced to the acquisition of rights. 
What the free black, as paradigm, reveals is that no right will restore black 
being — such restoration is a ruse. The scant rights given to free blacks — 
such as voting, holding property, and assembly — were ineffective in se-
curing humanity (resolution of the nothing in an antiblack world). These 
rights, rather than incorporating blacks into the political community, 
served to distort the continued metaphysical holocaust, since it connects 
rights to restoration. In Scenes of Subjection, Saidiya Hartman argues that 
postbellum emancipation produced debt, burden, and instability. Eman-
cipation is, thus, described as “travestied” because it created another form 
of bondage. Hartman’s analysis in the postbellum period and my analysis 
of the antebellum period provide a paradigmatic perspective on emanci-
pation. In neither period did emancipation eradicate antiblackness and 
restore being. The postbellum period, I would argue, is merely the ex-
tension of ontological terror to the entire black population. These period 
changes, proffered by historiography, conceal the continuity of the ques-
tion. The forms of bondage might differ, but the necessity of bondage re-
mains consistent across metaphysical time. Why is bondage continuous? 
This question brings us back to our proper metaphysical question: How is 
it going with black being? Bondage continues, in disguised form, because 
blacks bear the burden of incarnating nothing in an antiblack world. Put 
differently, emancipation sustains the imposition of nothing; it does not 
relieve the burden. 
We must depart, then, from Orlando Patterson when he writes in 
Slavery and Social Death, “As enslavement is life- taking, it follows logi-
cally and symbolically that the release from slavery is life- giving and life- 
creating. The master gives, and in giving he creates . . . what results from 
this deliberate loss is a double negation: the negation of the negation of 
social life, resulting in a new creation — the new man, the free man. Man-
umission, then, is not simply an act of creation: it is rather, an act of cre-
ation brought about by an act of double negation initiated by his power — 
for nothing.”33
Patterson’s romantic humanism avoids the question of black being that 
his theory of social death necessitates. The altruistic master, who gifts 
freedom for nothing, assumes an ontological function: creating a “new 
man, the free man.” What is the ontological procedure by which an ar-
ticle of merchandise outside the political community [Mitsein] becomes 
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human? What philosophy of becoming sustains this romantic narrative? 
What type of life, given by the master, can transform the dead thing? 
This new man, which Patterson celebrates, is not “looked upon as a [man] 
in the true and proper sense.” The life bequeathed to the emancipated 
does not resolve the issue of ontological propriety. For this life is nei-
ther true nor proper; it is a life indistinguishable from death, an ontic 
distortion. The gift of life (this existential condescension) reveals itself 
as an execration, since this new man assumes space without place — the 
new man is an outlaw. In this sense, life is fraudulent, as is as the mas-
ter’s promise of transformation. A resurrection never occurs, simply the 
extension of death in a different form (a more insidious form, since it is 
deceptive). Nothing cannot be negated (i.e., the black as nothing in an 
antiblack world). The negation of negation is a Hegelian romantic view of 
synthesis in which the new created from the negation is an elevation. But 
Hegel fails us here, since, as Fanon argues, the black “has no ontological 
resistance in the eyes of white men” (and even Hegel places blacks outside 
the movement of history and synthesis). Put differently, the new creature 
does not join the master- class; he is not master of anything, not even his 
own body (as kidnapping will show us). 
Within Patterson’s understanding, “free” (as in “free man”) is a legal 
experience, a transfer of property. But the ontological question would 
shift us toward the man, since freedom exists for the man. We could also 
suggest “man” cannot be reduced to “human.” Patterson assumes the two 
are synonymous and, thus, skirts the question of black being. What is this 
created thing? To assume that this creation is human begs the question 
about the ontological stability of this human. For this humanity is only 
given by another — the human is still a being- for another, which is anti-
thetical to a being- for-itself. (If the master decides to rescind his gift, what 
then?) This new human exists for (and at) the pleasure of his master. The 
man is still property, since he is born as a consequence of the master’s 
ultimate right in property — the master’s pleasure in his right to discard 
property at any time he so chooses. The slave, then, is never truly released 
from the master; he will always bear the stigma of the master’s power and 
ultimate authority over life and death (the master’s sovereignty remains 
in his creation). He breathes the breath of the master; it is in the master 
where his existence must be grounded and remain for the “gift” of free-
dom to hold. Thus, a man created (through legal decree) from a human is 
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not a human. It is something else — something we lack an adequate gram-
mar to describe. But whatever this something is, it is not the subject of 
humanism and cannot be easily incorporated into its romance (without 
facing the impasse of the question). 
Alan Nadel suggests that once emancipated, or free, the black was “no 
longer the master’s property, the black lost the protection entailed in be-
ing his asset. Because the extralegal code of honor which respected an-
other white man’s property (or the laws of slavery which protected his 
investment) no longer applied, the black became the universal slave of 
the white community and the white began to realize the implicit ideal of 
southern democracy as the Richmond Enquirer had articulated it — that 
all whites could be masters.”34 This new man is the property of all whites, 
the universal slave. The transformation (emancipation) is really just a 
move from the particular (single master) to the universal (community of 
whites/Mitsein), a transformation that retains slavery in essence. Thus, 
Patterson’s notion of life is not a gift of freedom for blacks at all, but a re-
configuration of antiblack mastery. 
TIME, DECISION, AND SUSPENSION 
The slave’s right to freedom took hold the instant it was granted. The court 
permitted a master to give a slave an “immediate right to present freedom 
[emphasis mine].”
— arthur howington, “A Property of Special and Peculiar Value”
The decision is an important aspect of law — either through an opinion, 
ruling, mandate, or order. It is through the decision that power manifests 
itself as sovereignty and demarcates between the legal and illegal by sus-
pending this distinction between them. Following Agamben, we under-
stand that the “state of exception” is the moment in which legal binaries 
are suspended into a zone of indistinction and sovereign power works 
through this indistinction.35 But what concerns me here is the relation 
between decision and suspension as ontological mechanisms, or the rela-
tion between decision, suspension, law, and the Law of Being. For the free 
black, as paradigm, illuminates this relation as one of terror.
In The Birth of Presence, Jean- Luc Nancy makes a distinction between 
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the decision of disclosedness and the decision that closes off. The latter is 
a feature of a metaphysics that uses the decision to self- assure existence, 
to remove uncertainty, and to close the openness of Being’s thrown- ness. 
We might suggest that the legal decision exemplifies this closure, with its 
emphasis on precedent, resolution, and finality. This type of self- assurance 
distorts the mechanism of the decision, ontologically, since Being’s thrown- 
ness presents an openness that defies closure or certainty. Put differently, 
the ontological decision must be undecidable, a decision that will never 
be able to decide. Dasein must decide that the decision is undecidable 
regarding existence and remain open to the unfolding of Being in this 
place of indecision. This, ultimately, will stimulate anxiety or a mood 
that reinforces indecision and exposes the absurdity of metaphysical se-
curity. Nancy and Heidegger would call this moment of indecision “sus-
pension”: “In suspension, by definition, decision escapes; it does not take 
place; it can never take place. . . . This suspension is the condition and the 
constitution- of- Being of the existent as such.”36 The constitution of Being 
is such that it escapes any attempt to capture it within the net of under-
standing metaphysics provides for the “They.” We can also suggest, fol-
lowing Nancy and Heidegger, that the Law of Being mandates the decision 
to undermine itself in indeterminacy, an indeterminate decision, which is 
the only true decision that one might ever reach concerning Being. What 
is important here is that indecision and suspension are openings for the 
unfolding of Being, for the (non)relation between it and Dasein. Rather 
than limiting becoming, indecision and suspension are necessary for it to 
occur. Legal certainty — the closedness of the law — depends on the dis-
tortion of suspension and indecision.
Antiblackness, as fundamental Law, adds another layer of distortion 
(or violent perversion) to suspension and indecision. Rather than decision 
and suspension serving as apertures of Being and stimulating necessary 
moods, these mechanisms are instruments of ontological terror because 
they function to outlaw black being. Indecision and suspension provide 
the contours of an abyss concerning abject black nothing. We will have 
to turn to the metaphysics of law to understand this, since (1) the pur-
pose of legal metaphysics is to secure self- assurance, and this is denied 
black being, and (2) the unfolding of Being in the place of indecision and 
suspension does not occur for black being because the ontological differ-
ence is not an issue for available equipment. In other words, if we must 
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get to the ontological through the ontic, then reading moments of legal 
indecision and suspension illumines another feature of metaphysics that 
is distorted doubly. 
Part of this distortion, or the self- certainty of law, is reliance on meta-
physical temporality. For the human, the undecidable (the suspension) 
is situated in a temporality beyond time, a primordial time in which the 
present, future, and past are all thrown into crisis. The vulgarity of meta-
physical time is such that it enables a distortion of the decision concern-
ing existence. But law attempts to provide a retreat from the heaviness 
of the undecidable by compressing the legal subject into the present. As 
system theorist Niklas Luhmann suggests, “The concept of the present 
[in law] contains rules for using the idea of simultaneity, which itself un-
derlies the possibility of communication in social life.”37 The present pro-
vides a temporal structure of intelligibility, meaning, and communication 
for legal reasoning and decision. Law moves in the present — although it 
relies on the past (legal precedent) and the future to sustain this present. 
Temporality and law are “conceptually fused in the West through their 
mutual implications of total order in relation to which social life acquires 
meaning,” according to legal theorist Carol J. Greenhouse. In its aim to 
provide the horizon of social meaning, law assumes a “mythic dimension” 
in relation to time: “it is a product of being in time (in that it is a human 
product) but also out of time (where did it or does it begin or end?).”38 
Much like the Freudian primal father’s paradoxical relationship to law, as 
both within the law (as the embodiment of the law) and outside the law 
(as the exception that grounds the law), the law assumes a paradoxical 
relationship to time in that it is produced through time but also situated 
outside of it (this is one dimension of law’s aporia that Derrida, Benjamin, 
and Agamben adumbrate). For Greenhouse, the law is a primary vehicle 
for Western linear temporality, and this sustains its mythic nature. 
What I am suggesting here through Luhmann and Greenhouse is that 
the present is the privileged site of legal constitution; the human assumes 
legal subjectivity through this fictive present. The law must maintain this 
fiction to ensure the integrity of its decision. This also, however, impli-
cates freedom. The human’s freedom, as articulated through the meta-
physics of law, always unfolds in the present. Freedom exists for the legal 
present, and its benefits are not deferred into an indefinite future.
The question concerning black being, then, is when does the free black 
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emerge within the legal decision? Posing this question might seem rather 
awkward, since we think that the black received this freedom in the pres-
ent, just as the human enjoys his freedom. The epigraph suggests that the 
slave’s right to freedom took hold the instant it was granted. The court 
permitted a master to give a slave an “immediate right to present free-
dom.” It assumes that the master’s ontological power took hold immedi-
ately, within the temporality of the human. The free black became free at 
the signatory moment, when the freedom paper registered the marks of 
the master and witness. But what the courts experienced was the disjunc-
ture of time concerning the free black. In fact, courts found it difficult to 
maintain this present for black being because it presented contradictions 
that were irresolvable. 
According to historian Arthur Howington, “The owner had property 
in the slave, but the government had ‘control over his social condition.’ 
Manumission, then, necessarily involved a concurrent act by the owner 
of the slave and the government. The act of emancipation required not 
only the consent of the master but the consent of the government as well 
[emphasis mine].”39 
Manumission enabled owners to dispose of property and disinvest, 
but the state retained its investment in black equipment through what 
Howington is calling “social condition.” Although the master could grant 
manumission through declaration, this freedom was imperfect and in-
complete until the state consented. In many cases, the captive could not 
obtain the consent of the state to complete the actualization of manumis-
sion.40 Thus, without the concurrent consent of master and government, 
present freedom proved to be a legal fiction, a fiction without which the 
legal system could not survive. Black being is fractured as property, both 
belonging to the master and the state — a “slave without a master,” as his-
torian Ira Berlin would call it. The time of emancipation, then, is uncer-
tain. The free black never obtains freedom because emancipation simply 
transfers property rights to the state. This is the condition of emanci-
pation for blacks. Emancipation suspends temporality, precluding any 
chance of becoming. The free black lives in this suspension of time, which 
provides neither ontological restoration nor legal redress — black time. 
Although the owner could abdicate the temporal ownership of the 
captive — remember the owner possesses the captive in perpetuity — this 
release of temporal materiality does not transform the captive into the 
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mode of the present. In fact, the act of manumission places the free black 
out of time, in black time, without the temporal horizon that freedom 
bestows to the human. If the aim of metaphysics is to secure the fiction 
of being through time (self- assurance) — in particular, the present — then 
time mediates and illumines the relationship between humanity and 
freedom; freedom becomes a mode of temporizing, and the human be-
ing must activate existence in the present to have any intelligibility in 
a metaphysical world. Thus, the inability for the law to secure the free-
dom of the emancipated black in the present results from the temporal 
caesura created by the law itself. In producing the category of the free 
black, the law attenuates into ambivalence and confusion. Black time does 
not transition into human time. Emancipation exposes a temporal zone 
of indistinction between the human being and property being, between 
that which depreciates over time and that which self- actualizes over time. 
Temporality without duration. 
Historian J. Merton England asserts, “A large number of Negroes seem 
to have been quasi slaves, released from the dominion of the master but 
whose freedom had not been sanctioned by the state. The nominal slave 
group was probably at least as large as those whose freedom was recog-
nized by law.”41 In his seminal work on judicial cases, Catterall observed 
that the “status of ‘quasi slave’ had no terrors for the logicians of the Ten-
nessee Court, even though they also believed that ‘there was no middle 
ground between slavery and freedom; no such thing as qualified freedom, 
or qualified slavery.’ ”42 And, paradoxically, even though the justices of the 
Tennessee Court refused to believe that a middle ground between free-
dom and bondage existed, Justice Robert L. Caruthers acknowledged, “It 
is true that the Court’s stance [seemed] to recognize a kind of intermedi-
ate state, between freedom and slavery, which is difficult to manage and 
regulate.”43 
This contradictory stance, that an intermediate position exists and 
does not exist for emancipated blacks, is a curious feature of antebellum 
law. According to Caruthers, the courts were at great pains to “devise 
some plan which would be just to the slave, and not inconsistent with 
the interests of society — that would sustain his right to liberty, and at 
the same time save the community from the evils of a free Negro popu-
lation.”44 The courts attempted to reconcile what appeared to be a par-
adox of law: to grant the captive liberty but at the same time deny this 
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liberty (as it would be an evil to society); suspension became the solution 
to this conundrum. Within the dispensation of suspension (black time), 
black being is undecidable. The courts hold this inability to decide on 
the being of free blacks as a feature of terror, an ontological terror. This 
suspension, then, is not the Heideggerian uprooting of Dasein, in which 
indecision enables the unfolding of Being, but something pernicious. The 
decision outlaws black being; this being remains a “being- for- another,” 
since emancipation fails to provide this free self with ontological security. 
The community that needs saving is the very political community that 
Taney’s decision was designed to protect. And the evil of the free Negro is 
the nothing that invades this community, threatening to undo it. In other 
words, the conundrum that the courts are trying to work out is the man-
date not to see and to refuse invisibility to black being. Suspension holds 
this contradiction as a feature of metaphysical indecision. Time is turned 
against the emancipated being such that a lack of the present is reconfig-
ured in the decision not to decide. What I am suggesting here, through 
Caruthers, is that emancipation withholds the present from black being 
(since the present is the privileged temporality of the human citizen; de-
spite Heidegger’s critique of vulgar time, this time is still fundamentally a 
racial privilege in an antiblack world. Furthermore, the philosopher can-
not destroy metaphysical time without attending to the Negro’s temporal 
suspension). Ontological terror is a legal strategy designed to place free-
dom in an indefinite future, but a future that will never arrive. 
Kara Keeling, rereading Fanon, would call such a temporality an inter-
val in which the black waits for arrival. The suspension is precisely this 
waiting and deferral of ipseity. The emancipated black will always remain 
fractured within this interval, awaiting the judgment of another. Once 
emancipated, then, freedom never arrives, since it lacks a temporal frame 
for such arrival; instead, the emancipated is given “black time,” the abyss 
and fracturing of temporality. In black time, existence is predicated on 
perpetual waiting. The black self, the generous gift of the master, is never 
proper to itself because it still belongs to another — in this instance the 
state assumes absolute mastery.
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SELF- POSSESSION AND FREEDOM PAPERS
But we must return to a proper metaphysical question, one the free black 
as paradigm brings to the fore with seismic force: what is this emanci-
pated, new creature? What constitutes this “new man,” which the law 
brings forth through the master’s prerogative and a legal decree? Answer-
ing this question is, indeed, a difficult task, since it leads to more ques-
tions and impasse. We encircle this question, unable to approach it ade-
quately with the ontometaphysical instruments at our disposal. But what 
we can think through is the legal ersatz, the stand- in for the ontological 
(non)relation — the self. The self is located at the place of Being’s unfold-
ing, and the law mandates seeing this self, even though it is invisible (Nan-
cy’s imperative to see the invisible). Even though this metaphysical self is 
not completely reducible to Dasein, we must, nonetheless, go through 
the ontic to get to the ontological (or “build a way,” as Heidegger would 
suggest). So, it is here that we must start: with the self that is so crucial to 
the legal imaginary. 
What renders the self so crucial is that it constitutes the mystical foun-
dation of legal thought. This self is the raison d’être of rights, immunities, 
privileges, and redress. Our concern is the relation between this new crea-
ture and this legal self, since what the master owns is much more than 
the body; the master owns this self. The body is not reducible to the self, 
and it does not exhaust the field of the self. The self is the ultimate prop-
erty because it anchors any ethical relation and possibility for freedom. 
Slavery is perverse precisely for this reason: it transforms the invisible 
and invaluable into something highly visible and monetized. The “high 
crime against the flesh,” as Spillers would call it, is this crude translation 
of the ontological into the science of arithmetic and finance. Therefore, 
Heidegger’s fear of metaphysics, that it would misuse technology, calcu-
lation, schematization, and predictability to turn the human into a mere 
object, is somewhat realized in slavery. The “flesh” (the primary relation) 
is severed, obliterated, and in its place the body stands as the object of 
market relations, statistical science, and arithmetic. Black nihilism would 
compel us to center the question of black being in any postmetaphysical 
investigatory procedure. 
The self, as the stand- in for the primary (non)relation, is the mystical 
entity that is purloined during the financial transaction between the mas-
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ter and the seller. And, consequently, when a captive leaves the plantation 
to find freedom, he is said to have stolen this self. The self does not belong 
to the captive, and the attempt to reunite the self with other aspects of a 
fractured being is cast as criminal. For blacks, any restorative enterprise 
is criminal in an antiblack world. But, to return to Patterson’s humanism, 
we must ask, does the master, in creating this new man, return this self? 
Can the law rectify an ontological obliteration? And is the self purchased 
the same self returned to the emancipated? Thus, our questions concern 
the subjects of self- possession and self- dispossession. How does the law 
transfer property of the self from the owner back to the property? One 
strategy of transferring property is through the legal instrument “free-
dom papers.”
It is through the free black as paradigm that we begin to see extraor-
dinary violence (ontological terror), as the immaterial, invisible self is 
not only objectified but does not exist without this objectification. We 
might borrow the word reification from the Marxist- Leninist tradition 
to attempt to conceptualize this aspect of terror. My concern here is not 
commodity fetishism and market relations (although these do factor into 
the process of emancipation) with my use of reification, but to suggest 
that something that is supposed to remain immaterial and invisible is 
transformed into materiality.45 This is the form of ontological terror that 
emancipation introduced to the free black. The novelty of the new man 
created is that his returned property remains property, and the white 
public is the owner. It is still property for another, and the freedom paper 
is the materialization of this self- as- property.
Emancipation, then, ensures that the black self remains a visible object; 
it does not render this self immaterial and invaluable. This is precisely why 
the emancipated black is never free under such conditions, since eman-
cipation does not restore the ontological relation upon which freedom is 
predicated. Freedom papers (deceptively named as such) actually served 
as “ontological” structures for free blacks. A piece of paper determined 
whether the black being in question was gifted with limited rights and 
autonomy or was an aspect of some master’s real estate. The free black 
is only free to the extent that he can produce this paper — but having to 
produce, or prove, freedom is not freedom, it is emancipation. If freedom 
papers were lost, stolen, destroyed, or even eaten, the being in question 
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could transition from a new man to an owner’s property, at any time or 
any place. This is an aspect of ontological terror for blacks; since you never 
know when your freedom paper will become an issue for you or whether 
someone wants to reclaim you as property (per the Fugitive Act of 1850). 
This is the crux of ontological terror for blacks: black being is violently 
reified into a material object (freedom paper), and this materiality is ca-
pable of infinite manipulation and destruction. Freedom papers are an 
indispensable technology of ontological terror because they enable the 
reification of the immaterial self, which leaves free blacks unprotected 
and vulnerable. The primary (non)relation cannot be secured, since this 
(non)relation depends on both a material object and the literary/herme-
neutical judgment of a white inspector. Reification is a strategy for not 
seeing an invisible self and seeing an abject object. 
The freedom paper served as proof of the master’s ontological power 
to create and gift life, but this self required incessant approval and recog-
nition from a human (nonreciprocal) recognition, which is the extremity 
of Fanon’s critique of Hegel. Since recognition is required, this black self 
always belongs to a white other (human); the human possesses this self 
through reading and emancipation. This celebrated gift is an execration, 
since what the master really creates is a condition of ontological terror. 
The master gifts terror, not ontological security.
For whites, reading and interpretation become an antiblack form of 
possessing the free black. Given that this self is materialized, the prob-
lem of reading becomes more than a literary concern, but an ontological 
one, as well. The stakes of (mis)reading become a matter of life and death 
for a free black standing before the human. Free blacks were required to 
present this paper whenever the human desired it. While standing before 
a human inspector, the free black was suspended ontometaphysically — 
awaiting a judgment from the human (i.e., stolen property of a master 
or a new creature). The free black, as paradigm, reveals the structure of 
black existence in an antiblack world as a unilateral conferral of execra-
tion and terror. 
In Freedom Papers, Rebecca Scott and Jean Hébrand offer a beautiful 
tracing of the Tinchant family traveling from several countries and the 
way written documents are central to this odyssey. Freedom papers are 
particular vehicles of movement through antiblack landscapes:
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This family emerges as one with a tenacious commitment to claiming 
dignity and respect. Members of each generation, moreover, showed 
an awareness of the crucial role of documents in making such claims, 
as they arranged for papers to be brought into being — sacramental re-
cords when taking a child to be baptized, notarial records when regis-
tering a contract, letters to the editor when engaging in public debate, 
private correspondence when conveying news to each other. For mem-
bers of the family, individual nationality and formal citizenship were 
not clearly defined but a person could still make things happen by put-
ting works on paper. The manumission documents drafted to protect 
the members of the first generations from slavery or reenslavement, 
for example, turn out to be highly complex creations, with a power 
both more fragile and more real than one might imagine [emphasis 
mine].46
The authors are certainly correct about the fragility of the power, since 
ontological terror renders such power (defined through romantic human-
ism) insecure or nonexistent. Indeed, what would power mean when the 
self is reified and consistently inspected? Or when white gazing (the “eyes 
of the white man,” as Fanon calls it) serves as the ultimate ontological 
procedure? What is also of interest is the linking between “claiming dig-
nity and respect” (restoring the ontological relation) and arranging “for 
papers to be brought into being.” Such an arrangement, ontologically, is 
impossible. The papers must do more than appear (bringing into being 
in a phenomenological sense); for the papers to have effect, they must also 
be brought into Being (realm of the ontological). These papers must arrive 
(into) the place of a withdrawal and an unfolding. This doubled reading 
indicates that appearing is impotent without the placing into Being — for 
an appearance (a phenomenology) without Being is not seen. (This allego-
rizes the gap between ontology and phenomenology, within which a black 
nihilistic thinking must begin). Put differently, freedom papers deceive 
through appearance. This is what renders the papers so fragile, and it is 
the purpose of these papers to remain fragile. Emancipation trades in real 
estate for fragility. This new man is the unseen, reified object, which ro-
mantic humanism — the agency, will, progress, and universality fetish — is 
unable to restore. 
If language is the house of Being, as Heidegger has suggested, then our 
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analysis must turn to the word itself to understand Being’s execration — 
given that it is the word that creates this new man and gifts him with life. 
The dead letter of the law brings forth a life indistinguishable from death. 
In essence, the dead letter of the law transfers its death upon the nothing 
that bears the stigma of indistinction. Let us consider a freedom paper 
to demonstrate the manner in which the word works to dispossess at the 
very moment of purported self- possession. Not only is the material object 
fragile (it can be physically destroyed at any moment), but also at the level 
of the word we see the freedom paper as another form of dis- possession: 
these are to whom it may concern: that the Bearer hereof, Black Hec-
tor and his wife Black Sallo, is now free from me and my heirs, executors and 
administrators and at full liberty to act and do for themselves, to pass and 
repass about their Lawful concerns, without trouble, let, or molestation of me 
the Subscriber, as witness my hand and seal, This Twenty- first Day of April, 
One- Thousand, Seven Hundred and Fifty- eight. 
be it remembereD: This, Twenty- first Day of April, One- Thousand- Seven- 
hundred and Fifty- eight, Came John Alexander of London Britain, Before me, 
John Scott, Esquire, And acknowledged the above Certificate of Freedom for 
the above named, Black Hector, and his wife Black Sallo (two of his Negroes) 
to be his Act and Deed as Witness to my hand and Seal and desire that they 
might be recorded this Twenty first day of April, 1758.
 — John scott (Justice of Peace) (Seal)
The law compels through the imperative voice (“Be it Remembered”), but 
who is the addressee? Who exactly is the subject called by the demand? 
The identity of the addressee is not clearly articulated in the freedom 
certificate. John Alexander provides a bit more clarity concerning the 
potential identity of the addressee. His witness opens with the phrase 
“these are to whom it may concern.” This phrase, a seemingly in-
nocuous formality, establishes a boundary of exclusion. It, of course, is 
not addressed to everyone, but to a particular addressee who is entitled to 
the freedom certificate. The freedom certificate does not properly belong 
to (concern) everyone. The opening witness suggests exclusive property; 
only those who are permitted to concern themselves with the contents of 
the document are invited and have a right to its contents. Therefore, it is 
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quite probable that the addressee compelled to remember the initiating 
event by the Justice of Peace is the same addressee to whom the certificate 
properly belongs. 
John Alexander identifies Black Hector and his wife, Black Sallo, as the 
bearer of the freedom certificate (“That the Bearer Hereof, Black Hector 
and his wife Black Sallo”). The bearer presents or yields the document to 
another; but if Black Hector and Black Sallo are merely bearers, beings 
who yield or surrender, can it be said that the freedom certificate properly 
belongs to them? The addressee is the one to whom the freedom certifi-
cate is surrendered, not the one who must surrender its content. Although 
the identity of the addressee is probably obvious by now, it is nevertheless 
important to tease out the rhetorical constructions of the freedom certif-
icate to understand how black freedom undermines itself in an antiblack 
language that cannot accommodate such a being. 
If the freedom certificate does not really concern Black Hector and 
Black Sallo, for they bear, surrender, and present a witness for another, 
then the freedom certificate also produces another instance of disposses-
sion within its structure. Discursively, Black Hector and Black Sallo are 
excluded from the very structure that purportedly determines their on-
tological transformation (from property to personhood). We can suggest 
that the freedom certificate belongs to the addressee, for the certificate is 
created (brought into being) for the benefit/pleasure of this subject. Put 
differently, the self of the free black is given to an Other in language, a 
dispossession that is established at the very instance of purported self- 
possession. They must surrender the self to another (this self never re-
ally belongs to them); and rather than becoming an “I,” Black Hector and 
Black Sallo become direct objects in a grammatical syntax attempting to 
bestow personhood. This grammatical objectification mimes the social 
objectification that a free black would experience in an antiblack order. 
Indeed, the freedom paper does not grant blacks the right to predicate 
(i.e., the inalienable capacities of the human); it only reconfigures objec-
tification through grammar. Grammar, then, betrays the purported in-
tentions of the freedom paper: the free black is dependent on the subject 
(the human) for the freedom paper to have any meaning or significance. 
Black beings are bereft of genuine predication, since available equipment 
can only act for another, for the benefit of the other. 
Laws such as black codes and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, for ex-
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ample, deputized white citizenry — rendering each white citizen address-
ees of the freedom certificate. The “To Whom It May Concern” opening 
phrase of the certificate, then, is an invitation to white citizenry [Mitsein] 
to participate in a collective reading, a reading that properly belongs to 
the white citizen by virtue of civic responsibility (i.e., the obligation to 
report fugitives and to ensure social order as mandated by the Fugitive 
Slaves Laws). Thus, the certificate addresses an absent presence, a col-
lectivity that exists outside the initiating moment/event of the signature 
(absence), yet is undoubtedly infused within the grammar of racial col-
lectivity (presence). Consequently, the presence of Black Hector and Black 
Sallo is registered as an absence — since the black physical body is always 
already absent from the collectivity that matters. In other words, Black 
Hector and Black Sallo are never called and do not have a right to respond 
to the call, even though the freedom paper makes them “free.” Black free-
dom does not arrive in the place of Being’s unfolding, it is just a presence 
that is absent in its lack of being (appearance without Being). 
The voice of the Law calls each white citizen to remember the event 
of the master’s signatory power — its ontological force. This involves a 
collective acknowledgment of the unlimited power of the master, to gift 
life to the dead. The signature attests to his act and deed. Following Ag-
amben, we could also suggest that the signature provides the “condition 
of possibility” for the master’s ontological power — his unique stamp on 
an antiblack metaphysical world.47 If, however, the call addresses a collec-
tivity that exists outside the initiating moment of the signature (i.e., the 
white citizen was not physically present at the moment of the signing), 
how can this collectivity remember the event? Does the law, then, make 
a demand of the legal subject that is impossible to obey? Moreover, is an 
encounter with the impossible demand a precondition for obedience (like 
the demand to see the invisible)? 
The law demands the reproducibility of the signatory event through 
the act of remembering, which is really an act of piecing together, re- 
membering, a fragmented narrative. Through the reconstruction of an 
event, the white citizen reconstitutes the ontology of Black Hector and 
Black Sallo at the time of inspection. In order for the will of the master’s 
signature to materialize as the emancipation of the bearers (upon each 
case of review), the originary event must be reproduced without altera-
tion. The self of Black Hector and Black Sallo depends upon the unfal-
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tering, undifferentiating repetition of an original event (i.e., the original 
event of the master signing the freedom paper). Put differently, the black 
free self depends on the willingness of humans to fantasize, to imagine, 
an event for which they were not present, but which they are compelled 
to remember nonetheless. The black self, then, is constructed through 
exercises of fantasy mediated through grammar and literacy. If one is 
unable, or unwilling, to re- member an unknown event (the signing), the 
black self under inspection vanishes — and property arrives in the vacuous 
ontological space. 
Black Hector and Black Sallo are continuously (re)produced through 
literacy and fantasy construction. Can we say that they are free? It is but a 
cruel mockery of freedom — freedom rebounding upon itself in absurdity. 
Thus, it matters little whether the freedom paper is forged or a master’s 
generous gift; the fundamental structure of the paper ensures the impos-
sibility of ontological security and the opening of terror. Being is never 
secure if it must be reified in a document. This is the viciousness of eman-
cipation. The freedom paper engenders a fraudulent self but not Being. 
This self is the vehicle, or object, through which the call of Being reaches 
the human. The free black is, thus, reinstrumentalized in its freedom. 
KIDNAPPING AND TERROR 
What renders ontological terror so vicious is the object that it takes as its 
obsession. I am calling this terror “ontological” because the antiblack net-
work of technologies and tactics takes this self as its target. But since this 
terror is invisible, not perceptible to the discerning eye, it is unlimited in 
its destruction and scope. More than fear, ontological terror engenders 
unending instability, without relief. Any black can become the target of 
this terror, since what sustains it is the lack of ontological ground and 
security for blacks in an antiblack world. To speak of a war on terror, in 
this instance, is difficult, since we lack any tactical procedures, strate-
gies, and technologies to provide security for this self. Indeed, how do 
you restore the severed flesh, the primary narrative, if this is ultimately 
the only solution? Rather than restoring the flesh, emancipation entraps 
blacks in a network of terror — terror predicated on the very self emanci-
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pation bestows. Without freedom, there is only terror. Ontological terror 
is sustained by the unbridgeable gap between freedom and emancipation. 
The free black, as a paradigm, illumines this terror; for in this instance 
we learn its tactics and operations: (1) It materializes the free self in a 
physical document. (2) It creates unending instability, since materiality 
is not permanent and is vulnerable to manipulation. (3) It profits from 
the invisibility of the violence, since the terror directed against this self is 
unseen. (4) It uses law as the vehicle through which it violates its target. 
(5) It renders black freedom just another form of captivity. This terror is 
the outcome of a metaphysical holocaust and the unbearable burden that 
nothing must endure in an antiblack world. 
Kidnapping free blacks is one form of this terror. We can suggest that 
the essence of kidnapping is not legal, but ontometaphysical. It could not 
exist without the ontological violence that sustains it. What kidnappers 
steal, then, is this precarious self and not just a black body. The black body 
encases a more vulnerable entity. Kidnappers preyed on this ontometa-
physical instability. They stole free blacks, usually from Northern states, 
and sold them into slavery for a profit. But again, what is important here 
is that kidnapping relies on the precarious black self — since this self exists 
to not exist, it is fleeting and material. Kidnapping illustrates that the free 
black does not exist as human being, since the ontological presumptions 
of freedom are denied blacks (and it is this denial that provides the condi-
tion of possibility for kidnapping). The lure of emancipation conceals the 
fact that freedom under such a condition is uncertain and stochastic. One 
experiences terror precisely because one never knows when this self will 
be targeted, or when one will be forced to prove the improvable. It is the 
terror of losing their freedom, as Carol Wilson has described it in Free-
dom at Risk.48 This terror is the ontological dimension of insecurity — at 
any time or place this self can be targeted. 
A kidnapper can claim blacks as property at any time because, as 
Samira Kawash explains, black freedom “was never absolute or unas-
sailable in a context of race slavery, freedom maintained a kind of con-
tingency not shared with freedom applied to whites in general.”49 This 
contingency is the difference between equipment and human being. The 
white human cannot transition from human into equipment because she 
has Being, and Being provides the condition for her freedom. Put differ-
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ently, freedom is unassailable ontologically because Being is unassailable. 
The unfolding of Being is the space of freedom for the human. This is not 
the case for black being, and this is why Taney argued that emancipation 
really did not matter much. Kidnappers benefited from this ontological 
problematic, since free blacks could move incessantly between property 
and freedom. This devastating transit is the ontological terror emancipa-
tion enables. 
CODA
Philosophy is always already constitutively related to the law, and every philo-
sophical work is always, quite literally, a decision on this relationship.
 — giorgio agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy
What I have proposed in this chapter is a theory of outlawing. Law is 
a fundamental instrument of terror, rendering black being unprotected, 
undefined, not seen, and reified. It exists to not exist. Outlawing departs 
from and challenges postmetaphysical thinkers and black humanists by 
asserting that blacks cannot rely on Being as an anchor for freedom, rec-
ognition, or ipseity because the Law of Being depends on black exclusion 
to enable the freedom of the human. The ontological difference must not 
become an issue for blackness, since black being is premier equipment 
for Dasein’s existential journey in a modern world. Thus, the relation be-
tween the Law of Being and the being of law (the metaphysics of law) is a 
collusion of terror — both outlaw blacks. The Law of Being outlaws blacks 
ontologically by mandating not seeing this being within the order to see 
the invisible (Being itself, manifested in the human, is what is invisible 
but must be seen). And metaphysically, the self (the legal representation of 
the human’s being) is denied blacks. This self is reified (in a physical doc-
ument), placed within an interval of temporality, that holds the present 
(black time), unstable is, and can transition into a human’s property at any 
time (kidnapping). For blacks, the ontological difference is suspended or 
withheld — Being will not stop the terror or serve as security against an-
tiblackness. This is why outlawing departs from postmetaphysical think-
ers — such as Nancy, Heidegger, and Ben- Dor — and humanists such as 
Patterson, Rebecca Scott, and Jean Hébrand. 
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The free black, as a paradigm, illumines the abyss of black being. Free-
dom is but a mockery within an antiblack world. Emancipation is the 
only option; there are no solutions to restoring the flesh and eradicating 
ontological terror. The form of terror might change, but the necessity and 
manifestation of terror remains. The free black teaches us not to become 
seduced by romantic humanism and postmetaphysics. A change in ter-
roristic tactics and strategies is not progress or freedom; rather, it is the 
metaphysical holocaust “showing itself in endless disguise,” as Hortense 
Spillers would describe it. 
THREE
SCIENTIFIC HORROR 
“Nothing” — what can it be for science except a horror and a phantasm?
HEIDEGGER , Introduction to Metaphysics
Blackness is (always already and only) cast inside the mathematics of unliving-
ness (data/scientifically, proven/certified, violation/asterisk).
KATHERINE MCKITTRICK , “Mathematics Black Life”
Science abhors nothing. It works tirelessly to avoid it, to disavow it, to 
dominate and control it. Metaphysical procedures and practices structure 
scientific thinking — calculation, schematization, predictability, objecti-
fication, and numerical supremacy. But nothing resists such metaphys-
ical strictures, and because it is not capable of capture within scientific 
webs, it is a horror. Heidegger claimed that nothing is but “a horror and a 
phantasm” for scientific thinking. Nothing is a monstrous thing, which, 
paradoxically, provides the condition of possibility for scientific thinking. 
In other words, nothing is the essence of science — the void, the abyss, 
the unruly thing is the repressed ground of scientific inquiry. How do 
you quantify nothing? How do you render nothing tangible, an object for 
observation? How do we predict and isolate this nothing? How do we dif-
ferentiate it from the “something” metaphysics rules with an iron fist? Un-
dergirding these inquiries is the most horrifying of them all: why is there 
something rather than nothing? Or what if there really is just nothing? 
In other words, science poses a proper metaphysical question through its 
avoidance of nothing — a nothing it must disavow and embrace all at once. 
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But this is not the entire story. If for Heidegger science is horrified of 
nothing and must repress this nothing to proceed scientifically, then sci-
ence has also found substitutes or embodied projections of this nothing. 
In this way, it comes close to the horror of nothing but can remain at a 
safe distance by turning this nothing into a something.1 This, I would 
argue, is the function of black being for science. Blackness enables a sci-
entific encounter with the horrors of an entity that is nothing and some-
thing at the same time. This brings us back to Alain David’s childhood 
riddle: “What is nothing while being something?” David’s answer, of 
course, is blackness. It is both nothing and something. This leads him 
to inquire, “Why are Negroes black?”2 Scientifically, we can suggest that 
Negroes are nothing incarnated because they are black. Much like black 
holes and other scientific mysteries, blackness functions to index the limit 
of science, that which it is unable to dominate through its schematized 
reasoning.3 But with its will to power and its will to know, metaphysical 
science still desires to engage this mystery, even though it horrifies.
We will present a few propositions that meditate on the relation be-
tween blackness, nothing, and science: (1) Science projects nothing onto 
black bodies as a way to engage the horror and disavow it simultaneously. 
(2) Life and death lose distinction and coherency for black being as noth-
ing. Once this distinction is displaced or otherwise destabilized, the sci-
entific imagination is boundless in its conquest over blackness as nothing. 
(3) Science performs important philosophical work in that it suspends 
the ethical relation to recast physical, emotional, and spiritual torture as 
objective scientific methodology. (4) Science is obsessed with conquering 
blackness — constantly searching for ways to either eliminate it, through 
practices such as bleeding or rubbing away, or to keep it in a netherworld 
of horrors to sustain brutality. (5) Science relies on numeracy or the cal-
culating mind to carry out its brutal obsession. Numbers are not neutral 
or innocuous but are weapons of pulverization and subjection. (6) The 
discourse of insanity is a particularly vicious framework for making on-
tometaphysical arguments about blackness. 
The free black will serve as our paradigm for understanding the re-
lation between science and black being. Antebellum society often envi-
sioned this nothing through the juxtaposition of freedom and blackness. 
Freedom and blackness are recast, insidiously, as scientific terms for the 
purpose of performing ontological work. Thus “free black” provided a 
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conceptual frame for applying scientific procedures to work through an 
ontological crisis — what is this black thing? Is it property? Is it human? Is 
it animal? Does it lack taxonomy? Is it nothing? 
THINKING WITH JOE, BLACK DEATH,  
AND METAPHYSICAL SCIENCE 
Dr. W. T. Wragg published “Remarkable Case of Mental Alienation” in 
the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal in 1846. He informs us that he is 
treating a young Negro named Joe (twenty years of age), and Joe has taken 
ill with “fever of a bilious type” on a Charleston plantation. What stunned 
Dr. Wragg, however, was that Joe pronounced himself dead, and word of 
his death traveled throughout the city. Although Dr. Wragg claimed he 
was not dead but was, in fact, living and breathing when he discovered 
him, “his case was of so serious a character as to call for most careful at-
tention.” Joe became more “delirious” and “pressed with the belief that he 
was dead.” Dr. Wragg initiated treatment of this “irrational contention,” 
which was predicated on “unsound premises.” According to Dr. Wragg, 
“[Joe] said that, being dead, his flesh would soon begin to rot and drop 
from his bones; remonstrated at being kept so unburied; earnestly de-
manded that his grave clothes should be prepared and put upon him, and 
that he be laid out in the usual form. He looked anxiously for the company 
to assemble, which was to follow his body to the grave, and would chant 
in touching language, a final adieu to his mother.”4
Joe’s delirium assumed a joyous constitution as he sang songs and gave 
witness about his death and burial. This troubled Dr. Wragg, and he diag-
nosed Joe as having “mental alienation,” a fracture between a fantastical 
(or delirious) perception of reality and reality itself (the “real world”). This 
fracture, the irrational gulf between reason and the deadly imagination, 
needed suturing. Dr. Wragg’s treatment, then, proceeds to suture percep-
tion with reality — to use medical science to create a place for Joe among 
the living, among human beings. Joe’s cure entailed “repeated bleeding, 
both general and local, blistering, purging, hot pediluvia with mustard, 
and other means of depletion and deprivation,” and as a result “his mad-
ness became more calm, but he never said anything rational.”
I would suggest that Dr. Wragg used medical science to address an 
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ontometaphysical condition. The symptom treated is the nihilistic an-
swer to the proper ontometaphysical question “What is black being?” Joe’s 
answer to the question appears resolute: black being is an always already 
dead thing, and this thing is worldless. Although it might appear to be 
alive (within the precincts of biology and scientific reasoning), this life is 
but an illusion — a scientific/ontic illusion. The black body is just an en-
casing for a primordial death (the destruction of the flesh, thanatology). 
The black body, then, is a breathing tomb — a corporeal casket, containing 
a primordial death. 
Joe’s death is not a physical death, however (we might call this, after 
Heidegger, “perishment”).5 He makes a distinction between death and the 
corrosion of the body (perishment). Dr. Wragg’s astonishment is really a 
misunderstanding; in fact, the entire treatment procedure is predicated 
on a fallacy — blurring the distinction between metaphysical death and 
biological death — a blurring that is necessary as a form of disavowal, a 
not seeing of the metaphysical destruction Joe endures. Thus, Joe’s self- 
diagnosis, his madness, is an ontometaphysical condition. He is, indeed, 
already dead, awaiting his physical demise. Death is an ontological mur-
der. The body is the least of Joe’s concerns (in fact, he is all but happy to 
get rid of the corporeal casing). The metaphysical holocaust is a blind spot 
(anamorphic) to the scientific eye and its hegemonic vision, despite its 
purported acuity. Again, this is not a Heideggerian death — where death 
is actually an aperture onto life, authentic life with Being — but is an onti-
cide, a destruction of all ontological grounds and relation to Being. 
What we have, then, is the limit of science and the beyond it cannot 
fully broach, but can only medicalize away. Had Dr. Wragg actually taken 
Joe seriously, actually listened to what antiblackness muffles, he would 
understand that mental alienation is the only condition possible for black 
being in an antiblack world. The term alienation is but an inadequate 
placeholder for onticide, which severs the flesh from the body. Science can 
neither suture nor cure this fracturing. And it is this death, reconfigured 
as the nothing of a metaphysical world, which constitutes the limit of sci-
entific thinking. Indeed, this type of death is a horror for science, since 
it is unable to transform it into an object of knowledge. This untranslat-
ability is recast as madness. Joe’s madness is the nihilistic condition of the 
metaphysical holocaust, of living in perpetual obliteration. 
David Marriott provides a contrast to the Heideggerian understanding 
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of death (as the authentic opening up onto Being through the mood 
anxiety). For Marriott, black death is “having lived without ever being 
truly alive; dead because never alive . . . black life is meaningless and so 
black death is meaningless — a legacy in which death is nothing . . . it is a 
death that cannot ever die because it depends on the total degradation and 
disavowal of black life. Ipso facto: death emerges as a transcendental fact 
of black existence but without transcendence (similarly, black existence is 
one condemned to live without the possibility of being) [emphasis mine].”6
Black death is nothing (existence without the possibility of being). It is 
not only that black death is nothing in the sense that it is meaningless or 
pointless (rather than paving the way for human freedom, it paves noth-
ing), but also that it is metaphysical nothing, an entity without being. 
Black death is the symbolic form of nothing that Dr. Wragg could not 
understand (he needed to think philosophically). For what he patholo-
gized and attempted to treat was nothing itself. Joe’s pronouncement is 
really about this nothing and not his physical perishment. He was never 
alive, and any life perceived is erroneous. The treatment, then, inverts 
the ontometaphysical problem: if Joe were to pronounce that he was alive 
and well, that would be a disjuncture between reality and perception. 
Dr. Wragg’s cure, then, is the true symptom in the diagnosis. We might 
call Joe’s ontometaphysical condition “the already dead,” following Eric 
Cazdyn. But in this case, black death is a chronic condition of modernity, 
without cure.7 Abdul R. JanMohamed would consider this disjuncture a 
“death bound subject,” which constitutes “a zone between the status of 
‘flesh’ and that of ‘meat,’ neither quite alive nor quite dead.”8 Joe’s body is 
meat, the object of a rapacious, antiblack appetite. What is the ontologi-
cal status of this interstice between flesh and meat? Or, what is the status 
of the zone of indistinction between metaphysical death and biological 
life? This is the proper metaphysical question that science broaches from 
a distance. 
We can also consider the “Remarkable Case of Mental Alienation” as 
an allegory of sorts, or a paradigm for thinking science with black being. 
For science cannot understand black death, or the nothing that is black 
death. When science reaches its limit, when its episteme is unable to com-
prehend, it diagnoses the impasse as madness. Madness, I would argue, is 
the name for answering the proper metaphysical question, nihilistically. 
One is mad because one is always already dead, although appearing fully 
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alive. Joe also allegorizes the plight of black being: it is vulnerable to the 
viciousness of scientific thinking and its devastating procedures.
Hortense Spillers identifies medical science as a particularly terroristic 
field in relation to blackness. Reading through the work of William Good-
ell, she traces out the vicious profit motive, which creates an economy of 
selling and purchasing diseased, damaged, incurable, disabled, and oth-
erwise worthless black bodies. She suggests, “This profitable ‘atomizing’ 
of the captive body provides another angle on the divided flesh: we lose 
any hint or suggestion of a dimension of ethics, of relatedness between 
human personality and its anatomical features, between human person-
ality and cultural institutions. To that extent, the procedures adopted for 
the captive flesh demarcate a total objectification, as the entire captive 
community becomes a living laboratory.”9
What Spillers describes here is a metaphysical procedure: what is to-
tally objectified is more than just the captive’s body. The real object of 
analysis is nothing. (It is the attempt to make nothing an object through 
the captive’s abject body.) Thus, the essence of science is not scientific.10 
This nothing horrifies science, and, consequently, the black body also 
horrifies science. This horror, however, translates into both a will to 
know and a process of disavowal (the Heideggerian conflict), and both 
re inforce/generate each other. In other words, black bodies become living 
laboratories because these bodies hold the secret of science — what it most 
wishes to know and what it most wishes not to know. This play between 
knowing and not knowing, desiring and detesting, hating and admiring 
would seem to land us in Lacanian territory, something like a scientific 
unconscious. Science is obsessed with this nothing — its limit and its pos-
sibility. As Heidegger asserted, when science attempts to explore its own 
essence, it relies on this very nothing it rejects and detects for the explora-
tion.11 The atomizing Spillers describes is a philosophical procedure under 
the guise of scientific objectivity. 
Andrew Curran would describe this scientific atomization as a textu-
alization of the African through discourses such as anatomy.12 Textualiz-
ing the black body would require a vicious hermeneutical- semiotic prac-
tice of reading blackness as a sign of abject nothingness. The black body, 
then, is a scientific mediator of sorts between the dreaded nothing and 
a scientific field determined to calculate, schematize, and dominate this 
nothing. This is precisely why black being is so valuable to science: black 
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being enables the total suspension of limits (ethical, moral, and spiritual), 
and this suspension leaves the scientific imagination unbounded in its 
antiblack quest for knowledge, truth, and power. A living laboratory has 
no rights that a white scientific mind is bound to respect, no limitations 
on scientific creativity, and no resistance against scientific objectification. 
As equipment in human form, black being broaches infinity, nothing en-
cased in a body. Our aim, then, is to understand the function of science in 
this metaphysical holocaust and to dispel the myth of objectivity, which 
masks metaphysical cruelty behind the auspices of scientific discovery. 
In its schematization, science also relies on the mathematical mind 
and its procedures to give numerical form to the formless — the infinite 
and the nothing. Katherine McKittrick calls this the “mathematics of un-
livingness,” where metaphysical thinking deploys numbers and calcula-
tive thinking to perpetuate the metaphysical holocaust. This is to suggest 
that numbers are weaponized against black being, mobilized to create 
a destructive calculus. She understands the invention of black being as 
emerging through numbers and the crude economy of commerce: “This 
is where blackness comes from: the list, the breathless numbers, the ab-
solutely economic, the mathematics of the unliving.”13 The purpose, then, 
of metaphysical arithmetic (schematized, calculative thinking) is to pro-
duce the unliving, the very death that Joe so insisted to Dr. Wragg. Once 
situated on the ledger, financial documents, and wills, black being is cast 
outside Dasein. These numbers provide space to black being without an 
ontological place — this is how numbers contribute to the metaphysical 
holocaust. Numbers conceal this devastation behind purported objectiv-
ity, but the number and its calculus are far from innocuous. The ledger is 
precisely the reification of this non- place (this nothing), and it is the way 
metaphysics can in fact contend with it. 
Heidegger’s critique of calculative thinking entails the destructive use 
of numbers to quantify man, to restrict his spontaneity and capture him 
in predictability.14 Badiou revisits this critique and revises it to dethrone 
“1,” which metaphysical philosophy uses to understand the subject and 
being.15 We might say, following Badiou, that “1” begins metaphysical vi-
olence: man is reduced to this “1,” a quantifiable thing of science. But, if 
we read McKittrick through Badiou’s critique, we understand that the 
purpose of antiblack schematization is to deny black being metaphysical 
“1.” As an ontological designator, mathematics of the unliving must begin 
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with unending subtraction of the nonexistent — a calculus that takes us 
into imaginary numbers, purely functional but lacking tangibility. (Ba-
diou’s theory, then, leaves power and violence untheorized in relation to 
mathematics, and this is why McKittrick’s conceptualization is essential 
to Badiou’s revelation that “ontology is mathematics.”) What I am sug-
gesting, here, is that mathematics of the unliving does not calculate a 
metaphysical “1,” which can be infinitely multiplied and added — this is 
the mathematics of humanism (and Badiou’s infinitely multipliable set 
theory cannot help us in this calculation; since black being is impossible 
to factor, it is both infinity and nothing [or something else], and the op-
erational procedure rebounds into nonsense. Perhaps blackness enables 
ontological operation, as mathematics, by its exclusion from both meta-
physical “1” and the null set). We might say the drive of black human-
ism, its endless romance with metaphysics, is to translate this nonsense 
number (whatever it is) into a quantifiable “1” — the indivisible human. 
This entails the ontological component of what Patricia Cline would call 
numeracy — the obsession with numbers, quantifying, and calculation in 
antebellum society.16
The metaphysical violence of the Three- Fifths Compromise, for ex-
ample, is purportedly resolved by adding the alienated two- fifths to this 
fractioning; and somehow, we finally arrive at this metaphysical “1.” (Most 
of romantic humanism and emancipatory logic is the attempt to reunite 
black being with this “1.”) But I read a certain impossibility in McKittrick’s 
term mathematics of the unliving, since such an additive procedure is a 
fantasy. Why is this the case? I would argue that the fractioning/fractur-
ing is the mathematical component of the metaphysical holocaust — the 
alienated two- fifths is the severing of the flesh, the primordial death. It 
is irretrievable. Black being is precisely this three- fifths (the ontometa-
physical remainder, its refuse), not a metaphysical “1” — no multiplicative 
procedure can produce this fantastical “1” (the three- fifths is, in fact, the 
numerical stand- in for nonsense, since the human cannot be fractioned 
from the “1.” Thus, the black is not a metaphysical human, following this 
mathematical scheme, but something other — equipment). And since we 
lack a calculus to arrive at this “1,” the promises of emancipation are but 
a ruse. Black being remains a nonsense sign within metaphysical arith-
metic, even when one is holding freedom papers. Black being is an un-
translatable variable (if we can even call it that) mathematically — it is 
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imaginary and is used to perform the function of settling the limits of hu-
manism (the function of imaginary numbers is to resolve an irresolvable 
equation). Emancipation is predicated on faulty mathematical ontology: it 
cannot incorporate black being into the “1” metaphysics uses to determine 
and identify a human.
Postmetaphysics might rejoice at this fracturing, arguing that it sets 
the stage for thinking [Andenken] outside metaphysical violence — that 
because blacks are inassimilable within metaphysical mathematical schema, 
they somehow are free. But this postmetaphysical logic denies the su-
preme privilege metaphysics holds over life; furthermore, the option to 
reject this privilege for some illusive freedom is also a power- laden privi-
lege. Outside the metaphysics of the human, I would argue, is only vulner-
ability and violence — ontological terror. Being will not unfold in this arid 
space — even within the interstices between sets, Badiou’s operations. We 
cannot twist [verwunden] this violence into something productive for Be-
ing. Blackness cannot look to Being for hope, that it will somehow save us 
from ontological terror if we assume an authentic posture toward Being’s 
unfolding. The destructive/deconstructive solutions of postmetaphysi-
cal thinking will continue to fail us — only death is there. Joe’s death, the 
death of black being. A meaningless death, a (fore)closure of Being — anx-
iety without any reprieve. This is the terror postmetaphysics continues to 
refuse, and this not seeing secures thinking and freedom for the human 
being. 
Scientific and mathematical thinking “calculates and factors blackness,” 
as George Yancy might suggest.17 And our task is to expose the essence 
of these calculations as the terror of nothing, black as nothing. Scientific 
thinking needs blackness because blackness is the living laboratory — a 
laboratory that functions biologically, but is dead ontologically. We will 
investigate a few instances of this thinking and how they contend with 
nothing in various forms. 
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RUBBING AWAY NOTHING 
For several years certain laboratories have been trying to produce a new a 
serum for “denegrification”; with all the earnestness in the world, laborato-
ries have sterilized their test tubes, checked their scales, and embarked on re-
searches that might make it possible for the miserable Negro to whiten himself 
and thus to throw off the burden of that corporeal malediction.
— Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks
Benjamin Rush’s “Observations Intended to Favor a Supposition That the 
Black Color (As It Is Called) of the Negroes Is Derived from Leprosy” pres-
ents a fantastical solution to the problem of blackness, its terrifying phe-
nomenology, and the nothing it encases. Rush’s “altruistic” intention in 
this study is to prove “that all the claims of superiority of the whites over 
the blacks, on account of their color, are founded alike in ignorance and 
inhumanity. If the color of the Negroes be the effect of a disease, instead 
of inviting us to tyrannize over them, it should entitle them to a double 
portion of our humanity, for disease all over the world has always been 
the signal for immediate and universal compassion.”18 The color black, 
then, provides a metaphysical form for thinking formlessness, dreaded 
nothing. And Rush medicalizes this formlessness as leprosy. To consider 
nothing an abject disease enables Rush to capture and schematize it. The 
discourse of epidemiology provides the distortion, or vehicle, for the real 
work of engaging this horror.
Because black being contaminates civil society by embodying the col-
lapse of sacred boundaries, it is impossible to incorporate black being into 
civil society and maintain this society at the same time. This startling 
reality perplexed many “abolitionists” — I use scare quotes here because 
abolitionists really did not abolish the problem of blackness in modernity; 
they merely advocated for blacks to inhabit a space of ontological terror.19 
The conundrum of black being and civil society came to be known as “the 
Negro Question,” and this question served as the limit of abolitionist fan-
tasies of black freedom, equality, or retribution.20 The Negro Question is 
the proper metaphysical question “What is black being?” Trying to figure 
out what this thing is that contaminates civil society and lacks placement 
in the domain of the human is the problem abolitionists attempted to 
resolve. Black being, whether as captive or as emancipated, would always 
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threaten to unravel the fabric of an antiblack civil society. One solution 
to the problem was simply to remove blacks physically from the United 
States. Colonization societies emerged in the United States and advised 
masters and the state to encourage free blacks to emigrate and settle in 
Africa. This solution was not quite successful, owing to the cost of the 
enterprise and difficult logistics.21 Neither was colonization benevolent, as 
Grant Walker would suggest — it became a convenient strategy for ridding 
society of its unwanted waste.22 
Dr. Benjamin Rush, the father of American psychiatry, provides an 
absolute solution to the problem of black being: eliminate it. This solution 
belongs to a class of genocidal discourses that seek to eliminate black-
ness itself, although Rush disavows such internecine implications. (He 
claims his aim is to generate compassion for the diseased, helpless black 
leper — black genocide recast as compassion.) “Observations” is not the 
typical genocidal enterprise, although there was discussion about lit-
eral genocide against free blacks in the mid- nineteenth century. Wil-
liam Andrew Smith, in his Lectures on the Philosophy and Practice of 
Slavery (1856), for example, argues that an accumulation of free blacks 
would make extermination the only reasonable and humane option for 
frustrated white humans.23 Rush, rather than exterminating the physi-
cal black body to resolve the tension between blackness and freedom, as 
Smith might suggest, simply wanted to remove blackness from the indi-
vidual (a different type of destruction). In essence, he desires to trans-
form the abject black into salubrious white (the “natural” color of hu-
mans, as Rush would suggest). Thus, the answer to the problem of black 
being is transmogrification. Rush desires to end a metaphysical holocaust 
with physical transformation. The gap between corporeality and ontol-
ogy is one he sutures with lightening the skin. Rush believed that leprosy 
caused the skin to become black, the lips to become big, the hair to be-
come woolly, and the nose to become flat, and if left untreated, it would 
pass along through generations. The danger of black leprosy (“Negritude,” 
as he called it) is apparent for Rush, since “a white woman in North Caro-
lina not only acquired a dark color, but several of the features of a Negro, 
by marrying and living with a black husband.”24 Blackness is the ultimate 
pathogen. It not only threatens to injure blacks (by concretizing abjection) 
but also whites, if whites come in close contact with blacks. 
Leprosy, then, is the scientific name of metaphysical execration — 
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nothing. Leprosy provides a conceptual space, within which Rush’s sci-
entific imagination luxuriates in its narcissism and its will to power over 
black as nothing. For the epidemiologist as philosopher, leprosy is indis-
pensable; without black lepers, how would Rush test his scientific power 
and quench his thirst for omniscience of black being? Put differently, the 
physical ailments of leprosy are not really Rush’s concern at all; they are 
merely justifiable means for reaching his romantic end, the eradication of 
antiblackness (and for Rush, the extreme means certainly justify his re-
doubtable ends). He uses leprosy to treat the ontometaphysical death the 
diseased black body entombs (or as Rush would call it, “tyrannizing over 
them”). Rush, then, rewrites himself as a metaphysician in “Observations.” 
Rush insisted that black being could be cured if the leprosy were 
treated. The case of Henry Moss convinced him that blackness could be 
eliminated.25 According to medical historian Harriet Washington, Henry 
Moss noticed that his skin began to whiten (what we now call “vitiligo”), 
and he began to display his body across the country to mystified audi-
ences. Rush became fixated on Moss and “hungered to understand and 
hoped to duplicate the process by which the Negro skin lost its color, 
and he theorized that ‘pressure and friction’ — violent rubbing — could 
banish color from the rete mucosum.”26 As part of Rush’s proposed solu-
tion to rub away blackness, “depletion, whether by bleeding, purging, 
or abstinence has been often observed to lessen the black color in Ne-
groes.”27 The desire to rub away blackness, to deplete it from the world, 
became Rush’s occupation. For he could not envision a political good life 
in which black being would be recognized as human being. Rush’s solu-
tion is a sign of philosophical desperation, since he finds it impossible 
to transform an antiblack world, and it is impossible for black being to 
achieve freedom. What I am suggesting is that the leprosy diagnosis is 
philosophically illuminating; the fact that Rush could think of no other 
solution to the problem of antiblackness indicates that emancipation/
freedom dreams are mere fantasy — one’s emerging from an active imagi-
nation. Only an extreme failure, recast as a compassionate solution, could 
put an end to the metaphysical holocaust and its lingering question for 
Rush. 
All solutions fail to eradicate antiblackness, since solution- oriented 
thinking depends on antiblackness. But the success within the failure is 
precisely the exposure of this double bind. Rush’s compassionate solution 
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to the problem of antiblackness must rely on antiblack strategies to real-
ize the solution — and this solution is just another antiblack formation. 
Antiblackness is both the problem and the solution. This is a dizzying 
and tortuous cycle, but one that does not seem to fatigue a romantic hu-
manist. For as Mark Smith astutely remarks, despite Rush’s altruistic in-
tentions, his “Observations” “inadvertently helped perpetuate the notion 
that blacks were irretrievably different and inferior.”28 
We can return to Alain David’s proper metaphysical question, “Why 
are Negroes black?” Rush’s answer is leprosy; it is an execration articu-
lated through a physical symptom (Fanon’s “malediction”). But simply 
changing the skin color of blacks will not restore the flesh, the severed 
primordial relation. This, perhaps, is what legislation like the “one- drop 
rule” is designed to preempt. Lightening skin color will not change the 
blood, even if it is drained. The blood is but a metaphor for an execration 
of being, which is unalterable. What Rush wishes to avoid, what horrifies 
him, is the nothing that black being incarnates. Transforming skin trans-
forms this formless nothing into a physical sign of hope for him. But this 
hope is but a ruse — the world needs black being. 
DRAPETOMANIA/DYSAESTHESIA AETHIOPICA
Dr. Samuel Cartwright published “Diseases and Peculiarities of the Ne-
gro Race” in DeBow’s Review (1851); it attempted to recast problems of 
metaphysics as problems of epidemiology. The essay, then, could be read 
as an exercise in translation — in which the grammar of science is im-
posed onto the syntactical terrain of the ontometaphysical. Cartwright is 
writing at the treacherous interstice between the ontometaphysical and 
the psyche; in his analysis, one informs the other until the distinction be-
tween psychic life and metaphysics is eradicated. We might call this inter-
stice between the ontometaphysical and interior space of the subject “the 
black psyche.” The black psyche is the metaphysical space of imagining 
the nothing that black being contains. In other words, science provides 
form for the terror of formlessness through this psyche — which is both 
abstraction and tangibility for science. As an abstraction, the black psyche 
articulates the symptoms, which emerge at the fault line between the two 
discourses. It also dissolves the distinction between the two, so that on-
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tometaphysical commitments are predicated on it. Thus, the abstraction 
serves a vital philosophical function — it is science’s alibi for metaphysi-
cal violence and domination. And because it is an abstraction, the black 
psyche is boundless in its probative power — its ability to get at the truth 
of black being. 
We are reminded here of Foucault’s work on the production of the soul 
and the psyche in The History of Sexuality. For him, the invention of the 
confessional and clinical room, for example, depend on the apparatus of 
soul and psyche as a vehicle for truth, knowledge, and power. The psyche, 
for Foucault, allows medical science to make its gaze boundless, and it 
reaches to the essence of the human’s truth.29 What Foucault uncovers in 
his genealogical excavation, I would argue, is the ontometaphysical labor 
the psyche and the soul perform for the world — the metaphysical will to 
power. The soul and the psyche are portals for the metaphysical and not 
just instruments of governmentality or biopower. This labor also enables 
the production of knowledge about the human so that truth and knowl-
edge marshal diverse fields at the site of the human — this relation is what 
Foucault would call “power.” 
Cartwright’s scientific technique requires a supplement to Foucault’s 
confessional technique in relation to black being. The problem, then, is 
that Foucault relies on an interiority that is not universally applicable 
(biopower is not exclusive to interiority, but it is still an essential aspect 
of the working of power through the human). In Toward a Global Idea of 
Race, Denise Ferreira da Silva defines Foucault’s subject as the Transpar-
ent I — the ontological figure consolidated in post- Enlightenment European 
thought. Interiority is the site of self- determination for this I, and scientific 
knowledge deploys productive nomos — reason as universal regulator — 
to secure the boundaries of this interiority in relation to self- determination 
that grounds scientific knowledge. But, the Transparent I is produced 
against the Affectable I — the scientific production of non- European minds 
as exteriority, non- self- determining and nonrational.30 I would suggest that 
the Affectable I is the black psyche and the Transparent I is the mind or 
Hegelian Spirit. For da Silva, Foucault’s analysis of biopower and modern 
genealogy does not go far enough because it is still wedded to interiority. 
Biopower must rely on interiority as its privileged site of subjection, after 
the body. Had Foucault been willing to question or give up interiority, he 
would have provided space for those who lack scientific interiority be-
124 chapter three
cause of global domination and violence against the others. Again, for me, 
the black psyche is not the mind — but an antiblack invention of domina-
tion. What da Silva’s masterful work does is present the coeval production 
of the “I” complement — the Affectable I. It is the Affectable I that Cart-
wright and other antebellum scientists are producing with the invention 
of the black psyche. And the black psyche reverses the triad structure 
of interiority- extraction- truth, since interiority is replaced by exterior-
ity and exteriority determines the truth of black being. Extraction is no 
longer necessary. Everything the scientist needs to know about blackness 
is shown on the outside. Cartwright determines the truth of black being, 
not by penetrating the depths of the black mind through confession and 
discourse, but by assembling a catalogue of external actions that he then 
inculcates into his invented black psyche. He then assigns the signifier 
truth to the end of the process of inculcating external interpretations to 
black being. 
Our concern here is not biopower, however. For the black psyche is 
designed not to fold blacks into humanity and the human sciences, but to 
situate black being outside these discourses. The black psyche is not about 
the manipulation of life or forced living, but about maintaining the mean-
ingless of death and the obliteration of life. Put differently, for Cartwright, 
his black psyche holds the truth of the metaphysical holocaust: black be-
ing is without ontological ground, without any metaphysical security, and 
is malleable in the destructive hands of the scientist. As an abstraction, 
the black psyche is also his intermediary between a nothing that must be 
controlled and a black body that needs to be disciplined. Physical brutal-
ity and metaphysical violence are both justified by using this black psyche 
as a ground of truth. In essence, the black psyche holds diverse myths 
together in a knot, a nodal point. The knotting of inferiority, ontological 
groundlessness, insensitivity to pain, uninjurability, theological execra-
tion, and physical contamination are the diverse discourses that enable 
Cartwright’s science to proceed — it could not without the invention of 
the black psyche. Furthermore, as an abstraction, Cartwright can deploy 
the capaciousness of his imagination and impute anything into this psy-
che. The black psyche does not contain any limits that the scientific gaze 
is bound to respect. 
We can also suggest that the symptom provides the material evidence 
of this psyche. Cartwright attributes antiblack symptoms to the very ap-
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paratus he creates. Any symptom just becomes further evidence of the 
truth of the black psyche. This creates something like a closed herme-
neutic circle for him (an unbreakable cycle); interpretation feeds off truth 
that itself is grounded in interpretation. Antiblackness must render the 
scientific procedure a hermetically sealed circle of myths recast as truth, 
abstractions recast as symptomatic materiality.31 
But if there were any hesitations about the legitimacy of this circle, 
any attempt to tear through its closure, Cartwright grounds his scientific 
hermeneutic and procedure in theology — as the ultimate ground of truth. 
The black psyche just articulates the will of a “white, western- god- man,” 
as theologian J. Kameron Carter would describe it.32 Theology, metaphys-
ics, and science are knotted in the space of the black psyche. The black 
psyche, in other words, is nothing, and as nothing it is infinitely pliable — 
 as a toy in the hands of the white scientist. 
Cartwright medicalizes this knotting with two terms: drapetomania 
(the disease causing Negroes to run away) and dysaesthesia aethiopica 
(hebetude of mind and obtuse sensibility of body — “rascality,” a disease 
peculiar to Negroes). In his encyclopedic imagination, he invents instru-
ments of execration that render being impossible for blackness. Drapeto-
mania, or the disease causing Negroes to run away, is an assemblage of 
antiblack theology, epidemiology, and political critique. This “disease,” 
according to Cartwright, “is as much a dis- ease of the mind as any other 
species of mental alienation, and much more curable, as a general rule. 
With the advantages of proper medical advice, strictly followed, this trou-
blesome practice that many Negroes have of running away, can almost be 
entirely prevented” (“Report on the Diseases”). For Cartwright, the medi-
cal field is boundless because its grammar can be appropriated to diagnose 
any aspect of the social — social phenomenon is vulnerable to the medical 
gaze. Reclaiming the purloined black self is recast as mental alienation, 
so that a strange syntactical relationship is established between redemp-
tion and alienation. Self- possession is an injurious self- loss, and the idea 
of a coherent black self is caught within a deadlock of impossibilities. For 
blacks, fracture is the state of mental health, and the traditional terms of 
salubriousness are inverted within an antiblack order. If a fractured self, a 
dispossessed self, is the healthy state of blackness, then any attempt to su-
ture this self through self- manumission precipitates death — the death of 
that which is already dead. Cartwright is not, then, attempting to save the 
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life of blacks (which is the oath of humanist physicians); rather, he wants 
to save the death of black being, to preserve ontological terror, which ren-
ders biological functioning a form of torment. These diseases are designed 
to prevent the violence from ending — which is what he considers the true 
objective of running away and all freedom dreams. 
Cartwright’s essay proffers a political theology as the etiology, or root, 
of this disease — he replaces biological antigens with theological trans-
gression: if the white man attempts to oppose the Deity’s will, by trying to 
make the Negro anything else than “the submissive knee- bender” (which 
the Almighty declared he should be) and raising him to a level with him-
self (turning equipment into human being), or by putting equality with 
the Negro; or if he abuses the power that God has given him over his fel-
low man by being cruel to him, or punishing him in anger, or by neglect-
ing to protect him from the wanton abuses of his fellow servants and all 
others, or by denying him the usual comforts and necessaries of life, the 
negro will run away (“Report on the Diseases”). Violating the divine exe-
cration of blackness — which we might also call the “Hamitic Myth” — is 
responsible for this disease of running away.33 Cartwright’s naturalism 
is a theological fiction from which he establishes the “order of things,” as 
Michel Foucault would describe it. The Negro is the eternal knee bender, 
and if the white man attempts to make this being upright through equal-
ity, then the black will run away. Cartwright neglects a neurological ex-
egesis for this condition, how exactly theological transgression impairs 
the brain or how equality distorts normal brain functioning — other than 
to capitalize on the implied rigor of the terms mental and disease to do 
this work for him. Theology and science are indistinct discursive fields 
for Cartwright, and the lack of scientific specificity provides a level of 
mysticism to the disease, which heightens its danger. 
Cartwright also identifies abusive power as another potential cause 
of this disease (“being cruel to him, punishing him in anger,” “Report on 
the Diseases”), although this cruel abuse of power, ultimately, becomes 
Cartwright’s cure for the disease. In essence, cruelty is the cause and the 
cure of the disease, which creates a dizzying circuit of cause and effect 
that is unbreakable:
If any one or more of them, at any time, are inclined to raise their 
heads to a level with their master or overseers, humanity and their 
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own good require that they should be punished until they fall into that 
submissive state which it was intended for them to occupy in all after- 
time, when their progenitor received the name Canaan or “submissive 
Knee- bender” (“Report on the Diseases”).34 
It is here we begin to see the metaphysical necessity of the cure, since 
it is imperative for humanity that they be punished. Perpetuating a meta-
physical violence translates into forms of physical brutality; it is a human 
necessity. Without this violence, the precarious ground of human ontol-
ogy is exposed as fraudulent. This exposure, then, is the death of human-
ity, and this cannot occur.
In The Body in Pain, Elaine Scarry describes the devastation of intense 
bodily pain. It is designed to “disintegrate the contents of consciousness” 
and to destroy the symbolic world of the captive.35 It unmakes the symbolic 
universe and produces what Agamben would call a “decreated being” — 
a husk of corporeality without the substance of consciousness. In this 
sense, we understand why Cartwright presents extreme cruelty, what 
masters call “beating the devil out of them,” as the cure to this disease. 
When one’s symbolic universe collapses with the laceration of the whip, 
the cropping of ears, the burning and amputation of limbs, the mauling 
of the canine patrol, it is difficult to sustain political desire or future as-
pirations. The experience of torture overwhelms black being such that the 
world outside the sadistic plantation ceases to exist — there is no longer 
a place to run. One inhabits space without a place in the world. Torture 
keeps black being worldless. 
But along with the experience of corporeal pain comes the dissolution 
of ontological boundaries (ontological terror); any previous sense of a co-
herent self dissolves, and the self becomes merely an object of pain. On-
tological terror provides the possibility for the experience of pain. Cart-
wright proffers a solution to the metaphysical problematic. When all else 
fails, simply dissolve the boundaries of the world such that the symbolic 
world and signification collapse. In such a context, only nothing exists. 
The disease dysaesthesia aethiopica (hebetude of mind and obtuse 
sensibility of body, rascality) impacts both mind and body, and skin 
lesions are its primary physical symptoms. This disease is much more 
prevalent among free blacks, according to Cartwright, who “do not have 
some white person to direct and to take care of them” (“Report on the 
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Diseases”). It causes blacks to become destructive, stupid, ravenous, lazy, 
narcoleptic, and abusive. Dysaesthesia aethiopica is a cornucopia of vi-
cious prepossessions about blackness, particularly free blacks, and the 
disease is “the natural offspring of Negro liberty — the liberty to be idle, 
to wallow in filth and to indulge in improper food and drinks” (“Report 
on the Diseases”). Liberty debilitates the mind and makes the free black 
unmanageable. 
We could suggest, then, that dysaesthesia aethiopica becomes some-
what of a “crypt signifier” (as Abraham and Torok would describe it) for 
antebellum society, and it encapsulates, or contains, a social trauma — the 
disruptive function of blackness in an antiblack world.36 The function of 
this signifier is to maintain an oppressive symbolic order, making dysaes-
thesia aethiopica another name for an antiblack phallus. Put differently, 
a crypt signifier absorbs trauma (trauma as a metaphysical problematic) 
within its discursive structure; it performs a necessary function of con-
taining what is unbearable or unmanageable for the subject. Within this 
analysis, Cartwright’s lexical properties assume this crypt function; 
dysaesthesia aethiopica is much more than just a neologism of racist 
pseudoscience. It absorbs the metaphysical anxiety about black being as 
nothing, the impossibility of incorporating this nothing into the world. 
Thus, the spurious science does not really matter much; the function 
of the signifier to symbolize a metaphysical problem is what renders the 
disease absolutely irresistible. The syntax of epidemiology provides a 
necessary smoke screen, or covering, for the abjection of the ontological 
exception, and the disease becomes a repository of anxieties and fears 
concerning nothing in modernity.
Freedom is the terrain of the human being, and, according to Cart-
wright’s science, any attempt to bring blacks into the fold of humanity 
creates dis- ease that is only curable with extreme forms of violence. An-
tiblack violence in modernity is reenvisioned as curative, as a necessary 
corrective, which renders it something other than violence, as we tradi-
tionally understand it. Antiblackness inverts the ethico- axiological struc-
ture so that black freedom becomes the name for absolute violence and 
antiblackness is the name for sociopolitical restoration. It is this perverse 
inversion of value and ethics that stains the metaphysical holocaust of 
blackness with abjection and devastation.
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Jonathan Metzl coined the term protest psychosis to describe the 
pathologization by medical institutions of black men protesting during 
the Civil Rights movement.37 We might suggest that Cartwright’s diseases 
provide the discursive precursor for the twentieth- century political psy-
chosis that characterizes black dreams of freedom. For Cartwright is re-
ally describing a certain psychosis, or maddening disjuncture, that would 
convince free blacks that they could actually operate as subjects instead of 
objects of property and accumulation — in much the same way that black 
protest for equality was considered so maddening and absurd that it could 
only be described as psychosis during the Civil Rights movement. In this 
way, Cartwright’s writing prefigures twentieth- century medicalization of 
black equality and political incorporation.
Cartwright, then, provided us with two of the most powerful meta-
phors of black being in modernity; and he can be read, in my opinion, as 
a metaphysician using science to articulate the ineffable. Drapetomania 
and dysaesthesia aethiopica capture the impossibility of living for black 
being. Modernity offers only two choices of death that are recast as life. 
Blacks live through social, metaphysical, and psychic death — the third 
choice of freedom is a fatal myth, one that antiblack violence is designed 
to eliminate. 
CALCULATING BLACK BEING: THE CENSUS OF 1840
In Ideology and Insanity: Essays on the Psychiatric Dehumanization of 
Man, Thomas Szasz rejects the phenomenology of insanity, the tradi-
tional view of insanity as a coherent/valid scientific entity existing in the 
world, and thinks of it, instead, as man’s struggle with the problem of how 
he should live.38 What undergirds insanity, for Szasz, is biofuturity — how 
man continues existence into the future, and how he can navigate the 
treacherous terrain of the world to maximize this existence. Insanity, 
then, would name the inability to resolve the riddle of existence and fu-
turity. If Szasz thinks of insanity as the problem of life, then the term be-
comes somewhat problematized when we apply it to black being because 
the presumptions of humanity and biofuturity do not easily translate. 
We would have to revise Szasz’s brilliant intervention into the ideology of 
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insanity and suggest that for black being, insanity names a certain meta-
physical deadlock, an impasse in relation to the metaphysical holocaust 
or perpetual onticide. 
We could describe the deadlock as this: if one accepts that one is al-
ready dead (as in the case of Joe), one is deemed insane (humanism’s he-
gemony deploys the term to invalidate metaphysical violence); conversely, 
if one assumes that one is a human being, with the ontological freedom 
this designation entails, one is always deemed insane — this is the under-
standing of Cartwright, for example (humanism exposes its utter hypoc-
risy and dishonesty through this term when black being attempts entry 
into the political community). Thus, black madness is a double structure 
of impossibilities — the impossibility of human freedom and the impos-
sibility of metaphysical resolution for black being. Insanity is not an ab-
erration from mental health (as if mental health is an option for severed 
flesh and body) but is the only existential (and metaphysical) condition for 
black being in modernity. Salubriousness for black being in an antiblack 
world is as preposterous as freedom. 
Insanity, then, becomes more of a philosophical discourse than a sci-
entific object in this regard. It borrows its semantic energy from the scien-
tific, but its aim is to describe the parascientific, the ontometaphysical. The 
Census of 1840 provides a gravid site to investigate the way insanity func-
tions as an ontological structure in an antiblack world. The census was not 
merely a medico- historical document (one we can review through a histor-
ical gaze), but also a significant philosophical articulation — rendering the 
free black both a medico- historical variable and a profound philosophical 
allegory. My aim, here, is to think about the free black and insanity as 
paradigmatic of ontological terror. If we read the mathematical/scientific 
document as saying something philosophical, it will supplement the his-
torical reading. I will argue that the census is a commentary on this noth-
ing black being bears, and the term insanity is the medical name for this 
metaphysical condition. Black insanity is not the inability to resolve the 
dictates of biofuturity, as Szasz would assert, but it is the inability to re-
solve the deadlock of black being — which is unresolvable. In this sense, 
black insanity is not something that can be cured, since the only cure is 
the destruction of the world itself. 
The sixth U.S. decennial census of 1840 is a peculiar document. For the 
scientiFic horror 131
first time in U.S. history, the federal government attempted to enumerate 
the “mentally defective” — “insane and idiots” (census nomenclature) — as 
a feature of racial difference. According to Albert Deutsch, the informa-
tion was collected through the “discerning” eye of inexperienced state 
agents, marshals, who were instructed to “conduct their inquiry from 
house to house, leaving no dwelling or institution uninspected, and to 
record the number of white and colored inhabitants of each — how many 
were lunatics or idiots, how many were supported by their own estates or 
friends, and how many were supported at public charge.”39 These agents of 
the state apparatus received very little training concerning methodolog-
ical procedures, reporting techniques, and medical literacy — statistics as 
“science in the making,” as Bruce Curtis would call it.40 In fact, marshals 
were unable to delineate between those individuals considered mentally 
insane and those individuals considered idiots, as insane patients and 
idiots were lumped together on statistical tables.41
The Census of 1840 received national attention because of the startling 
information collected. The most unexpected development of the census 
indicated that the rate of insanity was greater in Northern states:
The “insane and idiots” in the United States totaled 17,456. Of these, 
14,521 were listed as whites and 2,935 as Negroes. There was little dif-
ference between the mentally handicapped rate among Northern and 
Southern whites. In the North, one out of 995 white persons was re-
corded as insane or idiotic; in the South the ratio was one to 945.3. Of 
the 2,788,572 Negro inhabitants of the slave state, 1,734 were insane or 
idiotic — making a ratio of one to every 1,558. In the Northern, or Free 
states, on the other hand, 1,191 Negroes out of 171,894 were found to 
be insane or idiotic — a ratio of one in every 144.5. The rate of men-
tal disease and defect among free Negroes was about 11 times higher 
than it was among enslaved Negroes. In the free state of Maine, every 
fourteenth Negro was afflicted with mental disease or defect, in Mich-
igan every twenty- seventh, in New Hampshire every twenty- eighth, 
in Massachusetts every forty- third. In contrast, in the deepest South, 
where slavery was most firmly entrenched, the rate of mental handicap 
among the Negroes ranged from one in 2,117 in Georgia to only one in 
4,310 in Louisiana. Finally, New Jersey, with the lowest Negro insanity 
rate among Free states of the North, had twice the rate of its neighbor 
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Delaware, just below the Mason and Dixon line, which had the poorest 
showing of all the slave states.42
According to the census findings, 1 out of every 144 Northern Negroes 
was insane or feeble- minded, as compared with 1 out of every 995 North-
ern whites. But in the South, only one in every 1,558 Negroes was mentally 
handicapped. In the state of Maine, for example, it was reported that 1 in 
every 14 blacks was insane!
These statistics adumbrated a causal relationship between emanci-
pation and insanity. Northern states experienced a higher rate of black 
insanity than in the Southern states, where the “peculiar institution” 
was more entrenched. Moreover, black insanity was reported highest in 
Northern states where blacks were emancipated. 
This geopolitical understanding of blackness and insanity inadver-
tently created a psychic- cartographic imagination; by this, I mean the 
way that insanity is spatialized politically. Within a psychic- cartographic 
imagination, a map reveals much more than geopolitical configurations 
and landscapes. It also locates the origination and concentration of insan-
ity and mental death for antebellum thinkers — in essence, it exteriorizes 
what is considered most interior. The Mason- Dixon Line not only delin-
eated between free and slave territory, but also marked the limit of sanity 
along geopolitical configurations. The Mason- Dixon Line represented 
the liminal and unthinkable transition between conscious/unconscious, 
sane/insane, and manageable/unmanageable. Spivak, writing in another 
context, has called this permutation of geography, power, and knowledge 
an epistemograph, the peculiar way that the geographic imagination con-
figures epistemic production.43 In a word, the construction of the psychic 
cartographic imagination, an American epistemograph (the mapping of 
medical knowledge and antiblack domination in antebellum America) is 
perhaps one of the greatest achievements of this census report.
Pro- slavery advocates immediately used the census as scientific proof 
of the dangers of black freedom. This paternalistic discourse was articu-
lated with a logical twist: slavery not only was essential to preserving civil 
society and its various economic institutions, a popular line of reasoning, 
but was also absolutely necessary for maintaining the psychic stability of 
the slave, a line of reasoning that was novel and difficult to combat. This 
social altruism, withholding self- possession for the sake of the slave, re-
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lied on a complex political- philosophical argument: sanity and the public 
sphere were mutually exclusive for black being (both slave and free). Civil 
society must always already remain a fragmented impossibility if life was 
to be maintained (life as onticidal death). The pro- slavery argument re-
configures black livability as the inhabitation of death — social, political, 
emotional, spiritual. Black life is crudely reduced to biological function-
ality, much like equipment’s existence is reduced to its functionality. Put 
differently, pro- slavery advocates understand black bodies as equipment, 
and what they were saving was the maintenance of equipment — aside 
from use value, black bodies lacked biofuturity (outside the time of man 
and the world). The census, thus, provides scientific legitimacy for ratio-
nalizing antiblack violence. 
Frank Wilderson perspicuously argues that “civil society is held to-
gether by a structural prohibition against recognizing and incorporating 
a being that is dead, despite the fact that this being is sentient and so ap-
pears to be very much alive.”44 Civil society depends on a prohibition on 
blackness to function — and we can suggest that this prohibition supplants 
the taboo prohibition that Freud claimed grounded civilization, since an-
tebellum law permits incest and murder through the “chattel distinction,” 
as Kalpana Seshadri- Crooks suggests.45 If death “structures political life 
in terms of aversion as well as desire,” according to Russ Castronovo, and 
“produces bodies whose materiality disturbs the impersonality of citi-
zenship, but whose remove from socio- political life also idealizes the un-
historical and abstract nature of state identity,” then the materiality and 
non- ontology of blackness, as the embodiment of death, desanitizes civil 
society.46 The Census of 1840 articulates, through numerical signifiers, 
this very prohibition on blackness as death, and insanity provides the 
necessary grammar of prohibition. Nothing contaminates civil society 
and must be contained and removed. This is the metaphysical impetus 
behind antiblackness.
The Census of 1840, heralded as a beacon of truth to the world con-
cerning the necessity of slavery, actually was one of the most striking 
“statistical falsehoods and errors ever woven together under government 
print.”47 An ambitious statistician, Dr. Edward Jarvis, discovered the em-
barrassing errors while confined to his bed with a broken leg. Reviewing 
the official Census of 1840, Jarvis exposed internal contradictions and 
statistical inaccuracies within the census and concluded that
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the sixth census has contributed nothing to the statistical nosology of 
the free blacks, and furnished us with no data wherein we may build 
any theory respecting the liability of humanity, in its different phases 
and in various outward circumstances, to loss of reason or of the 
senses. . . . Such a document as we have described, heavy with errors 
and its misstatements, instead of being a messenger of truth to the 
world, to enlighten its knowledge and guide its opinion, is, in respect 
to human ailment, a bearer of falsehood to confuse and mislead. So 
far from being an aid to medical science, as it was the intention of the 
government on ordering these inquiries, it has thrown a stumbling 
block in its way, which it will require years to remove.48
The statistical inconsistencies were so grossly apparent that Dr. Jarvis 
demanded an official correction of the census. Jarvis discovered the fol-
lowing startling inconsistencies in the census report:
We found that the town of Worchester, Massachusetts, is stated to 
contain one hundred and thirty- three coloured lunatics and idiots, 
supported at public charge. These we know are the white patients in 
the state hospital, situated in that town. This single mistake multiplies 
the coloured lunatics of this state three- fold, and if it were corrected, 
it would reduce the proportion of coloured insane from one in forty- 
three to one in one hundred and twenty- nine. Warned by this example, 
we examined the statements respecting every town, city, and county, 
in all the states and territories, and compared on each one of these, the 
total coloured population with the number of coloured insane . . . the 
number of coloured insane in these towns and counties, carries on its 
very face its own refutation; no one who thus studies this report, can 
possibly be misled.
But these palpable errors are by no means all. There are others 
almost as gross, and to observers of society almost as self- evident — 
In many towns all the coloured population are stated to be insane, 
in very many others, two- thirds; one- half, one- fourth, or one- tenth 
of this ill- starred race are reported to thus be afflicted, and as if the 
document delighted to revel in variety of error, every proportion of the 
negro population from seven- fold its whole number, as we have shown 
in some towns, to less than a two- thousandth, as is recorded of others, 
is declared to be a lunatic. . . . 
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We examined the details of that document in regard to these disor-
ders among the coloured population in every town, city, and county of 
the Free states, and found in many of these places, the record cases of 
blindness and deafness and dumbness without subjects. These disor-
ders exist there in a state of abstraction, and fortunately for humanity, 
where they are said to be present, there are no people to suffer from 
them.49
Although these inconsistencies presented the social scientist with vi-
olations of scientific inquiry, these errors actually highlighted interesting 
philosophical moments concerning black insanity, moments articulated 
through the manipulation of statistical signifiers.
One of the errors that most disturbed Jarvis was the reporting of in-
sanity, deafness, and dumbness among Northern free blacks in areas 
in which free blacks did not reside. For example, Jarvis discovered that 
“many Northern towns were mysteriously credited with insane Negroes 
although they were entirely without Negro residents. Many other locali-
ties were listed in the census having more Negro madmen than were there 
Negro inhabitants. Thus the town of Scarsboro, Maine, which had a lily- 
white population, found itself charged with six insane Negroes. The town 
of Dresden, Maine, which boasted but three Negro inhabitants, found 
census- takers crediting it with double that number of insane blacks.” 
These statistical errors prompted Jarvis to remark that “we examined the 
details of that document in regard to these disorders among the coloured 
population in every town, city, and county of the Free states, and found 
in many of these places, the record cases of blindness and deafness and 
dumbness without subjects. These disorders exist there in a state of ab-
straction, and fortunately for humanity, where they are said to be present, 
there are no people to suffer from them [emphasis mine].”50
How do we account for these statistical errors, philosophically? If these 
ontological errors (the false reporting of being) were confined to one lo-
cality, or if entire populations of Negroes were not reported insane (or if 
black bodies were not utilized as surrogates for white insane patients), it 
would be simple to excuse these errors as mere reporting glitches, but 
the fact that these errors were pervasive throughout diverse geographical 
locations merits further interrogation.
These statistical inconsistencies present a very interesting philosoph-
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ical proposition: for black being, insanity is an ontometaphysical struc-
ture, and the presence of the black body is irrelevant to the application 
of the diagnosis. In other words, the Census of 1840, along with the em-
phatic defenses of it, implicitly makes a distinction between blackness as 
a (non)ontological feature and blackness as a phenomenal entity (a body). 
This seems a rather odd proposition, given that insanity is usually ap-
plied to a particular person, a body that we can easily identify, discipline, 
and treat. But the census departs from this commonsense understanding 
of insanity. Marshals could account for black insanity in places where 
physical black bodies did not exist because one does not need the physi-
cal body to make the claim that black insanity is a problem. Why is this 
the case? I would suggest that this error is only an error within the ontic 
science of statistical reasoning; but when we are really trying to describe 
an ontological condition of blackness using statistical instruments, then 
“error” must be reconfigured. Blackness becomes a ubiquitous threat, al-
ways already existing and floating throughout civil society as a phantom- 
like danger. Because this danger is ubiquitous, any state, city, or locality 
can claim the presence of black insanity. Within this logic, black bod-
ies are decentered and black ontometaphysics assumes centrality. This 
also explains why white insane patients were recorded in census data as 
black; insanity is an ontometaphysical feature of blackness in an antiblack 
world. So a “white insane patient” was somewhat of an oxymoron lexically 
for marshals, and they simply corrected this error. 
Thus, the errors that Jarvis described in detail were ontological truths. 
The census allowed antebellum society to participate in a collective dis-
course about the dangers of black freedom. We are dealing more with 
ontology as the ultimate science concerning blackness (ontology becomes 
a science for antiblackness) and less with psychiatry and statistics as rig-
orous sciences. If Jarvis had been able to think philosophically about 
blackness, instead of merely social- scientifically, then he would have un-
derstood why these defenders embraced the census with such urgency. 
Defending the census became self- preservation against the encroachment 
of nothing for antebellum humans. 
Needless to say, the census report was never corrected — despite Jar-
vis’s insightful critique of its validity (the census was valid on an entirely 
different register). His demands, however, prompted Congressman John 
Quincy Adams to introduce a resolution in the House of Representatives 
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to investigate the legitimacy of the census (in 1844). Adams instructed the 
Department of State to inform the House “whether any gross errors have 
been discovered in the printed Sixth Census . . . and if so, how those errors 
originated, what they are, and what, if any, measures have been taken to 
rectify them.”51 The Secretary of State was none other than John C. Cal-
houn, who was actually responsible for administering the Census of 1840, 
and he appointed William Weaver (who was actually superintendent of 
the Census of 1840) to review himself. Of course, Weaver found no errors, 
and the census was considered statistically valid.
Within an antiblack scientific procedure or process, truth and error 
lose integrity and become indissociable fictions. This is what Jarvis could 
not understand, but Calhoun adumbrated the arbitrariness of truth and 
error as scientific realities when it concerns free blacks:
That it [the Census of 1840] may contain errors, more or less, is hardly 
to be doubted. It would be a miracle if such a document, with so many 
figures and entities, did not. But that they have, if they exist, materi-
ally affected the correctness of the general result would seem hardly 
possible. Nothing but the truth itself is so would seem capable of ex-
plaining the fact that in all slave- holding states, without exception, 
the census exhibits uniformly, a far comparative prevalence of these 
diseases among the free blacks than among the Slaves of another State 
[emphasis mine].52
Calhoun presents a tautology to discount the inaccuracies that Jar-
vis exposed: “Nothing but the truth itself is so would seem capable of 
explaining that in all slave- holding states, without exception, the cen-
sus exhibits uniformly, a far comparative prevalence of these diseases 
among the free blacks than among the Slaves of another State.” As Jar-
vis argues, since the reporting is flawed throughout the study, from the 
very beginning, all conclusions must be questioned. Calhoun’s rejoinder 
insists that the conclusions are correct because they are correct — they 
were always correct, even before the census was compiled. Any errors 
are just subsumed (Hegelian Aufhebung) into the truth, such that errors 
become truth and truth becomes the errors that were always truth. This 
dizzying tautology appears to defy logic, or contravene the principles of 
science, but, in essence, antiblackness inverts logic for its own end.53 This 
illogic, expressed in the tautology, translates into the logic of death. The 
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displacement of truth and error is a strategy of metaphysical warfare. 
The tautology is designed to concretize the deadlock of black being: one 
is insane if one desires freedom or one is sane if one accepts social/polit-
ical death. Either way, the tautology ensures the inevitability of death, as 
scientific truth/error. 
Thus, the errors — reporting black insane patients in localities where 
blacks didn’t physically exist, for example — are eternal truths when black 
being and freedom are thought together. The syntagm “free black” is the 
discursive materiality of insanity; civil society collapses when the boundary 
between death and life, filth and purity, human and property is violated. 
The free black is insane precisely because of this unthinkable collapse.54
The insane represent the threshold of humanity, the not fully human 
transitioning into “rational inertia” or mental death, that zero degree of 
humanity, as a living and breathing waste object, wasting away into ir-
rational obscurity. The mad represent a certain paradox — they exist in a 
state of nonexistence. It takes the free black, however, to realize fully this 
paradox because this being is situated at the threshold of ontometaphys-
ics. Since its ontological borders are porous and unprotected by meta-
physical and juridical discourses, the free black dissolves into the abyss 
of insanity. Insanity, then, is the index of being as nothing. In Madness 
and Civilization, Foucault describes madness as a particular void within 
which reason recedes into the darkness of infinity. What renders mad-
ness so disruptive is precisely this vacuous space that “has become man’s 
possibility of abolishing both man and the world.”55 As somewhat of a 
dystopic dreamscape, insanity becomes the repository of unbearable ex-
ceptions, and the free black is the material embodiment of this night-
mare. But if we follow the thought of Kant, Hegel, and most pro- slavery 
advocates (and some abolitionists, as well), blacks are situated outside of 
reason; they are the infants of reason’s historical movement. How can a 
being purportedly void of reason, innately, become insane? If insanity as-
sumes a becoming for the human, an unfortunate fall from the mountain 
of reason into the abyss of unreason, then this becoming is completely 
absent in the insane black. Blackness is insane from its very appearance 
in the world — its appearance is the evidence of insanity. Insanity identi-
fies appearance without Being in an antiblack world. Given the existential 
positioning of blacks in an antiblack world, insanity is the only ground 
available. Blackness is born in this abyss within modernity.
scientiFic horror 139
If we read the census as just another piece of pro- slavery propaganda, 
then we miss the deep philosophical presumptions that engender (and 
sustain) the census; in particular, mathematics is philosophical writing 
otherwise. Unlike the Platonist, who believes that “mathematics is the 
discovery of truths about structures that exist independently of the ac-
tivity or thought of mathematics,” according to Benacerraf and Putnam 
in Philosophy of Mathematics,56 the census expresses an Aristotelian (or 
Nietzschean) perspective in which mathematics is a fictive or linguistic 
formation, and it becomes more like “a rigorous esthetics. It tells us noth-
ing of real- being, but it forges a fiction.”57 The census is a tapestry of anti-
black aesthetics; the numerical signs create a canvas of the beautiful and 
the good life in an antiblack order. This is why the census was too good 
to give up because of its philosophical beauty — which translates into an 
unbearable ugliness for black being. Statistics is ontological poetry in 
this case, and its validity exists in a register outside ontic accounting and 
verification. Put differently, the Census of 1840 invites us to think about 
mathematics not as an objective reflection of the external world, but as a 
premier tool for fantasies, power, and imaginings. 
Antiblackness relies on mathematics when guns, knives, and whips 
reach their limit of destruction — mathematics’ weapons are metaphysical 
and just as deadly.
CODA: THE FREE BLACK AS PARADIGM  
OF SCIENTIFIC HORROR
Here is proof of the necessity of slavery. The African is incapable of self- care 
and sinks into lunacy under the burden of freedom. It is a mercy to give him 
guardianship and protection from mental death.
 — John c. caLhoun, quoted in Deutsch, “The First U.S. Census of the Insane 
(1840) and Its Uses as Pro- Slavery Propaganda”
What type of life is even possible in the metaphysical holocaust? Are 
the terms life and death even appropriate to describe the condition of 
the being situated within this ontological lacuna? Theorists have ap-
proached these inquiries with unavoidable paradoxes: social death, necro- 
citizenship, living corpse, and living dead, just to name a few. The ante-
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bellum free black — a being situated between slave and citizen, human and 
property, political death and social life, and subject and object — consti-
tutes such an exception for antebellum U.S. society. Writing about the 
antebellum free black raises particular theoretical and philosophical 
problems, since the humanist grammars of being and existence fracture 
around the term free black and endlessly encircle it with paradoxes, con-
tradictions, and puzzles. The juxtaposition of free and black collides two 
disparate grammars into chaotic signification and conceptual devasta-
tion: freedom is the terrain of the living, of the being we call human, and 
black is the territory of existential dread, nonfreedom, and the being we 
might call object. With the term free black, we are forced into a permuta-
tion of conceptual ground that is unstable, and it desiccates beneath itself 
as a self- consuming oxymoron. Within this grammatical, syntactical, and 
conceptual chaos, even the terms life and death must be reconfigured and 
reorganized to capture the being situated within this unending violence. 
Indeed, what does it mean to live or to die when one’s living is a form of 
death, and one’s death is a gift of life? Because biology does not exhaust 
the fields of life and death, the problem at hand is more profound than 
we can imagine, especially when we analyze the condition of being that 
we call blackness.
It is this conceptual density that gets trafficked into, unknowingly per-
haps, the debates about free blacks in antebellum society. The epigraph 
raises these concerns without explicitly making bare the philosophical 
presumptions about blackness that anchor it. For John C. Calhoun, free-
dom for blackness is death, a form of death worse than mere biological 
expiration — mental death, or insanity. Since the human being names a re-
lationship of care between the self, Being, and its projection into the exter-
nal world (freedom), claiming that the black is incapable of such care places 
him outside the realm of freedom and into the domain of the unfree, the 
care- less, and the unthought. But this realm of unfreedom is also a form 
of death, according to Marriott, because antiblackness strips black being 
of this fundamental existential relationship by objectifying this self and 
presenting this relationship to the captor for his pleasure. Thus, we have a 
strange play between deaths, deaths reconfigured as life, which seems to 
be the only existential option for blackness in modernity: freedom engen-
ders mental death and unfreedom engenders social death. Because social 
death is a form of mental death to the extent that the mind is pulverized by 
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routinized pain and terror, and mental death is a form of social death to the 
extent that consciousness cannot actualize or move throughout the field 
of the social, there is no escaping this condition of death as life and life as 
death for Calhoun. “Free black” names this existential deadlock.
The antebellum free black has primarily become an object for his-
toriography and, concomitantly, has been analyzed through humanist 
presuppositions and conceptual paradigms (e.g., that there is a subject 
of the historical process; that a clear distinction between life and death 
exists historically; that blacks are human, capable of transforming space 
through time). Because Western historiography takes humanism for 
granted and applies the notion of human agency and existence to its ob-
jects of analysis, the ontological crisis of blackness is often overlooked in 
historiography. In other words, can we have a historiography that does 
not presume the human as the subject of history and the various capac-
ities that this human possesses (e.g., freedom, temporal change, time/
space capacity)? I would argue that the humanist grammar of “subject,” 
“human,” “agent,” and “freedom” does not quite apply to the antebellum 
free black, and thus, the antebellum free black is more of a philosophical 
allegory than a historical agent.
Reading the free black as a philosophical allegory, as a paradigm for 
ontological terror, enables us to expose the function of science and math-
ematics in the destruction of black being. Indeed, the antebellum free 
black is a particular historical figure (according to historiography), but 
the particularity of this figure exposes a larger paradigm of terror con-
tinuing in the present — and that will extend into the future as long as the 
world exists. Diagnosing free blacks as insane, even though their bod-
ies are absent from the examination, proposing physically rubbing away 
blackness as the only solution to antiblackness, beating the “devil” out of 
blacks until the symbolic constituents of existence crumble, and bleed-
ing out black bodies are scientific procedures for articulating the truth 
of the metaphysical holocaust (i.e., “one is already dead”). They serve as 
allegories of the condition of black being in a metaphysical war. The free 
black’s relation to science and mathematics has been one of utter terror 
and ontological insecurity. 
Whether we are talking about the experiments conducted on captive 
female flesh (e.g., Dr. J. Marion Sim’s viciousness), the torture and humil-
iation of blacks during the Tuskegee Study on syphilis, the forced steril-
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ization of black females, the fictions of the Bell Curve and other genres of 
antiblack scientific mythology, or the forced experimentation on prison-
ers, antiblackness mobilizes science and mathematics to inflict unspeak-
able harm. Thus, what I want to convey with the paradigm of the free 
black, here, is that the particularity of the antebellum free black unveils 
a vicious paradigm of terror for all blacks — no matter the time period, 
the geographical location, or the insistence of romantic humanism im-
portuning us to accept that we are free and human like everyone else. 
Thinking these diverse particularities together enables us to penetrate 
the depths of scientific horror. 
FOUR
CATACHRESTIC FANTASIES
SEEING AND NOT SEEING: PLAYTIME 
The problem of black being is also a problem of vision and envisioning. 
Our preoccupation here orbits around this proposition and the “meta-
physical infrastructure” (as Nahum Chandler would call it) that under-
girds the visual economy of signs, representations, and images concern-
ing black being. Part of the objective, then, is to listen to what images are 
telling us — to read the visual sign as a particular philosophical iteration, 
one wrapped up in violence.
To suggest that black visuality and violence are mutually constitutive 
and intertwined is well documented, and many scholars in art history 
and cultural/visual studies have edified our understanding of this en-
tanglement.1 Our investigation does not challenge this beautiful work, 
but seeks to contribute to it by centering a particular form of violence — 
ontometaphysical violence. I have argued that black being is continuously 
obliterated as a necessary feature of antiblackness. The nothing black 
being must incarnate is the metaphysical entity an antiblack world ob-
sessively attempts to purge, but fails in this enterprise, since the world 
cannot eradicate nothing. But failure does not preclude the enterprise; 
rather, it serves as its pernicious fuel. Thus, the metaphysical holocaust, 
the obsessive attempt to eradicate the black nothing, requires an exten-
sive arsenal of destruction. Hortense Spillers avers, “Sticks and bricks may 
break our bones, but words will most certainly kill us.” The metaphysi-
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cal holocaust requires, then, not just sticks, bricks, guns, and knives, but 
also words, iconography, images, and representations. Our focus here is 
on the way that images are indispensable weapons in the obsession with 
destroying nothing.
But this aspect of metaphysical violence raises a difficult problematic: 
how do you represent the immaterial, the nothing that haunts a meta-
physical world? How do you give a material form to what is most formless? 
How do we visualize black as nothing? Black being compounds our prob-
lematic, since it is not just that metaphysical violence is immaterial, but 
that the free black does not exist as such (does not exist within ontologi-
cal schemes). Or, if we return to Chief Justice Taney’s metaphysics, black 
being “exists to not exist” and must exist in this nonexistence. I italicize 
the word must to docket a certain necessity that the world would wish to 
disavow. Although black being does not exist, it must contain nothing for 
an antiblack world (as equipment and not being) — this is the crux of black 
suffering and the unbearable labor black bodies are forced to perform for 
the world. We must then inquire, how do you represent both what does 
not exist and what is also immaterial? How does the immateriality of the 
metaphysical holocaust enforce the nonexistence of black being? 
These inquiries bring us to the problem of representation. Gayatri Spi-
vak would consider this problematic one of catachresis. For her, cata-
chresis is “a metaphor without a literal referent standing in for a concept 
that is the condition of conceptuality.”2 A catachresis ruptures the field 
of representation, given that it lacks a literal referent. And you cannot 
properly represent what lacks a literal referent (and in our case, you must 
represent that which exists in nonexistence, since representation is part 
of the arsenal of destroying nothing). The difficulty Spivak presents with 
the entanglement (but not collapse) of Vertretung (something akin to po-
litical representation, “treading in your shoes”)/Darstellung (placing there 
through representation, as in portrait or theater) is that Vertretung relies 
on Darstellung, such that putting yourself in someone’s shoes (or even re- 
presenting a historical account of a being, like the antebellum free black, 
for example) is also a form of portraiture or art.3 In short, to suggest we 
can really represent at all conceals the disruption of the sign real at the 
heart of the enterprise. I completely agree with Spivak’s deconstruction, 
her important displacement of the sign representation. 
For our analysis, however, we must contend with the fact that meta-
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physical violence obliterates the Da in Darstellung in that there is no there 
for black being to be placed [stellen]. The destruction of the there- ness and 
the inability to place within this there- ness is the representational com-
ponent of the metaphysical holocaust that black being must endure. The 
metaphysical infrastructure upon which representation depends is one 
that cannot accommodate black being. In other words, the metaphysical 
holocaust renders representation always already fraught — because the 
place of representation is obliterated for black being.
When investigating black being, we are ultimately asking, how do you 
represent that which lacks a place (and not just a literal referent)? What, 
exactly, is placed there — the illegitimate place? I would suggest that the 
metaphysical holocaust (the obliteration of the very place enabling rep-
resentation) mobilizes catachresis. I am borrowing the term catachresis 
in this investigation to docket the necessity of representing that lacking 
both a place and a literal referent (black being, essentially, lacks a literal 
referent because this place has already been obliterated). As Ronald Judy 
reminds us, “The Negro cannot enable the representation of meaning, 
[since] it has no referent.”4 
Put differently, representation relies on ontological ground (or a meta-
physical infrastructure) that assumes a coherent place of being, which rep-
resentation fills. But when such a place is absent, representation encounters 
a problem. Catachresis provides a way out of this deadlock, since it creates 
a fantastical place for representation to situate the unrepresentable. 
Visual terror frames Fanon’s well- known encounter with a young boy:
“Dirty nigger!” Or simply, “Look, a Negro!”
“Look, a Negro!” It was an external stimulus that flicked over me as I 
passed by. I made a tight smile.
“Look, a Negro!” It was true. It amused me.
“Look, a Negro!” The circle was drawing a bit tighter.
I made no secret of my amusement.
“Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened!” [emphasis mine] 
The young boy makes an impossible demand, an imperative that is 
bound up in the visual — one similar to Nancy’s imperative to see. In this 
instance, the imperative to look and to see is impossible precisely because 
it requires a seeing of that which is nothing, that which is execrated, that 
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which does not exist. If the Law of Being requires the human to see what 
is invisible, meaning to see Being in the place of its withdrawal and un-
folding, then the young boy presents an imperative that disables seeing 
and renders it ineffective because one can only see that which has a place 
(a being there). But the Negro lacks a place ontologically. One must see 
through a certain ontological blindness; this blindness, this unbearable 
opacity, illumines as it conceals. What one sees when one looks at the 
Negro is something ineffable, something we must struggle to comprehend 
with the resources at our disposal. For the imperative to see this thing 
is outside the frame of vision, and our metaphysical vision depends on 
ontological coherence. The ontic and the ontological converge on the site 
of the visual. Within (and without) this field, the Negro is anamorphic, 
an ontometaphysical distortion, or blind spot. The imperative to see this 
distorting blind spot is, then, an imperative to not see, or a seeing that dis-
avows the impossibility of the demand. One must see to not see. In other 
words, the young boy demands Mama to see that which cannot be seen 
ontologically, and her seeing translates into a not seeing. The demand, 
then, could be restated as, “Mama, see the Negro precisely by not seeing 
him.” Look into the blind spot of vision to see what vision cannot accom-
modate. As David Marriott perspicuously suggests, black being “can only 
be seen insofar as one blinds oneself to it, and blindness is all the security 
and comfort the whiteness of the eye needs.”5
How does one look at that which does not exist and cannot be seen? 
What would enable such a looking? For one must not just see the “Nigger” 
but also the “Dirty Nigger.”6 How do you look at the dirtiness of black 
being? This dirtiness is the metaphysical contamination, the impurity, 
and the flaw that outlaw ontological explanation, as Fanon would describe 
it. Put differently, within the demand to see is both a phenomenolog-
ical and ontological order. The young boy not only insists that Mama 
see Fanon’s black body (the phenomenological form) but also his dirt-
iness (the ontological interdiction) — the contamination through which 
the black body is but a portal. Sylvia Wynter reminds us that the Negro 
must represent all that is evil and impure to secure the boundaries of the 
human. As such, the Negro cannot serve as a proper object of knowledge. 
The Negro, then, represents something for which epistemology and the 
vision predicated on this field of knowledge cannot accommodate. Mama 
must see this metaphysical impurity, this dirtiness, this “dirty Nigger.” 
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Put differently, the eyes are not the organ of this seeing, of this impossi-
ble demand — one sees dirtiness, contamination, and impurity (the Dirty 
Nigger) through something else.
The black body is but an ontic illusion with devastating realities. It 
provides form for a nothing that metaphysics works tirelessly to obliter-
ate. Lacan provides a heuristic way to understand the black body as the 
vase that provides form for the formlessness of nothingness.7 The black 
body holds this nothing, a nothing that is projected onto it. The young 
boy’s imperative, then, is a double imperative to see both the vase and 
the nothing it contains. One would think, however, that destroying the 
black body would resolve the problem, but since what is really the target is 
something for which carnal weapons are ineffective, the destruction will 
not end. This is the metaphysical holocaust that the Negro must endure, 
the unending terror and obliteration that will continue as long as the 
metaphysical world continues. Turning to Lacan again, we can suggest 
that the metaphysical holocaust is the global instantiation of a demand 
that relentlessly pursues its impossible object: the eradication of nothing.8 
Fanon avers that the “Negro is a toy in the white man’s hands.”9 The 
function of a toy is to facilitate play. It enables a staging, a configuration, 
an imagining of both the toy and the context within which the toy is 
placed. The toy is a vehicle for fantasy. Within this fantasy, the toy an-
chors the enjoyment and imagination of the one staging the experience. 
To understand the Negro as this toy, then, is to think about the Negro as 
a vehicle for fantasy — a vessel of the human’s imagination and configura-
tion of the world.10 One plays with the Negro to stage an encounter with 
nothing. This nothing can assume various forms depending on the vital-
ity of the human fantasizing, since one cannot just imagine nothing; some 
form must be given to it. An antiblack fantasy relies on the Negro to play 
with nothing and to configure it within the world — in essence, to domi-
nate (and objectify) nothing through the knowledge imposed during the 
fantasy. Looking is a form of playing with the Negro. One looks through 
fantasy and manipulates the Negro as play — one is able to finally see the 
nonexistent and imagine filling in the vacuous space of nonbeing. Playing 
with the Negro as a toy, then, is all about filling in this ontological vacuity 
(the obliteration of Da, there- ness) with something devastating. 
This vacuity, or blank space, is the non- thereness of black being. As an 
activity of play, the human fantasizes about filling it up with something 
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comprehensible, even if paradoxical and nonsensical. One can deploy the 
arsenal of imagination to fill in this place, where being never arrived. The 
objective of playing with this toy, in other words, is to provide a referent 
for that which does not exist, but must exist in our fantasizing (the con-
dition of possibility for fantasizing nothing). We might call this a cata-
chrestic fantasy. Since the Negro lacks an ontological place (a Da- sein), it 
also lacks a worldly referent (which is why Wynter might claim the Negro 
cannot serve as a proper object of knowledge). In a catachrestic fantasy, 
one attempts to address a proper metaphysical question: “What is the 
Negro?” The Negro is metaphysics’ “most phantasmagoric creation,” as 
Rinaldo Walcott cogently describes it.11
I will suggest that images, in particular, illustrations, are important 
tools for fantasizing, looking, and playing with the Negro. Within the 
image, the human’s fantasizing power is boundless, and an absolute sov-
ereignty of unchecked power is unleashed to fill in the empty space. It is 
within the image, the pictographic sign, that the impossible imperative 
to see that lacking a proper referent is achieved by imagining the referent. 
The image, then, performs important philosophical work, and playing is 
not merely an enterprise of amusement. Achille Mbembe suggests that 
the “pictographic sign does not belong solely in the field of ‘seeing’; it 
also falls in that of ‘speaking.’ It is in itself a figure of speech, and this 
speech expresses itself, not only for itself or as a mode of describing, nar-
rating and representing reality, but also a particular strategy of persua-
sion, even violence.”12 Thus, we must ascertain what the image is saying 
to us through the imperative to see. We must understand the ontological 
violence the image enacts as a feature of the continuous metaphysical 
holocaust. This chapter reads illustrations as a philosophical discourse, 
one enabled by fantasy and play. 
These images are situated within what Hortense Spillers would call 
the “grid of associations, from the semantic and iconic folds buried deep 
within the collective past” that black being represents.13 This grid is the 
network of fantasy that antiblackness engenders through images and ico-
nography. Semiotics becomes untenable to the extent that the grid relies 
on a signified that is purely speculative, unstable, and unreliable. Fur-
thermore, the signifier is just as problematic, since it does not exist. Both 
signifier and signified lack any real referent to ground them, and this ex-
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poses the ontological presumptions upon which semiotics, as a field, is 
predicated. We might suggest that the Negro marks the obliteration of 
the sign, as Baudrillard and other postmodern semioticians might in-
sist.14 But the Negro, as fantastical sign, exists for this obliteration — the 
destruction of the sign is the function of the Negro in an antiblack world. 
The Negro is the nodal point of semiotics, and at this zero point of satu-
ration the Negro exists to be obliterated continuously, not just physically 
but also semiotically. What is “buried deep within the collective past” is 
precisely the metaphysical holocaust that renders the Negro an impossi-
ble referent — one that does not lend itself to substitutions easily. What I 
am suggesting is that the Negro is the irreplaceable nonreferent that sets 
semiotics in motion. Or, paradoxically, we could describe it as the phal-
lus of the Lacanian phallus for the human. It is a nonsensical sign buried 
deeply within a global unconscious, which psychoanalysis and semiotics 
can only approach but never quite penetrate. The Negro, then, is a sign 
that is not a sign — nothing we are able to recognize or incorporate into 
the chain of associations and signifiers that provide meaning and inter-
pretation for the world. 
Playing, then, is not innocuous; it is a vicious form of enjoyment and a 
weapon of destruction. The Negro, as toy, encapsulates the utter collapse of 
the distinctions between play and terror, imagination and destruction, sign 
and referent, image and speech, and philosophy and fantasy. Saidiya Hart-
man describes this black being as “an empty vessel vulnerable to the pro-
jections of other’s feelings, ideas, desires, and values.”15 What is projected 
in this emptiness is precisely the desire to overcome the nothing that limits 
freedom (that disrupts the metaphysical fantasy of human coherence). 
To think through this play and the catachrestic fantasies it engenders, 
we must interrogate what Heidegger might call Bildwesen, or the “essence 
of images.” To return to a pervasive theme throughout this book, I will 
argue that the essence of images about black being is not imagistic, but 
of the order of metaphysics. In other words, the essence is re- presenting 
black as nothing and staging an encounter with this nothing. What is 
played with, then, is nothing. The Negro makes the playing possible. We 
might, again, borrow a Lacanian (and Žižekian) reading of fantasy as that 
which allows the human to come close to nothingness (as the real) but not 
too close for comfort — to enjoy the pleasure within the terror the fantasy 
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presents (as a form of jouissance).16 As such, the fantasy would map the 
coordinates of the human’s desires; it is pedagogical in that it teaches the 
human how to desire by engaging the undesirable. Along this thematic, 
we might say that the catachrestic fantasy is pedagogical in that it artic-
ulates a philosophical desire and maps its ontometaphysical coordinates. 
What is this philosophical desire? Precisely to give form to black form-
lessness and, finally, answer the riddle “What is black being?” 
Following Fanon’s insistence that we “put the dream back in its proper 
time and place,” I would suggest that the catachrestic fantasy constitutes 
an interstice between Fanon’s real fantasy and a Lacanian fantasy.17 By this, 
I mean that antiblackness is situated on both ends of the dream- work — 
as that which puts pressure on the dream and on the world. In a cata-
chrestic fantasy, a free black is a fantasy within the (real) world and within 
the (unconscious) dream. Neither the real world nor the unconscious can 
adequately represent this thing — condensation and displacement are left 
without any sign except a nonsense one. In other words, the catachrestic 
fantasy dissolves the distinction between the real and the fantasy, not just 
because antiblackness is found on both sides, but also because the free 
black doesn’t exist on either side. The figure presented is not a free black, 
but something else — something emancipation produced but cannot re- 
present. A catachrestic fantasy, then, emerges from the need to give form 
to that which is nothing. Black existence (what you see when you look at a 
black body, for example) is not anything representation can incorporate 
into its epistemology.
CATACHRESTIC FANTASY
We now turn to a few images to see what cannot be seen and to look into 
the blindness of nothing that the Negro must represent. Hortense Spillers 
once inquired, “Do we look with eyes, or with the psyche?”18 How exactly 
must the young boy’s mama see this thing that Fanon catachrestically 
re- presents? Our answer is that we look through catachrestic fantasies, 
which require much more than the eyes and an ocularcentric sensibil-
ity.19 Seeing the staged fantasy, as play, requires an ontometaphysical per-
ception beyond the eyes. The young boy’s demand is to look through an 
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antiblack fantasy in which the Negro is but a plaything for the real enjoy-
ment. We are required to look into the vase and see nothing, the Negro as 
nothing. But this nothing must assume a form within the image. In fact, 
the form conceals the nothing it encases. Our seeing, then, must uncover 
this concealment. 
I will present the following propositions to “build a way” (as Heidegger 
would call it) through this abyss of representation: (1) Catachrestic fan-
tasy is deployed as a solution to the problem of black being and represen-
tation. (2) Fantasy enables the representation of the sign continuously 
obliterated. (3) Catachrestic fantasies enable the representation of black 
as nothing, and it enables representation to give form to formlessness. 
(4) The free black lacks both a literal referent and a place, given that it 
does not exist, even when the term is deployed as a description of being. 
(5) Since the free black does not exist, emancipation allows illustrators to 
deploy a capacious imagination in imaging this being. 
Our investigation will listen to the work of illustrated journalism for 
its ontometaphysical commentary.20 I chose politically motivated illustra-
tions and a work from Edward Clay’s “Life in Philadelphia Series” because 
it is here, I believe, that the metaphysical question is broached. Illustrators 
are not bound by a literal referent, and they often grapple with the prob-
lem of place. What these illustrations reveal, I will argue, is the important 
work that catachrestic fantasies perform in both giving form to formless-
ness and obliterating the place of black existence. I have also chosen an 
image from the antebellum period and beyond as a way to demonstrate the 
futility of temporal distinctions when it concerns black being. Whether 
we are in the antebellum period, the Civil War, or post- Reconstruction, 
the proper metaphysical question is consistent. Neither time nor roman-
tic progress narratives have settled the question of black being. I have also 
chosen these particular images because I believe they engage the proper 
ontological question “What is black being?” Or, “How is it going with 
black being?” Images become philosophical discourse when philosophical 
proofs reach their limit — when philosophy needs to rely on irrationality, or 
unreason, to supplement its enterprise. In other words, the proper meta-
physical question of black being can only be broached through the absurd 
or the fantastical. Images take us into the capacious universe of fantasy. 
152 chapter Four
CATACHRESTIC FANTASIES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
Illustrations are important, and often neglected, forms of philosophi-
cal discourse because they employ fantasy, imagination, and paradox to 
work through difficult questions. In figure 4.1, Harper’s Weekly presents 
a catachrestic fantasy as an answer to the proper metaphysical question 
“What is black being?” Or, following Patterson, what is this new crea-
ture the master creates with his power of transubstantiation? In this 
illustration, an emancipated black is contending with farm animals; he 
is at great pains to convince the animals of his newly acquired ontometa-
physical status. The emancipated black, haughtily popping his collar and 
holding his head above the farm animals, asserts in stereotypically frag-
mented speech that “I ain’t one ob you no more. I’se a man, I is!” The farm 
animals, as if fully comprehending this assertion, dissent with mouths 
ajar and with various looks of consternation. They respond with non-
verbal communication. The comedic drive of the illustration is the utter 
absurdity of a dialogic exchange between a speaking being and a non-
speaking being. But this absurdity translates into metaphysical reality 
for the emancipated — fantastical comedy becomes a form of philosoph-
ical realism. 
What is important about the illustration is that it provides a devas-
tating critique of romantic humanism and emancipation rhetoric. If the 
captive is juxtaposed to inanimate and animate objects, chairs, desks, 
houses, and farm animals, then emancipation exacerbates this troubling 
juxtaposition. In essence, the animals respond to the emancipated black 
through looks of mockery and disbelief: “You may be emancipated, but 
what are you now?” Emancipation fails to transform property into per-
sonhood or chattel into human being. 
The emancipated black must insist that he is no longer sentient prop-
erty, but he directs this insistence to farm animals, not a human com-
munity (a political community). Put differently, he must seek recognition 
from farm animals, since such recognition is implausible within the po-
litical community. But this recognition makes a mockery of the Hegelian 
scene — for Hegel does not envision such recognition occurring between 
objects. It is a recognition that undermines recognition. What would 
recognition from farm animals accomplish? Why does the emancipated 
black need such recognition? Emancipation engenders incessant pleading 
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to a community that is unable to grant recognition (farm animals) or a 
community that refuses such recognition (Taney’s political community). 
Furthermore, if ontological resistance is predicated on meeting the 
eyes of the white man, according to Fanon, then the illustration suggests 
that such resistance will never occur, since the emancipated are relegated 
to a netherworld, a spatiality without a proper name. Caught between 
animal and man, this new creature lacks a place within the world. The 
emancipated black resides in the interstice of existence. Giorgio Agam-
ben would consider such a figure a “creature” or a “werewolf” produced 
through a sovereign ban. The free black embodies “a threshold of indis-
tinction and of passage between animal and man, phyis and nomos, ex-
clusion and inclusion . . . the werewolf, who is precisely neither man nor 
FIGURE 4.1 This illustration depicts a free black man addressing farm 
animals by exclaiming, “Ugh! Get out. I ain’t one ob you no more. I’se a man, 
I is!” Harper’s Weekly, January 17, 1863. Courtesy of Hargrett Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library/University of Georgia Libraries.
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beast, and who dwells paradoxically within both while belonging to nei-
ther.”21 In other words, the emancipated black, or free black, is neither 
man nor animal, but something other. This, then, is the answer the cata-
chrestic fantasy proposes: the emancipated black is nothing our symbolic 
can accommodate, no- thing that has a proper place within the order of 
things. Emancipation releases blacks into a non- place of utter terror, vul-
nerability, and vicious mockery. The answer to the proper metaphysical 
question, then, is that the emancipated black is a placeless being.22
What is funny about this cartoon for subscribers, then, is the philo-
sophical impasse itself: the utter placelessness and undecidability of this 
new creature. Hidden within the crevices of the cartoon is ontological 
terror; this terror becomes the punch line. Black being is amusing because 
it assumes subjectivity where there is none. Put differently, romantic hu-
manism provides the necessary backdrop for the terroristic humor: it cir-
culates untruth that is reappropriated for humorous ends. The untruth is 
that black being will be incorporated into the human family and its polit-
ical community once emancipated, and this incorporation is the sign of 
freedom. Mocking humanism and its romance is the objective of the car-
toon. The cartoon is a philosophical response to black freedom dreams. 
Illustrators also rely on aphesis (dropping portions of a word), ple-
onasm (superfluity and redundancy), hyperbaton (inversion of nor-
mal grammatical order), malapropism (a substitution of one word for a 
similar- sounding word, resulting in nonsense), and solecism (improper 
use of grammar and tactless speech) to create a pernicious arsenal of 
rhetorical violence. They present stereotypical broken black speech as ev-
idence that black being is inassimilable. If what distinguishes man from 
animal is language, as philosophers have asserted, then this new creature 
is a speaking animal — not human, but something like a “talking ape,” to 
borrow David Walker’s terminology.23 But this talking thing lacks a place 
within the world, where language and subjectivity would converge. Thus, 
part of the humor is the utter inefficacy of language, literacy, and reason 
to resolve the ontometaphysical problem. The Negro must not only turn 
to nonspeaking animals for recognition and interlocution, but also face 
the fact that language/literacy will not guarantee humanity. In essence, 
communicative rationality is the joke, one that postmetaphysics and ro-
mantic humanism continue to disavow.24 
This question carries over beyond the war, seeking a definitive answer. 
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The Currier and Ives illustration (figure 4.2), as if directly addressing this 
proper metaphysical question, answers with the subtitle, “Settling the 
Question.” What needs to be settled, then, is not a trivial literary debate 
but the proper metaphysical question itself. The vicious illustrative imag-
ination continues as two black literary scholars are debating in front of an 
eager crowd (again, illustrating the utter inefficacy of language and literacy 
for achieving human recognition). In the illustration accompanying this 
image, the debate ends with an all- out brawl. Both scholars are bruised 
and bleeding, and the room is totaled. It is clear that the illustration mocks 
black intelligence and civility. Ronald Judy has insisted that literacy is the 
hallmark of rationality and humanity in modernity, and this illustration 
suggests that even literacy will not restore humanity.25 In the hands of the 
unruly thing, literacy devolves into physical violence. 
FIGURE 4.2 “A Literary Debate in the Darktown Club—Settling the Question,” 
by Thomas Worth. Published by Currier and Ives, 1884. Courtesy of the Library 
of Congress.
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Beneath this stereotypical depiction of black incivility lies a catachres-
tic fantasy — one that preconditions the violence that is to erupt after 
the debate. Hanging on the wall is a poster entitled, “De Lions ob De-
bate.” The title is deceptive in that it would purport to present only those 
with the most formidable intelligence and sharp reasoning. The poster 
is designed to frame the scene, the fantasy, as a meeting of the minds. 
But the mind is not what the poster frames; rather, it uses lions literally 
and not metaphorically. The debaters are portrayed in an almost mythical 
way — half lion and half man (reflecting a version of what Tommy Lott has 
called “the Negro Ape metaphor” in visual culture).26 Each hybrid being, 
mockingly wearing a bow tie to exaggerate the hybridity, appears untamed 
and vicious. This is precisely Agamben’s creature or werewolf as ontologi-
cal limit. It is this limit that frames the fantasy, since we are to regard the 
debaters on stage not as humans, but as something other. Something nei-
ther fully man nor fully animal but something other — something without 
a proper name. The hybrid man/lion represents the catachresis that must 
constitute black being. Emancipation produces this catachresis as neces-
sity. Whatever this thing is, it lacks a proper referent. 
The indistinction between man and animal is not an opening onto Be-
ing or a dethroning of anthropocentrism; rather, it is an indistinction of 
terror and dread.27 The poster hanging on the opposite side demonstrates 
what happens to lions. President George Washington has slayed a lion 
and is victoriously sitting on it, holding an ax. We can suggest that the 
first president serves as a metonymic figure for humanity and the political 
community. The ax and the bloodied lion both symbolize the metaphys-
ical holocaust, which provides the frame for the debate stage. Human-
ity valorizes the violence over the lion, a violence that continues without 
end. Furthermore, we can suggest that the question can only be settled 
with extreme forms of violence and terror — this is ontological terror. This 
creature is produced through this violence, and emancipation sustains it. 
The question, then, is settled. Will emancipation transform black being 
into human being? Currier and Ives respond with a mocking, “No!” 
Derrida insisted that “one never escapes the economy of war.”28 And 
war becomes a structure through which metaphysics renders antiblack 
destruction operative, an “ideology of war,” as Nelson Maldonado- Torres 
might call it.29 This becomes even more apparent when catachrestic fanta-
sies broach deep metaphysical questions. These fantasies rely on war and 
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its apparatus to imagine beyond the limits of proper referents. In figure 
4.3, Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper presents a vicious fantasy con-
cerning the disposability of black being as a scene of war. “Contrabands” 
fled Confederate states and sought refuge from union soldiers during the 
Civil War. According to Barbara Tomblin, General Benjamin F. Butler 
declared blacks fleeing from Southern plantations and seeking protection 
“property of the enemy and subject to confiscation.”30 Giving safe haven 
to blacks served a strategic purpose: to drain the Confederacy of valuable 
wealth. Once confiscated, Union armies pressed blacks into various forms 
of work. Thus, even in union camps, blacks were still considered equip-
ment and property — value was not grounded in the invaluable for blacks 
(i.e., Being exceeding metaphysical value schemes), but freedom was cod-
ified in use value for the Union. Antiblackness, then, is not confined to 
the antebellum South but is the condition of possibility for the world, 
including the valiant North. But the question before the Union, and still 
FIGURE 4.3 “Dark Artillery; or, How to Make the Contrabands Useful.”  
Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, October 26, 1861. Courtesy of the  
Library of Congress.
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before us, is this: what type of work will help configure the value of black 
waste, the fleeing black body? What type of use does confiscation justify? 
What value would such creatures have during a war — uneducated and 
unwanted? If one could not rely on natural law alone to ascertain value 
(i.e., the inalienable rights of man), then value must be found elsewhere. 
Hortense Spillers remarks, “The captive body, then, brings into focus a 
gathering of social realities as well as a metaphor for value so thoroughly 
interwoven in their literal and figurative emphases that distinctions be-
tween them are virtually useless.”31 Whether we call this being a “captive,” 
“emancipated,” “contraband,” or “free,” the distinctions are utterly useless 
when the question of value is foregrounded. These distinctions, which 
orient much of historiography and legal studies, are differences without 
a difference, ontologically. 
The question of value, then, reconfigures our proper metaphysical 
question. In essence, it inquires about how to ground value of a being 
lacking place in the world.32 The illustrators provide an answer to this 
inquiry: since black being exists for destruction, why not make this being 
an extension of war machines? In this fantasy, black being is a sentient 
weapon, blurring the distinction between machine and flesh, weapon and 
body. Warfare provides value for sentient refuse. Black bodies are literal 
artilleries of destruction — there is no self to protect, just an open vulner-
ability to deadly violence. 
We might also suggest that the black weapon prefigures the suicide 
bomber, which preoccupies contemporary analysis of necropolitics. But 
martyrdom is absent from such an analysis because the black weapon is 
pure use value. The weapon does not sacrifice itself; destruction is its reason 
for existence. Black weapons also lack any relationality between humans 
and a political community from which to ground such self- sacrifice. Black 
death, vulnerability, injury, and destruction are mere comedic by- products 
of a war between humans. In the image, soldiers easily affix cannons to 
black bodies and position these weapons in the line of fire. 
The battlefield is precisely the space of emancipation — a death- scape. 
And the being emancipation creates in this space is the black weapon. 
War allegorizes the metaphysical holocaust, which places black being in 
extraordinary harm without regard to any ontological ground of resis-
tance. This war, unlike the Civil War, is without end. The black weapon 
is being for another within an economy of brutality, strategy, and calcu-
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lation. This catachrestic fantasy realizes the terror Heidegger envisioned 
with his critique of technological reasoning. The complete collapse be-
tween technology and flesh could only be realized with black being, and 
the image articulates this understanding.33 It is unthinkable that the 
union soldiers would become weapons because they are human beings. 
Thus, it is not just that the image is viciously satirical, but also that the im-
age exposes a kernel of truth: it is indeed plausible that black being could 
be used in such a way in an antiblack world. Humor encases a metaphys-
ical truth. Black being lacks ontological security and is malleable in the 
hands of humans. This is ontological terror. 
We might also revisit the Lacanian terms enjoyment and interpassiv-
ity — for it seems that both are operative in the catachrestic fantasy. The 
cynosure of the image is a black weapon with a minstrel- like smile (a 
smile that indicates utter obsequiousness to vicious demands and un-
awareness of immediate danger), gladly sitting on the ground to facilitate 
the soldier’s reloading. The smile is a signifier of stupid enjoyment, a mas-
ochistic embrace of destruction. Through the smile, the black weapon is 
aligned with the nothing and all the terror it entails. The smile, then, is the 
figuration of interpassivity and enjoyment. The terror of nothing is pro-
jected onto black bodies (black weapons must hold the destructive enjoy-
ment for the white subject, standing as a substitutional receptacle for the 
human’s enjoyment), and the enjoyment is vicious — it is the enjoyment 
of continual destruction (the metaphysical holocaust).34 The smile also 
dockets a certain duty or obligation of black being — to rejoice in destruc-
tion as service (in this way, service as black suicide is inconceivable for 
the illustrator; only honor and duty explain the stupid enjoyment. The 
illustrators, then, impose a fallacious agency on the weapon, which is part 
of the vicious humor, since a weapon has no choice in the matter/manner 
of its destruction). 
And we might say the smile signals “arbitrary [black] death as a legiti-
mate feature of a system,” as Lewis Gordon poignantly notes.35 The arbi-
trariness of black perishment exposes its meaningless enjoyment through 
the loss of meaning.36 The metaphysical world is a battlefield for blacks, 
blacks reconfigured as weapons for a war without end. At any moment, at 
any time, blacks could perish — or, to retool Heidegger, this perishment 
occurs in einem Augenblick (in a blink of an eye, or immediately). Again, 
I am using the term perishment over Gordon’s death to docket the utter 
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lack of meaning and being black destruction entails. Thus, there can never 
be Ereignis for black weapons, no event in which death enables an authen-
tic embrace of being. Heideggerian death is impossible for black being. 
There is only death as perishment — meaningless, arbitrary, and eventless 
destruction. The smile is the internecine sign of this destruction. 
The smile, then, is absolutely essential to the image (its punctum, to 
borrow Barthes’s term).37 The smile gets us to the essence of the image. 
What the black weapon is smiling at is nothing. This, ultimately, is the 
fantasy the illustrator presents, and it serves to disavow the brutal context 
within which the weapon is placed. For the illustrator, blacks embrace the 
terroristic nothing antiblackness imposes upon it. Imposition is recast as 
masochistic embrace. The image stages an encounter with nothing as a 
dutiful embrace of onticide. 
The black body is finished. The image articulates the closure of meta-
physics: the black body is nothing more than an antiblack invention, an 
instrument of a destructive will to power. Any agency we imagine we can 
extract from this body by reclaiming and celebrating it has evaporated in 
a toxic atmosphere. By closure, however, I do not mean the end (as is the 
fantasy of some postmetaphysicians) but the completion of its interne-
cine aim concerning black being. The aim, the metaphysical enterprise, 
is to sever the flesh from the body through the work of violence, degra-
dation, and terror, such that what is left is not a human body, but a body 
as machine. This is what the image proudly proclaims. The image, then, 
can be read as an antiblack celebration, a triumph over black being (and 
the intransigent remainder of the flesh). In his brilliant essay “The Black 
Body as Fetish,” Anthony Farley argues that the black body serves as the 
object of white fantasy; the body is pressed into narratives of savagery 
and degradation to maintain white mastery and racial innocence. Taking 
something like Žižek’s advice, “Enjoy your symptom,” seriously,38 Farley 
suggests that a masochistic embrace of the function of the black body in 
antiblack fantasy produces pleasure (or jouissance): 
Blackness today is a masochistic pleasure in being humiliated. Black-
ness, having completely submitted itself to the pleasure imperative of 
whiteness, has reached its limit. . . . We have experienced the black 
body from the situation of submission. From that situation, we have 
experienced the black body as a pleasure formation, a pleasure- in- 
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humiliation, that gave flesh to the body. The black body is familiar to 
us today because we have experienced white pleasure- in- humiliating 
as our own pleasure- in- being- humiliated. In making this connection 
to the audience we experience our identity, our black body identity, as 
a contingent historical project, as a game, as a performance, as a form 
of pleasure. This experience of blackness as a performance has made it 
possible to transgress. The creation of a new body is possible once the 
old body is experienced as a performance.39
For Farley, what I am calling the closure of metaphysics is complete, 
since the black body has been so thoroughly colonized by the white plea-
sure principle. But this closure, for him, has also produced a form of 
transgression; since the black body is nothing more than a performance 
for a white fantasy, one can refocus attention from liberating this body 
and creating a new one. I completely agree with Farley that a certain 
jouissance marks this body — how else could one endure antiblackness? 
But, unlike Farley, I do not believe that this produces transgression, if by 
“transgression” he means the potential to create a new body. What the 
image reveals is that the potential for creating something new, something 
transgressive, is almost impossible, since the fantasy is corporeal destruc-
tion. In other words, we assume that something will be left on the other 
side of the fantasy (i.e., like a Lacanian subject after having traversed the 
fundamental fantasy). But when the fantasy is to destroy through the per-
formance of humiliation and submission, nothing is left to transgress. 
Antiblack fantasy and its pleasure principle constitute warfare, complete 
and absolute violence. Humanists introduce a counter- fantasy, as it were, 
that there will be a survivor, a contraband who will be saved if submitting 
to the sadistic pleasure of white masters. But this contraband reveling in 
masochism will be obliterated. This, then, is the closure of metaphysics — 
a cycle of invention and destruction; a cycle sealed hermetically by onto-
logical terror; a cycle without end. The smile is the sign of this closure. 
The black body is finished. 
What, then, would a being lacking ontological resistance resemble? It 
takes a catachrestic fantasy from Frank Leslie to broach this question, and 
the answer proffered is a thing that emerges through violence and exists 
only for perpetual destruction — black artillery. 
Edward W. Clay, a nineteenth- century caricaturist, presents an onto-
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logical allegory in his series Philadelphia Fashions. This series denigrates 
free blacks and codifies its viciousness as humor. Clay demonstrates the 
terroristic uses of comedy; it is a pernicious instrument of antiblackness 
in his hands. Each illustration capitalizes on black abjection and execra-
tion. The aim is to mock emancipation by pairing malapropism with visual 
excess. The result is both extraordinary semiotic and linguistic violence. 
And since the violence occurs on both registers (semiotic and linguistic), 
the image is an indispensable weapon in the metaphysical holocaust. In 
other words, black being must be continually destroyed on multiple lev-
els. Clay deploys the destructive resources of his imagination to pulver-
ize blackness. The distinctions between terror and humor, comedy and 
injury, amusement and devastation are dissolved, and the semiotic field 
transforms into a battlefield. I would also suggest that Clay performs im-
portant philosophical work with his images — he provides an apodictic 
answer to the metaphysical question of black being. Images are important 
ontometaphysical tools because they can defy the limits of reason and all 
the philosophical constraints of the imagination. When words, proofs, 
and formulation reach their rational limits, images carry them beyond 
these limits into a different philosophical arena, antiblack fantasy. 
In figure 4.4, Mr. Frederick Augustus and his companion are elegantly 
dressed. The black dandy, eponymously (and sarcastically) named Au-
gust(us), holds up a monocle. His companion inquires, “What you look at 
Mr. Frederick Augustus?,” and he replies, “I look at dat white loafer wot 
looks at me, I guess he from New York.” 
Clay stages a fantastical (non)relation between the image of the free 
black (fixed in blackness, lifeless) and the human viewing the image (the 
white loafer). This (non)relation serves as an allegory for the position of 
the human and that of the equipment that can only be seen, but can never 
see in an antiblack world. The monocle also allegorizes emancipation — 
for the free black must see the world through a distorted vision. Emanci-
pation does not restore sight to equipment (Nancy’s injunction to see, for 
example); rather, it provides the illusion of seeing. I would also suggest 
that the (non)relation is fantastical, since a lifeless image is speaking to a 
white spectator (the consumer of Clay’s humor). In short, we structure the 
discourse of the lifeless (the socially/politically dead) with the mocking 
presence of the human. This discourse translates into what Judy would 
call “muteness,” since black being lacks a position in discourse that is ac-
FIGURE 4.4 Philadelphia Fashions, 1837. Courtesy of Smithsonian Institution, 
National Museum of American History, Division of Home and Community Life. 
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knowledged or recognized). Put differently, the free black can speak but 
cannot be heard. 
Clay assigns a feature of animation (sight, looking) to an inanimate 
object (Mr. Augustus and his companion) to produce humor, for the op-
era glasses actually magnify an inanimate eye. With one eye closed and 
the monocle magnifying an inanimation, Mr. Augustus explains that 
he is looking at a white voyeur who is looking at him. But this presents 
a problematic: how does one see through an inanimate eye? What does 
this seeing provide Mr. Augustus? There is a disjuncture, then, between 
image and text, utterance and capacity, and eye and the look. In essence, 
the white loafer is looking at him, but Mr. Augustus is unable to return 
this look — but how would August have any knowledge of the world based 
on vision, given that the lifeless eye is unable to grant visual/epistemo-
logical certitude? Furthermore, if the “I” in the statement “I look at dat 
white loafer” is based on the functioning eye (the organ of his certitude), 
then not only is the eye disabled, but also the predicating function (look-
ing) of the “I.” Mr. Augustus’s claim that he is looking, then, presents 
a certain fraudulence embedded in the deployment of this “I” — in this 
place of the missing eye. Both his eye and his “I” are fraudulent — he 
is unable to see the white human. Vision is unilaterally deployed as a 
feature of dominance (in an almost panopticon arrangement). Put dif-
ferently, if what distinguishes the human from the object is the capacity 
to predicate, as a legitimate function of the “I,” then Clay desiccates the 
ground of certitude and predication for the free black. Nahum Chandler 
describes black being as bringing “the problem of predication to issue 
with force.”40 The human has the prerogative of sight and the epistemo-
logical claims that accompany it, but the black can only assume a fraud-
ulent relation to this predication. Mr. Augustus pretends to be a human, 
assuming that he can look just like the white loafer who is inspecting 
him; but without the privileged organ, he can only be seen (this is the 
realm of equipment).
We might ask, what does Mr. Augustus actually see through the inan-
imate eye? Nothing. In relation to the human, he sees the nothing that he 
is within an antiblack world. The free black, then, is nothing more than 
this fraudulent eye/I — this unbridgeable disjuncture between utterance 
and capacity. The image serves as a vicious allegory of black freedom. One 
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can make a claim to it audaciously and proudly, but in the end emanci-
pation is unable to suture the disjuncture between the claim and meta-
physical condition. We might also suggest that the fraudulent eye is a 
substitute for Being — it fills an absent space, of being- there. If it is Being 
that allows us to see the invisible (the Law of Being), then such a seeing 
is absent for the free black. Moreover, the white loafer does not properly 
see Mr. Augustus, either, just equipment or an object where a human is 
supposed to appear, an anamorphic blind spot.
Frantz Fanon insists that “the black man has no ontological resistance 
in the eyes of the white man.” The eye enables “ontological resistance,” and 
in Fanon’s formulation the eyes are an aspect of whiteness. The eyes serve 
as a metonymic extension of the “I” — it is the “I,” as eye, that has the capac-
ity to resist. The bilateral look, then, would bring us to a Hegelian moment 
of mutual recognition, where the look assumes an ontological function of 
constituting boundaries. But in the eyes of white men, blacks have no on-
tological resistance precisely because the black eye is missing. Ontological 
constitution is a unilateral enterprise from the human’s eye to the non-
seeing black thing. Fanon continues, “And already I am being dissected 
under white eyes, the only real eyes. I am fixed. Having adjusted their mi-
crotomes, they objectively cut away slices of my reality. I am laid bare. I 
feel, I see in those white faces that it is not a new man who has come in, 
but a new kind of man, a new genus. Why, it’s a Negro!”41 [emphasis mine]. 
Following Lacan, we can also suggest that white eyes stare into the 
gaze, rather than another pair of eyes when looking at black being (which 
is why black being cannot properly be seen). Mr. Augustus (and his com-
panion) is not a human subject but the incarnation of the gaze within the 
visual field. For, as Jacques Lacan has indicated in the Four Fundamental 
Concepts, the gaze “[made] visible . . . the subject as annihilated in the 
form . . . of castration . . . it [reflected] [his] own nothingness.”42 The gaze 
is a terroristic entity. It shames the subject by reflecting the nothingness 
of the subject’s core. It is precisely this nothingness that is projected onto 
black bodies — and this is why Mr. Augustus’s eye must be missing, al-
ways already castrated. In other words, Clay presents his own catachrestic 
fantasy of an embodied gaze — a nothing within the field of vision, which 
can claim neither subjectivity nor predication. But since the free black 
does not exist, Mr. Augustus and his companion are signs without proper 
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referents — signs of nothing. And a being without a proper referent pro-
vides ample ground for fantasizing. This enables Clay to present a fraud-
ulent eye as the source of sight.43 
I must also note that even without the distorting monocle, seeing still 
is precluded. Mr. Augustus’s companion appears to have both eyes open, 
but this does not enable her to see any more than Mr. Frederick Augustus. 
She, in fact, asks Mr. Augustus, “What you look at Mr. Augustus?”44 In 
this way, Clay seems to close the circle of uncertainty. Whether the eyes 
are present, open, or fraudulent, seeing is not a predicating function for 
the black object that can be seen, but not see. Freedom does not enable 
blacks to see, so such freedom is but a mockery. Without the capacity to 
see white humanity, to return the look, and to resist the objectifying im-
pulse of the human, emancipation merely replaces property with fraudu-
lence. Neither the captive nor the free black can see. 
The title of figure 4.5 brings us to our metaphysical question: the great 
American “What Is It?” This is the crux of the issue before us, and it pro-
pels black thought and philosophy. The question turns Fanon’s philosoph-
ical sarcasm and exasperation (“I see in those white faces that it is not a 
new man who has come in, but a new kind of man, a new genus”) into a 
serious question: what is this new genus? The title refers to a deformed 
black man featured in P. T. Barnum’s Museum on Broadway. Deforma-
tion, however, does not exhaust the question, since the question is put to 
all black being. To provide an answer to this searing question, illustrators 
put catachrestic fantasies into service. This political cartoon attacks Pres-
ident Lincoln’s integrity and racial loyalty. It is in response to the arrest of 
Clement Laird Vallandigham, leader of the Copperheads (Peace Demo-
crats). Vallandigham claimed that Lincoln intended to enslave whites and 
to free blacks. Lincoln arrested him on charges of treason for supporting 
the confederacy. 
The snakes are the Copperheads angrily chasing Lincoln for the arrest. 
Blacks also chase Lincoln, calling him “Fadderrr Abrum” and asking him 
to “take us to your Bussum.” In response to this request for haven and ac-
ceptance, Lincoln says, “Go back to your masters, don’t think you are free 
because you are emancipated.” The image allegorizes the problem of black 
being. When seeking reprieve from romantic humanism, an antiblack 
world insists, “Don’t think you are free because you are emancipated.” A 
fundamental distinction between freedom and emancipation exists that 
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distinguishes the human from his equipment. Conflating freedom and 
emancipation produces disappointment, disavowal, and destruction. 
Reading Lincoln’s comment, “Don’t think you are free because you are 
emancipated,” alongside the title of the image, “The great American what 
is it?” suggests that the metaphysical question “What is it?” is a feature of 
this gap between emancipation and freedom. Put differently, we under-
stand freedom orients the human, but what does emancipation orient? 
What is the being for whom emancipation is an issue? What is it? The 
fantasy does not provide an apodictic answer to the question, but the 
skeleton and demon in the background, along with the snake eating a 
black man, suggest that this being is a thing of execration — of the dark 
abyss. Emancipation releases blacks into a form of hell — a space of onto-
logical terror. 
FIGURE 4.5 “The Great American What Is It? Chased by Copper-Heads,”  
E. W. T. Nichols, 1863. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
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The scene, then, imagines the “zone of non- being,” as Fanon might call 
it. This is the space that is not a place, a site of unspeakable destruction 
without end. Lewis Gordon argues that this zone can be read in two 
ways: “It could be limbo, which would place blacks below white but above 
creatures whose lots are worse; or it could simply mean the point of total 
absence, the place most far from the light, in a theistic system, radiates 
reality, which would be hell.”45
If we read this catachrestic fantasy as one determined to re- present 
this zone of non- being, then we might say that both of Gordon’s read-
ings are at work here. The scene is indeed a limbo to the extent that the 
political demand of blacks is situated outside a political community. In 
other words, the political architecture relegates black being outside its 
structure in a space without clear definition — such a demand cannot be 
heard, even if uttered (despite the yearnings of romantic humanism).46 
Lincoln appears to be running away from this space, attempting to leave 
the snakes, the skeleton, the blacks, and the demon behind him. Lincoln 
symbolizes a white descent into the liminal space — this is just the danger 
of aligning with blackness or attempting to end the metaphysical holo-
caust (you are cast out of community). But in this fantasy, blacks are on 
par with snakes, demons, and skeletons. Through this leveling, blacks are 
re- presented as ghost- like figures, taking their place alongside skeletons 
and demons — “specters of democracy,” as Ivy Wilson might call it.47 These 
ghosts are caught between the worlds of the living and the unliving — 
biologically functioning but ontologically dead — a form of purgatory, await-
ing judgment. It is the ghost that is “the occasion of all racial ontology,” 
as David Marriott would describe it.48
Don’t think you are free because you are emancipated. 
CODA
ADIEU TO THE HUMAN 
The Department of Justice released its report (2016) exposing disturbing 
practices in the Baltimore Police Department. It details the persistence 
of antiblack violence, abuse, inveterate neglect, and routinized humilia-
tion. Graphs, statistics, and anecdotal narratives create a vicious tapestry 
of signs and symbols. This tapestry requires a deciphering, for what it 
says is more than just persistent injustice; it articulates something else, 
which requires a different grammar. Rev. Heber Brown iii, speaking to the 
New York Times (August 10, 2016) about the report, recounts a disturb-
ing instance. A teenage boy was stopped and strip- searched in front of 
his girlfriend. After he filed a complaint with the police department, the 
officer, it seems, wanted revenge and stopped the young boy again, strip- 
searched him, and this time grabbed his genitals. The officer, intoxicated 
by unchecked power over black bodies, wanted to injure something else, 
not just the teenager’s body. Rev. Heber Brown III states, “What that of-
ficer did is not just violate a body, but he injured a spirit, a soul, a psyche. 
And that young boy will not easily forget what happened to him, in public 
with his girlfriend. It’s hard to really put gravity and weight to that type 
of offense.”1
The violation that Reverend Heber Brown III describes is ontological 
terror — it is the systemic destruction of “a spirit, a soul, a psyche.” On-
tological terror is not a phenomenon we can relegate to an unenlight-
ened past; it remains with us. What I have argued throughout this book 
is that black being constitutes the nothing in an antiblack world, which 
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is continually degraded, dominated, and violated. Antiblackness is anti- 
nothing. A “spirit, a psyche, a soul” marks symbolic forms of a nothing 
(something not quite translatable within metaphysical schemes). It is pre-
cisely this nothing that ontological terror targets, and black existence is 
precisely the condition of unending nothing- destruction. This, of course, 
is a metaphysical fantasy, since nothing can never be destroyed, but it 
provides a metaphysical world with a devastating will to power. Black 
being is invented precisely to constitute the object of a global drive — the 
endless pursuit of nothing.
Postmetaphysicians and romantic humanists neglect this global drive 
— either by celebrating the emancipatory potential of nothing or by cling-
ing, desperately, to metaphysical humanity and freedom. Both strategies 
have consistently failed to realize freedom, progress, or redress. It is time 
to discard these fantasies and face the terror of antiblackness. 
What I am suggesting, ultimately, is that black being begins to get 
over the human and its humanism fantasies. We’ve tried everything: from 
marches, to masochistic citizenship (giving our bodies to the state to bru-
talize in hopes of evoking sympathy and empathy from humans), to ex-
ceptional citizenship and respectability, to protest and armed conflict; in 
the end, either we will continue this degrading quest for human rights 
and incorporation or we will take a leap of faith, as Kierkegaard might say, 
and reject the terms through which we organize our existence. 
By abandoning the human, human- ness, and the liberal humanism 
that enshrouds it, we can better understand the violent formations of an-
tiblackness, particularly ontological terror. To abandon the human does 
not mean that one accepts the terms of inferiority or worthlessness. We 
do not have to abandon within the axiological framework of humanism; 
we can reject that framework as well. In other words, we have invested 
unbelievable value in the human — it constitutes the highest value in the 
world. And for this reason, we are terrified of letting go of it because we 
believe this value will protect us against antiblackness (it will not). As 
long as we continue to invest in the value structure that renders the hu-
man the highest, and most important, being within the world, we will 
continue to plead for recognition and acceptance. It is this terror of value, 
of not possessing this value, that keeps us wedded to the idea of the hu-
man and its accouterments (and I must say, constantly revisiting the hu-
man, reimagining it, expanding it, and refashioning it does nothing but 
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keep us entangled in the circuit of misery). This entanglement of value 
and ontology produces tremendous misery and disappointment for black-
ness. As Rinaldo Walcott perspicuously states, “What it means to be Hu-
man is continually defined against [blacks]. The very basic terms of social 
Human engagement are shaped by antiblack logics so deeply embedded in 
various normativities that they resist intelligibility as modes of thought 
and yet we must attempt to think them.”2 We must question the antiblack 
logics grounding the human, even if such thinking is rendered unintelli-
gible by metaphysical knowledge formations and traditions. Black think-
ing, then, must think what is impossible to think within the constraints 
of metaphysics and ontology. Our enterprise broaches the unknown, the 
place where we can no longer ask questions, and there sits in this space.
Perhaps what I am suggesting constitutes an ontological revolution, 
one that will destroy the world and its institutions (i.e., the “end of the 
world,” as Fanon calls it). But these are our options, since the metaphysi-
cal holocaust will continue as long as the world exists. The nihilistic reve-
lation, however, is that such a revolution will destroy all life — far from the 
freedom dreams of the political idealists or the sobriety of the pragmatist. 
The important task for black thinking (philosophizing, theorizing, 
theologizing, poeticizing) is to imagine black existence without Being, 
humanism, or the human. Such thinking would lead us into an abyss. But 
we must face this abyss — its terror and majesty. I would suggest that this 
thinking leads us into the spirit, something exceeding and preceding the 
metaphysical world. We are still on the path to developing a phenome-
nology of black spirit, but it is an important enterprise. I will continue 
this work in subsequent writing, but I can say for now, the aim is to shift 
emphasis from the human toward the spirit. The spirit enables one to 
endure the metaphysical holocaust; it is not a solution to antiblackness. 
The spirit will not transform an antiblack world into some egalitarian 
landscape — the antiblack world is irredeemable. Black nihilism must rest 
in the crevice between the impossibility of transforming the world and 
the dynamic enduring power of the spirit. In the absence of Being there 
is spirit. Heidegger understands spirit commingled with Being, and the 
question of Being (“How is it going with Being?”) “is the spiritual fate of 
the West.”3 Heidegger is both correct and incorrect. The spiritual degra-
dation, routinized violence, and suffering around the globe is a conse-
quence of Being and its hegemonic, Eurocentric violence. So, for humans 
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to continue to ask the question of Being is to perpetuate a spiritual vio-
lence of black torment. The answer to misery is not Being; rather, it is only 
by obliterating Being by dis(re)placing Heidegger’s question with “How 
is it going with black being?” that we can have access to the spirit. Being 
is enmity to the spirit. Contending with black as nothing will set us on 
this spiritual path. Along this path, we can experience something akin to 
Ashon Crawley’s concept of breath (without the promises of universal hu-
manism), as the possibility for thinking and breathing otherwise (we can 
push this thought to its limits and suggest that for black thinking, spiri-
tual breath and thinking are “identical” rather than thinking and being). 4
Black studies will have to disinvest our axiological commitments from 
humanism and invest elsewhere. Continuing to keep hope that freedom 
will occur, that one day the world will apologize for its antiblack brutality 
and accept us with open arms, is a devastating fantasy. It might give one 
motivation to fight on, but it is a drive that will only produce exhaustion 
and protest fatigue. What is the solution? What should we do? How do 
we live without metaphysical schemes of political hope, freedom, and hu-
manity? I would have to suggest that there are no solutions to the prob-
lem of antiblackness — there is only endurance. And endurance cannot 
be reduced to biofuturity or humanist mandates. Endurance is a spiritual 
practice with entirely different aims. 
Ontological Terror seeks to challenge metaphysical and postmeta-
physical solutions. The paradigm of the free black teaches us that such 
solutions sustain the metaphysical holocaust. Let our thinking lead us 
into the “valley of the shadow of death,” and once there we can begin to 
imagine an existence anew. 
NOTES
INTRODUCTION: THE FREE BLACK IS NOTHING
 1 Throughout this book, I will use the terms Negro and black interchangeably 
to docket an ontological problem of Being and blackness. I am not as much 
interested in historicizing the terms or engaging in the contentious debates 
concerning identity; rather, I understand these terms as pointing to the same 
problematic, which is beyond individual identity. 
 2 The term ontological terror appears in many scholarly texts, primarily as an 
undeveloped term but expressing a poetics of fear or anxiety. Much of this 
work is done in theological studies in which the lack of ultimate foundations 
(i.e., the Death of God thesis) leaves the subject unnerved. Most of this work, 
however, assumes humanism as its ground of investigation, meaning that the 
human subject is precluded from exercising its ontological capacity. My use 
of ontological terror is designed to foreground not only the terror the human 
feels with lack of security, but also that this fear is predicated on a projection 
of ontological terror onto black bodies and the disavowal of this projection. 
Thus, humanism does not exhaust ontological terror, and an antimetaphysical 
understanding of it is necessary to analyze antiblackness. My use of ontolog-
ical terror is more along the lines of Julius Lester’s description of it as “the 
terror of nonexistence, the unending trauma of being damned in the flesh” 
in his Lovesong: Becoming a Jew, 25. For examples of ontological terror as a 
human/humanist experience, please see Anthony B. Pinn’s wonderful Terror 
and Triumph: The Nature of Black Religion; Markus Dressler and Arvind- Pal 
S. Mandair’s Secularism and Religion- Making; and Louise Morris’s master’s 
thesis, “The Spectre of Grief: Visualizing Ontological Terror in Performance,” 
which understands the artistic representations of terror as a veil — something 
concealing trauma. I will argue something similar in chapter 4, but argue that 
representations expose and uncover rather than serving as a veil.
 3 In his The Question Concerning Technology: And Other Essays, Heidegger un-
derstands that the overcoming of metaphysics [überwunden] is impossible, 
since a remnant will always remain and one must go through metaphysics to 
ask the ontological question; but the thinker must aspire to verwunden, the 
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surmounting that restores metaphysics (technology as instrumentalization and 
domination in this instance) “back into its yet concealed truth,” 39. 
 4 What does black thinking entail without being? This is an exceptionally dif-
ficult question, but one that sets all black critical enterprises into motion. 
Heidegger, for example, believed being and thinking were the same. If this is 
the case, then black philosophy’s presentation is not thinking in this familiar 
sense, but something for which grammar fails us. In other words, the question 
put to black nihilists, and Afropessimists, “what are you doing?” cannot be an-
swered apodictically within the horizon of metaphysical and postmetaphysical 
thinking. Black thinking is unthought because its activities are unrecognizable 
philosophically — thus, black thinking is the process of destroying the world.
 5 See Grant Farred’s Martin Heidegger Saved My Life for a Heideggerian ap-
proach to thinking race. 
 6 This seems to be the crux of Martin Heidegger’s critique (and those of post-
metaphysicians): that metaphysical procedures set the ground for tremendous 
acts of violence, since Being is so crudely reified. He suggested in “Letter on 
Humanism” (in Basic Writings: Martin Heidgger) that our metaphysical ideas 
of the human, representation, and objectification limit freedom. 
 7 I use the signpost of the transatlantic slave trade to indicate an emergence or 
event of metaphysical horror. Michelle Wright cautions against “Middle Pas-
sage Epistemology” in which other spatial formations (i.e., other oceans) are 
excluded from the narrative of African slavery. I certainly agree that antiblack-
ness is a global event and that multiple oceans transported black commodities. 
My use of transatlantic slave trade here is not to posit it as the only passage-
way, but to provide a signifier for metaphysical holocaust and its commence-
ment. Please see Michelle M. Wright, Physics of Blackness: Beyond the Middle 
Passage Epistemology.
 8 Oren Ben- Dor, Thinking about Law: In Silence with Heidegger, 105.
 9 Vattimo describes Heidegger’s term Ge- Schick as “the ensemble (Ge) of the 
Schicken, the sendings or apertures of Being that have conditioned and made 
possible the experience of humanity in its historical phases prior to us. Only by 
inserting our current sending (our Schickung) — that is: present significance of 
‘Being’ — into the ensemble of the Ge- Schick do we overcome the metaphysical 
oblivion of Being, breaking free of thought that identifies Being with beings, 
with the order that currently obtains.” See his Nihilism and Emancipation: Eth-
ics, Politics, and Law.
 10 Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-
modern Culture, 1 – 13.
 11 Vattimo, Nihilism and Emancipation: Ethics, Politics, and Law, 35; emphasis 
mine. 
 12 It is not within the scope of this project to conduct a genealogy or a history 
of Being [Geschichte des Seins]. But the concept Being, particularly Dasein, 
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certainly has a development in Western thought not as a universal but as a Eu-
rocentric field of inquiry. Heidegger condenses his antiblackness in the concept 
“primitive Dasein,” which is “not conscious of itself in its way of being” (The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 138), and thus cannot pose the ontological 
question — being is not an issue for it. Or when Heidegger suggests in The 
Introduction to Metaphysics, “The Greeks become in principle better kind of 
Hottentot, in comparison to whom modern science has progressed infinitely 
far. Disregarding as the particular absurdities involved in conceiving of the in-
ception of Western philosophy as primitive, it must be said that this interpreta-
tion forgets that what is at issue is . . . great can only begin great . . . so it is with 
the philosophy of the Greeks.” What exactly is this primitive caught between 
human being and animal? What determines the “betterness” of the Greeks 
against the Hottentot, for whom philosophy proper is absent? How does the 
“particular absurdity” of black thinking (Hottentot philosophy)/black existence 
engender Heidegger’s question of being itself? How do we break the antiblack 
tautological circle “great begins great” to create space for black thinking — that 
dejected and debased enterprise cast out of historical movement? Any history 
of Being would need to work through the exclusion of the primitive from Da-
sein and the use of this primitive in the existential journey of the human. For 
indeed, non- Western cultures provide a temporal backdrop for Heidegger to 
commence his philosophical thinking. My argument here is that the concept 
develops as an antiblack field that is exclusive and violent. It posits European 
Dasein as the guardian of Being and the rest of the globe as dependent on 
European thinking. Rather than thinking of Being as a universal field (i.e., ev-
erything experiences its happening), we can understand the development of 
the concept as an instrument of European global domination. Thus, whatever 
the black is lacks explanation within Being, and it is the task of black thinking 
to imagine black existence outside Being and its arrogant universalizing tac-
tics. Please also see Nelson Maldonado- Torres’s “On the Coloniality of Being: 
Contributions to the Development of a Concept,” 240 – 70, for a similar argu-
ment about the violent development of the concept. Richard Wolin asked the 
provocative question “What is the role to be played by politics in the historico- 
metaphysical process whereby the truth of Being is historically recovered?”; see 
Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger. Along 
these lines Ontological Terror inquires, “What is the role of antiblackness in 
the forgetting of Being and its historical recovering?” Throughout this book my 
answer is that remembering Being is dependent on remembering the Negro. 
 13 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 67.
 14 David Marriott. “Waiting to Fall,” 214.
 15 I use “black thought,” “black thinking,” and “black philosophy” interchangeably 
to signal a certain intellectual labor, one designed to investigate the abyss of 
black existence without ontology. Thus, my approach will seem foreign to an-
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alytic philosophical traditions (and its scientific reasoning and metaphysical 
logic) and equally foreign to Continental philosophy, or even what John Mul-
larkey (Post- Continental Philosophy: An Outline) would call “post- Continental 
Philosophy,” as I do not assume that Being is universal in its difference or man-
ifestations. Both analytic and Continental approaches rely on Being, and black 
thought/philosophy is charged with thinking against Being itself — even if we 
can never get completely outside of it. This means black thought is the “other of 
philosophy,” as William Desmond would call it in his Philosophy and Its Others: 
Ways of Being and Mind, and even the other of Heideggerian Andenken. Black 
thought has not overcome metaphysics, since antiblackness is what remains, 
what anchors metaphysics within Destruktion. For this reason, black thought is 
the only thinking capable of entering the abyss of nothing. Cornel West defines 
Afro- American philosophy as “the interpretation of Afro- American history, 
highlighting the cultural heritage and political struggles, which provides de-
sirable norms that should regulate responses to particular challenges presently 
confronting Afro- Americans.” The question embedded in this beautiful defi-
nition is how does the black philosopher interpret existence (as history)? Is 
being the “ground” of such interpretation? In other words, the definition of the 
noetic function of Afro- American philosophy neglects the question of being 
itself — can we interpret “culture” without presuming the “isness” of culture, 
which would bring us back to the question of being? I would argue that black 
nihilism, as a philosophical formation, does not neatly fall into any of the cate-
gories West uses to map black thought: rationalism, existentialism, humanism, 
or vitalism — since the ontological ground anchoring these traditions is unre-
liable and is thrown into crisis. The question of black being unravels these tra-
ditions. Please see his magnificent essay “Philosophy and the Afro- American 
Experience” in A Companion to African-American Philosophy. 
 16 Jean- Luc Nancy might argue that freedom is the dissolution of grounds and, 
especially, the labor of experience and/as necessity. It is the utter exposure to 
groundlessness that is the experience of freedom as such. I agree that ground-
lessness is important, but would mention that Nancy’s postmetaphysics intro-
duces a form of terror that is left unacknowledged, and this is precisely what 
the metaphysical holocaust does: it leaves black being without any ontological 
grounds. Does this mean black being is free? We could only answer in the af-
firmative if we also suggest that antiblackness is necessary for black freedom. 
Such a formulation — in which freedom is groundlessness and antiblackness 
dissolves ground — would sustain the metaphysical holocaust as the condition 
of experiencing freedom for blacks. This is why black freedom is incompatible 
with postmetaphysical presentations of freedom because they, inadvertently, 
would rely on antiblackness to incorporate blacks into its narrative. If, then, 
freedom is antiblackness for blacks, what good is freedom? It, indeed, is not 
freedom at all — only the human can celebrate groundlessness. (Because this 
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groundlessness is sustained by Being’s gift of unfolding, such is not the case for 
blackness.) Please see Nancy’s The Experience of Freedom. 
 17 Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy, 
203 – 5. 
 18 I would also suggest that our ideas of freedom originate from a political theory/
philosophy in which it becomes indistinguishable from liberty. For example, 
Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Conceptions of Freedom” presents freedom as the twin 
axes of negative and positive vectors. Positive freedom is the actualization 
of one’s desire for mastery, rationality, opportunity, and capacity. Negative 
freedom is the overcoming, or removal, of interference on one’s mastery or 
reasoning will. Hannah Arendt, along this vein, offers a theory of freedom as 
action — in particular, political action (deriving from the Greek polis). These 
theories, by placing freedom squarely in political action or mastery, leave the 
question of what is free unattended because it is assumed to be a human. Once 
this ontological ground is questioned, however, we realize that Being must be 
secured before we can even engage in a question of action, reason, will, mas-
tery, or interference. This approach to black being is unproductive because the 
ontological humanism, which grounds political philosophy/theory, does not 
transfer to the black thing outside ontology. This is the conundrum before us. 
The legal and historiographical literature applies this humanism to free blacks 
when the problem of blackness is that it lacks this ground to begin with. Thus, 
freedom is not an issue for it. We can speak of liberty, rights, and, as I will ar-
gue, terroristic emancipation, but these are not freedom, but ontic substitutes. 
Or, in the case of black being, emancipation is what is left when freedom and 
ontology are no longer options.
 19  Frank Wilderson, Red, White, and Black (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2010), 38.
 20 Maurice S. Lee, Slavery, Philosophy, and American Literature.
 21 Orlando Patterson offers a voluminous study of freedom in his Freedom, vol. 
1: Freedom in the Making of Western Culture. His objective is to present a so-
ciological analysis of freedom’s evolution — from antiquity to modernity. He 
argues that valuing freedom evolves through devaluing the condition of slav-
ery. I definitely agree that slavery renders freedom intelligible, but again, the 
ontological question is circumvented. His analysis presents freedom not as 
an aperture or horizon of ontology, but as an evolving object (a metaphysical 
entity) that moves through history in relation to slavery. Conceiving freedom 
in this way collapses it into practices of value and exchange — not something 
that provides the condition of possibility for any valuation because it enables 
the human to ground itself. Moreover, the ontological condition of both slave 
and master is not synonymous or merely a legal distinction — as if gifting the 
slave with freedom will make him a master.
 22 Vittorio Possenti, Nihilism and Metaphysics: The Third Voyage, 8. 
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 23 Please see Ira Berlin’s Slaves without Masters: The Free Negro in the Antebellum 
South.
 24 John Hope Franklin, The Free Negro in North Carolina, 1790 – 1860, 3 – 4. 
 25 As an example of skirting the ontological question in romantic narratives of 
black humanism, we can examine Ira Berlin’s The Long Emancipation: The De-
mise of Slavery in the United States. He raises the question, “If black people 
were not to be slaves, what exactly would they be?” This question should com-
pel an investigation of the word be, a question of existence when humanist 
ground is not secure. For indeed, the “transformation from person to property,” 
as he describes it, is more than just a change in legal status; it is also a change 
in the meaning and condition of existence. We are led, however, into a ro-
mantic narrative about slavery’s supposed demise and the function of multiple 
forces in achieving it — through emancipation. It seems as if the question dies 
alongside slavery’s demise. I am arguing that this is far from the case. Slavery 
is still very much with us to the extent that slavery signifies the exclusion of 
black being from humanist ontology. We have not accomplished the demise of 
slavery, only variations of its viciousness. 
 26 Again, this is to reiterate that I am not suggesting the voices or opinions of free 
blacks do not matter. This is to say, however, that we want to interrogate the 
ontological ground and presumptions from which that voice emerges. There 
are many contemporary historiographies that grapple with the concepts of 
freedom and free blacks. In Forging Freedom: Black Women and the Pursuit 
of Liberty in Antebellum Charleston, for example, Amrita Chakrabarti Myers 
uncovers archival material of free black women in Charleston, South Carolina. 
She presents freedom as an experience, one that depends on resources and op-
portunity. The ground of ontology, however, is never broached; thus, freedom 
is removed from ontology and relegated to sociolegal context. The problem 
with this is that ontology is not reducible to experience, and the author pro-
ceeds as if free black experience is an ontological claim of freedom — however 
fickle it was or how tenuously the freedom might be experienced. I focus on the 
conflation of experience with (human) ontology because the problems that ori-
ent the text — systemic terror, risk of reenslavement, routinized violation — are 
ontological problems. Experience cannot eradicate these problems, no matter 
how free someone feels. These problems persist after sociolegal freedom be-
cause they are symptoms of the ontological condition of nonfreedom. Sociole-
gal and affective experiences leave the fundamental problem unresolved. There 
is a tendency in historiography to neglect the ontological foundation of the 
systemic violence it uncovers, since avoiding ontology and focusing on affect 
and experience allow us to incorporate blacks into a humanist fantasy (with 
synonyms like agency, liberty, voice, power). My issue is, then, that assuming 
human freedom is precisely the problem, which free blacks experienced as ten-
sion between a legal status and a nonplace in an antiblack world. This tension 
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is an ontological violence, which not labor, family, resources, wealth, nor com-
munity can rectify. A nonmetaphysical historiography would proceed from 
the lack of ontological ground and read the archive through this violence. My 
hope is that historiography will begin to question and challenge the humanism 
upon which it is predicated to understand the capaciousness of antiblackness. 
For similar elisions of ontology in historiography, see Max Grivno’s Gleanings 
of Freedom: Free and Slave Labor along the Mason- Dixon Line, 1790 – 1860, and 
Damian Alan Pargas’s The Quarters and the Fields: Slave Families in the Non- 
Cotton South.
 27 Giorgio Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, 18. 
 28 Alexander G. Weheliye, Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, 
and Black Feminist Theories of the Human, 13.
 29 Tommy Curry, “Saved by the Bell: Derrick Bell’s Racial Realism as Pedagogy,” 
36.
 30 Michel Foucault, “Questions of Method,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, 77.
 31 See Vincent Woodard’s brilliant analysis of consumption, cannibalism, and ho-
moeroticism through historical archives in his The Delectable Negro: Human 
Consumption and Homoeroticism with U.S. Slave Culture. 
CHAPTER 1: THE QUESTION OF BLACK BEING
 1 I use the word being in the term black being simply to articulate the entity of 
blackness that bears the weight of unbearable nothing. Since ontology cannot 
provide the ground for understanding the being of blackness, terms like be-
ing, existence, and freedom applied to blackness become nonsense. But given 
grammatical paucity and the lack of intelligible language to describe the in-
describable, I must make use of it, even as I undermine the very terms that 
I employ. I write the term being under erasure to indicate the double bind 
of communicability and to expose the death of blackness that constitutes the 
center of being. 
 2 Hortense Spillers, Black, White, and in Color: Essays on American Literature 
and Culture, 406.
 3 In Martin Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, he recovers Plato’s non-
metaphysical understanding of polis not simply as the geographical location 
of the city- state, but as “the place, the there, wherein and as which historical 
being- there is. Polis is the historical place, there in which, out of which, and 
for which history happens” (170). I am arguing that black being lacks precisely 
this historical place (there- ness) that situates the human being in the world. 
Black being, then, lacks not only physical space in the world (i.e., a home) but 
also an existential place in an antiblack world. The black is worldless in this 
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way, bordering on something between the worldlessness of the object and the 
world poorness of the animal. Please see Kevin Aho’s “Logos and the Poverty of 
Animals: Rethinking Heidegger’s Humanism” and Matthew Calarco’s Zoogra-
phies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida for an engagement 
with Heidegger’s fraught distinction between the world- poor animal and the 
world- forming human and his anthropocentrism. 
 4 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 3.
 5 Nahum Dimitri Chandler, X: The Problem of the Negro as a Problem for 
Thought, 2.
 6 Spillers, Black, White, and in Color, 203.
 7 In The Remains of Being: Hermeneutic Ontology after Metaphysics, Zabala sug-
gests, “Heidegger undertook his destruction of the history of ontology in terms 
of the history of Being in order to destroy layers covering up the original nature 
of Being, those layers that metaphysical thinking has constructed.” I am argu-
ing that we cannot proceed with this destruction without the Negro’s exclu-
sion from history in Hegel, Kant’s black, stupid Negro, Heidegger’s primitive, 
unthinking Hottentot, etc. These are the layers of metaphysical violence that 
enable philosophy to develop notions of time, progress, freedom, and reason. 
Spillers would urge us, in my reading of her, to adopt a destructive protocol 
attentive to the violence undergirding the ontological question itself.
 8 W. E. B. Dubois, The Souls of Black Folk, 1. Dubois also suggests in Dusk of 
Dawn that this problem is “the central problem[s] of the world’s democracies 
and so the problem of the future world.” I would also argue that this problem 
is the central problem of ontometaphysics. Philosopher Nahum Chandler pro-
vides a definitive reading of Dubois as broaching the problem of ontometa-
physics through a “deconstructionist” practice in X: The Problem of the Negro 
as a Problem for Thought. My analysis, however, is situated at the limit of de-
construction and Destruktion — blackness as the “undeconstructable” core of 
ontometaphysics. 
 9 Spillers, Black, White, and in Color, 206.
 10 I interpret Hortense Spillers’s term pornotroping as the appropriation and use 
of the black body as a text, a sexualized text for fantasy, prurient othering, 
and unchecked gratification. Within an antiblack grammatical context, black 
bodies are pressed into the service of a sexualized semiotic and hermeneutic 
procedure or, as Spillers describes it, “externally imposed meanings and uses.” 
How one interprets and makes meaning of the black body as a sexual sign in 
an antiblack grammar is the function of pornotroping. Alexander Weheliye 
understands pornotroping as translating into a scopic economy, where the hi-
eroglyphics of the flesh are sexualized through vision. Although I am in full 
agreement with his presentation of the scopic dimensions of pornotroping, 
I depart from his diacritical analysis as it concerns the productive potential 
of it. I understand pornotroping as an antiblack strategy in the metaphysical 
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holocaust and not as a site for self- making or freedom; see Weheliye, Habeas 
Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the 
Human.
 11 Sylvia Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom To-
wards the Human, after Man, Its Overrepresentation — An Argument,” 313.
 12 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 1. The phrase Wie steht es um das 
Sein?” might also translated as “How is it going with Nothing?,” as Heidegger 
seems to suggest in his lecture “What Is Metaphysics.” The question “How is 
it going with Nothing?” is the question of black(ness) for me in metaphysics, 
since “Black” and “Nothing” are articulations of the problem of Being — that for 
which ontology cannot adequately account. 
 13 Santiago Zabala, The Remains of Being: Hermeneutic Ontology after Metaphys-
ics, 1.
 14 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 77
 15 In particular, Heidegger’s discussion of calculative thinking in his Introduction 
to Metaphysics, 216.
 16 The idea of relationality is essential to the work of postmetaphysics (and roman-
tic humanism). For example, Arendt posits freedom as occurring between men; 
a relation between men engenders freedom in The Human Condition. Jean- Luc 
Nancy would claim that “singular plurality” or a relation within an open/un-
defined community determines both existence and the possibility of freedom 
in his Being Singular Plural. Heidegger would also posit a Mitsein or a “being- 
with” as constitutive of a collective “world- forming” in his Being and Time. In 
short, part of the postmetaphysical project is to center relationality as essential 
to existence. But when such relation is nonexistent for black being, meaning 
that there is only a unilateral use and not bilateral relation, all such grounds of 
existence, freedom, and being for blacks are thrown into fundamental crisis.
 17 Alain David, “On Negroes,” in Race and Racism in Continental Philosophy, 11.
 18 David, “On Negroes,” 14. 
 19 Philosopher François Laruelle also provides a similar metaphysical reading of 
blackness through the concept uchromia — thinking blackness as the determi-
nation and limit of color and understanding itself; please see Laruelle, From 
Decision to Heresy: Experiments in Non- Standard Thought. 
 20 Ronald Judy, (Dis)forming the American Canon: African- Arabic Slave Narra-
tives and the Vernacular, 107. 
 21 David Marriott presents the reading of Fanon’s n’est pas as reducible not to 
simple negation but to that which ruptures both negation and positivity. This, 
I would argue, is another articulation of the formless form that is the black 
Negro; please see Marriott, “Judging Fanon.” 
 22 Gianni Vattimo, Nihilism and Emancipation: Ethics, Politics, and Law, 35. 
 23 Lindon Barrett, Racial Blackness and the Discontinuity of Western Modernity, 
73.
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 24 Spillers, Black, White, and in Color, 212. 
 25 Arendt understands natality as the ontological anchor of human freedom (and 
the “central category of political thought”). In essence, the beginning is a state 
of capacity, a capacity she will later develop as political action. Jean- Luc Nancy 
has a similar conception of natality as a figuration for the way Being unfolds 
into existence (e.g., existence is the house of Being). For both Arendt and 
Nancy, natality and birth are conceptual ways of embracing possibility: either 
as the unfolding of Being or as the potential for political action and freedom. 
For black being, I am arguing, such a natality is absent. Paradoxically, we can 
say that black being is born into death — the emergence of black being is a death 
sentence, not the domain of action or the unfolding of being. This paradox is 
the blind spot of postmetaphysical thinking, and it cannot accommodate a 
being whose emergence is without innate human freedom or being. In other 
words, the object lacks a substantial narrative of natality in both of these the-
ories; it is just present and used. See Nancy, The Birth to Presence, and Arendt, 
The Human Condition.
 26  Bryan Wagner, Disturbing the Peace, 1.
 27 I do not have the space to delve into the problem of identity within the conti-
nental philosophical tradition, but this “problem” seems, at least in my mind, to 
reach a standstill concerning blackness. If the great problem of identity is meta-
physical unity, or grounded sameness, according to Heidegger and Deleuze, 
then it seems that black being is a doubling or fracturing that displaces the logic 
of identity. Black being can never attain adequacy, as self- sameness — it is always 
being for another. Split between being for another and the form of formlessness, 
blackness is not identity (which is the error of black identity politics). Our task 
is to present black existence without the grammar of identity, unity, adequation, 
and metaphysics. This, perhaps, is an impossible task, but the presentation of 
the impossible is all one can do with a catachresis. Given this difficulty, we 
must be weary of appropriating the terms and concepts of metaphysics and 
ontological imaginations, as tempting as they might seem. Gavin Rae provides 
an exquisite analysis of the way Heidegger and Deleuze approach the problem 
of identity (ultimately reformulating the philosophy of becoming as difference 
or groundlessness). Neither of these strategies account for blackness. Please see 
his Ontology in Heidegger and Deleuze: A Comparative Analysis.
 28 Ronald Judy, (Dis)Forming the American Canon, 89.
 29 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 110.
 30 Fanon describes it as the “vast black abyss”; Black Skin, White Masks, 14. 
 31 Again, “African- being” here is merely a signifier for a primordial relation that 
antiblackness destroys. In Fanon’s case he experiences this destruction from 
Martinique, while Equiano experienced it from Africa. The metaphysical holo-
caust is global in reach; I use “African being” to describe a variety of geograph-
ical specificities that produce blackness.
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 32 This, of course, is not to say that blacks do not exist, as Fanon intimated, as 
a phenomenal entity that can be encountered through the senses, but it is to 
suggest that this phenomenal existence does not equate to an ontology. How 
to describe this existence outside ontology is the problem of blackness — the 
problem for the whole of metaphysics.
 33 I would also point this criticism to Jean- Paul Sartre’s celebration of nothing 
in Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. His exis-
tentialism critiques the transcendental ground of human nature and the re-
stricting teleology this ground engenders by arguing that there is nothing (no 
ultimate ground outside the self ); therefore, we can choose, out of this nothing-
ness, the form our lives will take. Ultimately, his existentialism uses this noth-
ingness to place ultimate responsibility for one’s life on the individual (on this 
subject). Thus a Sartrean existentialism would celebrate nothing/nothingness 
as the occasion for productive action and transformation. I cannot disagree 
with this celebration more strongly, since, in my opinion, it assumes a transcen-
dental ontology of a human capable of transforming nothing into a productive 
something. This is not the case for black being. For black nihilism, nothing 
restricts human freedom with a terror it attempts to control and project onto 
black being. Put differently, if nothing for Sartre enables the celebration of 
agency and choice, it is only because the terror of nothing is first projected 
onto black bodies in a metaphysical world. The rejoinder that my position is 
bad faith relies on the very metaphysics (or philosophical anthropology) that 
destroys the flesh. Put differently, without the flesh, one cannot act authenti-
cally or experience radical freedom, since the ground of the human is absent. 
Sartrean existentialism only applies to the human subject (embodies flesh) in a 
metaphysical world. This critique carries over into the important work of black 
existentialism and its reliance on Sartrean ontology. Black nihilism and black 
existentialism, then, although agreeing on the viciousness of antiblack racism, 
would part ways as they concern philosophical anthropology, since humanity is 
not the ground of black being, and this ground is necessary for a celebration of 
nothing and a rejection of bad faith; see Lewis Gordon’s groundbreaking work 
Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism (in particular the critique of Deconstruction 
and the analysis of the living dead), and Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. 
 34 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 8.
 35 Fred Moten, “Blackness and Nothingness,” 749.
 36 Spillers, Black, White, and in Color, 206.
 37 I must address the inventive work of object- oriented ontology, particularly 
Graham Harman’s speculative realism. Harman provides a rigorous critique 
of Kant’s correlationism (as Quentin Meillassoux would describe it in After 
Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. He suggests that tools have 
“tool- being,” and this being (or dare I say “essence”) is withdrawn or distorted 
(allure) in the relationality between objects and human and objects such that 
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we never truly know this being (we never really know a tree), only the dis-
torting presentation of the tool as it appears to us during certain context. 
The being of the tool “lies beneath the manifest presence of the object,” ac-
cording to Harman. Thus, we circulate various simulacra or distortions of all 
objects — and this distortion is what also plagues our encounter with Dasein, 
since its being also withdraws or is distorted ontically. I would argue, however, 
that the tool- being and the human being are differentiated through the work 
of violence and power. This is to say that even if the black, as tool, has a being, 
that has been distorted or concealed, this being is forever lost, inaccessible, 
and ultimately inconsequential in the face of antiblack violence. The tool- being 
will not protect black objects from violent relationality and exploitative use. 
Antiblackness constitutes a global alluring function: to commence to destroy 
the being of black objects and to place nothing in the space of that destruction. 
My argument is simply that object oriented ontology or speculative realism 
does not acknowledge the violent structuration of objects in relation to hu-
mans — even if we reject correlationism. Whatever lies beneath the black body 
will not provide freedom, escape, or refuge from the metaphysical holocaust; 
please see Harman’s Tool- Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects.
 38 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being- in- the- World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being 
and Time, Division I, 63. In Basic Problems: From Being and Time (1927) to The 
Task of Thinking (1964), Heidegger also states that it is the “in- order- to” that 
determines the “isness” of the equipment. It is utility for the human. “What and 
how it is an entity, its whatness and howness, is constituted by this in- order- to 
as such, by its involvement” (293). 
 39 Heidegger, Being and Time, 95 and 97. 
 40 Saidiya V. Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self- Making in 
Nineteenth- Century America , 21. 
 41 Wynter also suggests “the nonsupernatural but no less extrahuman ground (in 
the reoccupied place of traditional ancestors/gods, God, ground) of the answer 
that the secularizing West would now give to the Heideggerian question as to 
the who, and the what we are”; in “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/
Truth/Freedom Towards the Human after Man, Its Overrepresentation — An 
Argument,” 264.
 42 Spillers, Black, White, and in Color, 208.
 43 Miguel de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, 6.
 44 Chandler, X: The Problem of the Negro as a Problem for Thought, 20. 
 45 Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political. 
 46 Giorgio Agamben, “What Is a Paradigm?” in The Signature of All Things: On 
Method.
 47 Distinguished historian Ira Berlin makes a geographical distinction between 
the upper, middle, and lower South. These distinctions are designed to chal-
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lenge the conception of the South as a homogenous space. Although I agree 
these distinctions might allow us to conceptualize different legal, social, and 
political occurrences, they are immaterial to the question of being. No matter 
the geographical location or the different strategies of destruction, the meta-
physical holocaust is a constant across diverse variables. There is not a space 
void of antiblack violence; please see Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First 
Two Centuries of Slavery in North America.
 48 The African Repository: The Twelfth Annual Report of American Society for 
Colonizing the Free People of Color of the United States, vol. i (1851). 
 49 In But One Race: The Life of Robert Purvis, Margaret Hope Bacon presents a 
searing biographical witness. According to Bacon, Purvis’s inherited wealth 
and lighter skin afforded him the opportunity to spend time thinking through 
the contradictions of blackness and freedom (e.g., the “irrational logic” of col-
onization society) and to challenge antiblack injustice. Purvis is one of many 
prominent leaders who worked tirelessly to address antiblackness. 
 50 Robert Purvis to Henry C. Wright, August 22, 1842, Weston Papers, Boston 
Public Library. 
 51 The Liberator, April 10, 1857; also quoted in Leon Litwack, North of Slavery: 
The Negro in the Free States, 1790 – 1860, 63.
 52 Jared Sexton, “Don’t Call It a Comeback,” in OpenDemocracy (June 17,2015), 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery/jared- sexton/don%E2%80%99t 
- call- it- comeback- racial- slavery- is- not- yet- abolished.
 53 African Repository, vol. i, 68.
 54 African Repository, vol. xxvii (1851).
 55 Not only did the South impose anti- emigration laws banning blacks from entry, 
or forced removal once emancipated, the North made livability so miserable 
for free blacks that it became even more hostile than the South in many ways. 
Representative Henry C. Murphy of New York, for example, supported re-
strictive legislation in New York to prohibit “any who shall bring the wretched 
beings to our Free States, there to taint the blood of whites, or to destroy their 
own race by vicious courses” (emphasis mine). It is this wretchedness (the exe-
cration) that these restrictive laws are designed to address. In other words, the 
restrictive laws (even if only existing as a constant terror) attempt to address a 
metaphysical problem with a legal instrument; Appendix to the Congressional 
Globe, volume 17, 30th Congress, 1st session, 579 – 81.
 56 African Repository, vol. xxvii (1851).
 57 Sylvia Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom To-
wards the Human, after Man, Its Overrepresentation — An Argument.” 
 58 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. 
 59 Rodney Barfield suggests that free Negro caste “was the most despised and re-
viled element of the American population — albeit the fastest- growing section. 
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Racism had so imbued itself in the American character that free blacks were 
completely outside the social contract”; see his America’s Forgotten Caste: Free 
Blacks in Antebellum Virginia and North Carolina , 13. 
 60 Illinois Constitutional Debates of 1847, 860.
 61 As quoted in Litwack, North of Slavery, 69.
 62 The Lacanian drive serves as a productive heuristic device to understand 
antiblackness and its objective. For Lacan, the drive relentlessly pursues an 
impossible object, which commences as a destructive repetition and surplus 
enjoyment of this repetition — the ultimate result is a form of extinction. Anti-
blackness pursues nothing as its impossible drive, but the destructive pleasure 
is projected onto black bodies (“interpassivity,” as Slavoj Žižek would call it); 
see Jacques Lacan’s Écrits: A Selection.
 63 Agamben, “What Is a Paradigm?” 
 64  Frank Wilderson, Red, White, and Black, 45.
CHAPTER 2: OUTLAWING
 1 I am using the rather awkward construction (non)relation to signify that the 
idea of relation is always already infused with metaphysical presumptions (i.e., 
it presupposes a relation is comprises discrete entities that can be differenti-
ated and brought together within space/time). Since Being is neither an entity 
nor subordinate to the scientific constraints we place on it (space/time), we 
cannot properly call the presencing of Being a relation, but for lack of a more 
sufficient grammar, I will call it a (non)relation to indicate the happening [Er-
eignis] between Being and being. This, then, is how I interpret Giorgio Agam-
ben’s rereading of Heidegger and Nancy when he suggests, “The being together 
of being and Being does not have the form of a relation,” in his Homo Sacer, 60. 
 2 Oren Ben- Dor, Thinking about Law: In Silence with Heidegger, 145.
 3 Ben- Dor, Thinking about Law, 150.
 4 Ben- Dor, Thinking about Law, 378. 
 5 Jean- Luc Nancy, The Birth to Presence, 44.
 6 Nancy, Birth to Presence, 43 – 44. 
 7 Nancy, Birth to Presence, 47.
 8 Nancy, Birth to Presence, 47. 
 9 Hortense Spillers, White, Black, and in Color: Essays on American Literature 
and Culture, 208.
 10 Spillers, White, Black, and in Color, 207. 
 11 Patricia Tuitt, Race, Law, and Resistance, 11.
 12 Patricia Williams, “On Being the Object of Property,” 13.
 13 Bryan Wagner, Disturbing the Peace: Black Culture and the Police Power after 
Slavery, 1.
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 14 Charles Mills, The Racial Contract. 
 15 Frank Wilderson, Red, White, and Black, 17.
 16 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 138.
 17 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 110.
 18 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 110
 19 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 110
 20 Ben- Dor, Thinking about Law, 378.
 21 Ben- Dor, Thinking about Law, 164.
 22 Spillers, White, Black, and in Color, 225.
 23 I am using “place” here to indicate the there- ness within which Dasein stands 
forth and appears by emerging through its concealment. This standing forth 
requires a place, as Martin Heidegger argued in Introduction to Metaphysics: 
“The place belongs to the thing itself. The various things each have their place. 
That which becomes is set into this placelike ‘space’ and is set forth” (69). This 
isn’t the metaphysical- geographical space bound to ordinary modes of appear-
ance, but the inhabitation of becoming. Since black being does not become or 
appear through Being, such a place is absent. Luce Irigaray makes a similar 
argument with the place- lessness of woman (her proper place is absorbed by 
man as envelope, used for his existential unfolding), in her rereading of Greek 
philosophy and Heidegger. Please see her An Ethics of Sexual Difference.
 24 Ronald Judy, (Dis)Forming the American Canon: African- Arabic Slave Narra-
tives and the Vernacular, 89.
 25 Ben- Dor, Thinking about Law, 131.
 26 Kalpana Seshadri Crooks, HumAnimal: Race, Law, and Language.
 27 Jurisdiction, then, determines who has standing before the law and who lacks 
such standing. Taney considers Scott’s writ erroneous because he lacks the 
standing jurisdiction bestows. We can also read in this legal concept the es-
sence, or essential unfolding, of law itself, since for Heidegger, in his Introduc-
tion to Metaphysics, Being, understood through the Greek Phusis, “is the event 
of standing forth, arising from the concealed and thus enabling the concealed 
to take its stand for the first time” (16). Furthermore, “This standing- there, 
this taking and maintaining a stand that stands erected high in itself, is what 
the Greeks understood as Being” (63). What I am suggesting here, by reading 
Taney’s legal reasoning alongside Heidegger’s understanding of Being, is that 
the law’s purpose is to illumine the human’s emerging through its standing. 
In other words, to have legal standing is to have one’s Being recognized by 
the law. Taney ultimately argues that blacks lack standing because they lack 
Being — merchandise never emerges or appears but must remain concealed in 
the opening, or light, of law. 
 28 The Dred Scott Decision: Opinion of Chief Justice Taney. Library of Congress. 
http://hdl.loc.law//llst.022
 29 The belief that the position of blacks was fixed was also advanced by many, 
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but Dr. Josiah Nott probably presented the strongest presentation of this ar-
guments. For him, slavery was a moral obligation; see Paul Finkelman’s “The 
Significance and Persistence of Proslavery Thought,” 95 – 114.
 30 I think Chief Justice Taney’s use of the term axiom is quite revealing of the 
philosophical agenda he has in mind: not just to establish a set of truths by 
which an antiblack society must orient itself, but also that axioms are them-
selves ontological and the idea is the “ontic translation of ontological axioms. 
The subject draws on the symbolic resources of its world in order to represent 
to itself and others the axioms of being- in- the- world that are simultaneously 
transcendent and immanent, trans- immanent, in relation to this world,” ac-
cording to Sergei Prozorov. In other words, Taney uses an axiom to express, 
or symbolize, an ontological truth, but this ontological truth must translate 
into an idea. I would argue that the symbolization of an antiblack axiomatic 
is precisely the opinion itself. Taney’s opinion is the representation (idea) of 
something ontological — which is why legal decisions are deceptively ontologi-
cal; please see Prozorov, Theory of the Political Subject: Void Universalism, vol. 
2, Interventions, 29.
 31 It is well rehearsed in academic and legal circles that Dred Scott was one of the 
Supreme Court’s greatest errors. I, however, think that the opinion was the 
most realistic ruling in an antiblack world. Taney performs a vitally important 
task here: to unravel the romantic narrative of universal humanism, which cap-
tivates the legal imagination. 
 32 Wilderson, Red, White, and Black, 22 – 23.
 33 Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, 211. Patterson even goes as far 
to say, “Even when the slave pays, he is really not paying for his freedom. It is 
usually conceived of as making a gift offering in gratitude for the master’s freely 
given decision to release him from slavery, however that release is arranged.” 
This is the extremity of black humanism, and it translates into a disturbing 
avoidance of the domination within the manumission itself — manumission as 
a strategy of narcissistic power and control. 
 34 Alan Nadel, Invisible Criticism: Ralph Ellison and the American Canon, 13. 
 35 Agamben, The State of Exception. 
 36 Nancy, Birth to Presence, 95 – 96. 
 37 Niklas Luhmann, “Law and Social Theory: Law as a Social System.” 
 38 Carol Greenhouse, “Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation 
of Law,” 1631.
 39 Howington, “Property of Special and Peculiar Value,” 312. This split was de-
signed to “balance the rights of the slaves and masters against those of the 
body politic.” Saidiya V. Hartman brilliantly articulates another duality of being 
for the captive — the spilt between chattel object and reasoning criminal. This 
flexible ontology served the interest of the master as well as the State. Thus, the 
duality that Howington and Hartman explore is in essence quite similar; see 
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Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self- Making in Nineteenth- 
Century America.
 40 In 1852, Tennessee attempted to re- enslave free blacks who had not received 
the consent of the state. “The statute mandated that when a slave was freed 
without the state’s consent, the county court was to appoint a trustee for the 
slave. This trustee was tantamount to a master”; see Howington, “Property of 
Special and Peculiar Value,” 315.
 41 J. England Merton, “The Free Negro in Antebellum Tennessee,” 46. 
 42 Helen Tunnicliff Catterall, ed., Judicial Cases Concerning American Slavery 
and the Negro, 479.
 43 Howington, “Property of Special and Peculiar Value,” 314. 
 44 Howington, “Property of Special and Peculiar Value,” 315. 
 45 The term reification has a rich philosophical tradition originating from György 
Lukacs’s History and Class Consciousness. Lukacs insists that the process of 
commodity exchange and the commodity fetishism that it produces distorts 
human praxis so that it becomes something like a second nature. Humans be-
gin to transfer their “thingification” of the commodity and its use value to other 
humans, the intersubjective experience, and, ultimately, to themselves. Only 
a true human praxis could reverse this distorting stance, a structurally false 
praxis. My use of the term borrows the sematic energy of “thingification” and 
the crude praxis of conceiving of beings as mere means. I do not, however, 
share Lukacs’s belief in the efficacy of true praxis, nor do I identify the source 
of antiblackness as the distorting practice of unchecked commodity- fetishism 
transference. My conception of reification is not tethered to capitalism because 
I believe antiblackness is a problem for any economic organization of the so-
cial. Reification is more in alignment with Martha Nussbaum’s objectification, 
but I do not propose an ethical or moral framework within which to situate 
reification/objectification, since antiblackness renders every ethical and moral 
framework ineffective. Given this philosophical difficulty, I do not retain fealty 
to the original intent of the term. I do find it useful, however, for understand-
ing the process of reducing immateriality into material substance. For lack of 
a better term (since “objectification” entraps me in the subject/ object division 
of metaphysics), I have chosen “reification.” Please see Martha Nussbaum’s Sex 
and Social Justice, and Axel Honneth’s reformulation of reification through 
recognition in his “Reification: A Recognition- Theoretical View.” 
 46 Rebecca Scott and Jean Hébrand, Freedom Papers: An Atlantic Odyssey in the 
Age of Emancipation, 3.
 47 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method. 
 48 Carol Wilson, Freedom at Risk: The Kidnapping of Free Blacks in America 
1780- 1865.
 49 Samira Kawash, Dislocating the Color Line: Identity, Hybridity, and Singularity 
in African- American Literature, 49. 
190 notes to chapter three
CHAPTER 3: SCIENTIFIC HORROR
 1 In “What Is Metaphysics,” Martin Heidegger states, “If science is right, then 
one thing is for certain: science wants to know nothing of no- thing [vom Nichts 
wissen]. In the end, this is the scientifically strict comprehension of no- thing. 
We know it in wanting to know nothing about the no- thing”; in Heidegger, 
Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), 
96. This wanting to know nothing about nothing is the source of scientific 
knowledge, for all scientific procedures conceal the dreaded desire for nothing. 
My contention here is that science resolves this tension between refusal and 
embracing nothing with black being. It uses black being to explore the meta-
physical mysteries of nothing by projecting the dread onto black bodies. This 
projection provides an ideal site of scientific disavowal. 
 2 Alain David, “On Negroes,” in Race and Racism in Continental Philosophy, 8 – 18.
 3 Evelynn Hammonds conceptualizes black holes in relation to black female sex-
uality and absent- presence (or silence). She suggests that a black hole brings 
two problematics to the fore: detection and compositional knowledge (i.e., 
“What is it like inside a black hole?”). The first is answered by attentiveness to 
distortion (the distorting impact of a black hole on two stars, for example) and 
the second by geometry, a geometry still yet to be formulated by mathematical/ 
scientific thinking. I find this analysis exceptionally generative in understand-
ing the relation between blackness and nothing. How do we detect and under-
stand the composition of nothing? These two questions pose a certain horror 
for science, given their unanswerability. Whereas black holes might be ren-
dered comprehensible by positing being as a condition of studying them (i.e., 
detection and composition), black as nothing (i.e., formlessness) cannot rely 
on the ontological ground of being, so we reach a limit with the two proce-
dures Hammonds lays out; please see Hammonds, “Black (W)holes and the 
Geometry of Black Female Sexuality,” in African American Literary Theory: A 
Reader, 492 – 93. 
 4 W. T. Wragg, “The Remarkable Case of Mental Alienation,” 34, 16.
 5 Please see Heidegger’s Being and Time on the distinction between perishing, 
demise, and death. I have been arguing that black being can lay no claim to 
ontological grounds, and this includes the existential meaning of death. Thus, 
within this ontometaphysical schema, Joe would simply perish — much like any 
biological organism. Only the human experiences authentic death or inauthen-
tic dying. Black being cannot die, since this death assumes an inauthentic rela-
tion to being that can be corrected (through anxiety). 
 6 David Marriott, Haunted Life: Visual Culture and Black Modernity, 230 – 31.
 7 Please see Eric Cazdyn’s The Already Dead: The New Time of Politics, Culture, 
and Illness.
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 8 Abdul R. JanMohamed, The Death- Bound Subject: Richard Wright’s Archeology 
of Death, 19.
 9 Hortense Spillers, Black, White, and in Color: Essays on American Literature 
and Culture, 208.
 10 In “What Is Metaphysics?,” Heidegger ruminates on the essence of science: 
“Science wants to know nothing of ‘no- thing.’ But even so it is nonetheless 
certain that, when it attempts to talk about its own essence [Wesen], it calls 
on ‘no- thing’ for help. It claims for its own what it has rejected. What sort 
of conflicted essence unveils itself here?” (33). The black body facilitates the 
unveiling, or working through, of this conflict for science. 
 11 Heidegger, Basic Writings, 96.
 12 Andrew S. Curran, The Anatomy of Blackness: Science and Slavery in an Age of 
Enlightenment.
 13 Katherine McKittrick, “Mathematics Black Life,” 17.
 14 Please see Stuart Elden’s remarkable study on Heidegger’s critique of calcula-
tive thinking in Speaking against Number: Heidegger, Language and Politics of 
Calculation (especially the chapter “Taking the Measure of the Political”). 
 15 Alain Badiou, Being and Event. Ricardo L. Nirenberg and David Nirenberg 
also trace the relation between the Heideggerian critique and Badiou’s de-
parture and supplement of this critique; please see their “Badiou’s Number: 
A Critique of Mathematics as Ontology,” 585 – 614. Although set theory does 
not provide an ontological framework within which to ground black being (is 
there a pure procedure to understand that straddling of nothing and infinity?), 
his critique of the violence 1 performs is essential to understanding the “math-
ematics of the unliving.” 
 16 Patricia Cline Cohen, A Calculating People: The Spread of Numeracy in Early 
America.
 17 George Yancy, Look, a White!: Philosophical Essays on Whiteness.
 18 Benjamin Rush, “Observations Tended to Favor a Supposition That the Black 
Color as It Is Called of the Negroes Is Derived from the Leprosy,” 295.
 19 This understanding departs from aspects of abolition historiography that view 
abolition as a radical activity, one bringing the questions of labor and black 
humanity to the fore. For an example of this understanding of abolition, please 
see Manisha Sinha’s The Slave’s Cause: A History of Abolition. Steven Best and 
Saidiya Hartman argue in “Fugitive Justice” that abolition was “incomplete,” 
and I understand the incompletion of the enterprise as the inability to resolve 
the ontological crisis of black being. It is antiblackness that needs abolition, 
and a change in legal status does not change ontological death; please see Jared 
Sexton’s “Don’t Call It a Comeback: Racial Slavery Is Not Yet Abolished.” 
 20 I might also add the Negro Question, or “Nigger Question,” as Thomas Carlyle 
and John Stuart Mill call it (Carlyle and Mill, The Nigger Question and the Ne-
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gro Question), remains even after emancipation — the ontological question of 
Negro Humanity is never really resolved (our proper metaphysical question). 
Thus a relentlessly antiblack study such as Some Phases of the Negro Question, 
penned by Charles Wesley Melick, pursues this question with the understand-
ing that it isn’t yet resolved in the twenty- first century. 
 21 Allen Yarema documents the negrophobia that necessitated the emergence of 
the colonization movement. The unwillingness of Americans to treat blacks as 
equal (or human), even when possessing limited rights, convinced many that 
colonization was the only option for blacks. Black freedom remained an ideal 
that only relocation could realize, but even relocation failed to provide freedom 
from antiblackness. African settlements were often not acknowledged as serious 
international actors, and those relocating faced very dangerous conditions, such 
as disease; see Yarema’s American Colonization Society: An Avenue to Freedom?.
 22 Please see Grant “Sylvester” Walker, A Conspiracy to Colonize 19th Century 
United States Free Blacks in Africa by the American Colonization Society.
 23 William Andrew Smith, Lectures on the Philosophy and Practice of Slavery: As 
Exhibited in the Institution of Domestic Slavery in the United States: With the 
Duties of Masters to Slaves (1856), 128. 
 24 Rush, “Observations,” 294.
 25 Rush actually conducted his own experiments on Moss on July 27, 1796. He used 
the results of this experiment as the basis for his presentation to the Ameri-
can Philosophical Society entitled, “On the Color of the Negroes.” He would 
expand this into “Observations.” See Katy L. Chiles’s Transformable Race: Sur-
prising Metamorphoses in the Literature of Early America, 196. Moss’s body, 
then, is precisely a living laboratory — biologically functional but ontologically 
dead — and Rush builds an entire career from the open vulnerability of black 
bodies to the scientific gaze. For could Moss refuse Rush’s experiments? His 
body belonged to a public trust of prurient knowledge accumulation for science. 
 26 Harriet Washington, Medical Apartheid, 80.
 27 Rush, “Observations,” 296.
 28 Mark M. Smith, How Race Is Made: Slavery, Segregation, and the Senses, 14.
 29 Michel Foucault clarifies some of his thinking about confession, power, and 
madness in “The Confessions of the Flesh,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected In-
terviews and Other Writings 1972 – 1977, 194 – 228.
 30 Denise Ferreira da Silva, Toward a Global Idea of Race, 21 – 33.
 31 Samuel Cartwright even proffers “Cholera of the mind” to explain the splinter-
ing of the mind unique to blacks diagnosed with cholera — the symptoms are 
“dreams, prophecies, or any idle thing.” The choleric black mind is not a mind 
at all, but a black psyche within which Cartwright unloads antiblack reasoning 
and beliefs. Please see Katherine Bankole’s Slavery and Medicine: Enslavement 
and Medical Practices in Antebellum Louisiana for Cartwright’s discourse on 
blackness and cholera. 
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 32 J. Kameron Carter, “Christian Atheism: The Only Response Worth Its Salt to 
the Zimmerman Verdict.” 
 33 For a reading of the Hamitic myth as an antiblack Christian fantasy and a re-
tooling of this fantasy by black Christians, see Sylvester Johnson’s The Myth of 
Ham in Nineteenth Century American Christianity: Race, Heathens, and the 
People of God.
 34 One of the most fervent rejoinders to Cartwright came from a black physician, Dr. 
James McCune Smith. He worked with orphans in New York and used his find-
ings to make general claims about the misuse of science to make antiblack claims. 
He asserted that “he hoped much from science,” but this humanistic hope — 
that science could operate objectively for the improvement of all beings — 
remained unrealized, a tortuous fantasy. Please see Gretchen Long’s Doctoring 
Freedom: The Politics of African American Medical Care in Slavery and Eman-
cipation, for more analysis on Dr. Smith’s scientific desires. 
 35 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World, 38.
 36 Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonomy.
 37 Jonathan Metzl, The Protest Psychosis: How Schizophrenia Became a Black 
Disease.
 38 Thomas S. Szasz, Ideology and Insanity: Essays on the Psychiatric Dehuman-
ization of Man, 4.
 39 Albert Deutsch, “The First U.S. Census of the Insane (1840) and Its Uses as 
Pro- Slavery Propaganda,” 471.
 40 Bruce Curtis, The Politics of Population: State Formation, Statistics, and the 
Census of Canada, 1840 – 1875, 17. 
 41 Deutsch, “First U.S. Census of the Insane (1840),” 471.
 42 Deutsch, “First U.S. Census of the Insane (1840),” 472.
 43 Please see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: To-
ward a History of the Vanishing Present, 41. Although Spivak is analyzing the 
cartographic imagination of continentalist philosophers, her discussion of the 
epistemograph is pertinent to a discussion of the geopolitics of knowledge in 
general.
 44 Frank Wilderson, Red, White, and Black, 41.
 45 Kalpana Seshadri- Crooks, Desiring Whiteness: A Lacanian Analysis of Race, 
40.
 46 Russ Castronovo, Necro Citizenship: Death, Eroticism, and the Public Sphere in 
the Nineteenth- Century United States, 1.
 47 Quoted in Deutsch, “The First U.S. Census of the Insane (1840),” 475.
 48 Edward Jarvis, “Insanity among the Coloured Population of the Free States,” 
83. 
 49 Jarvis, “Insanity among the Coloured Population,”84. 
 50 Jarvis, “Insanity among the Coloured Population,” 84. 
 51 Deutsch, “The First U.S. Census of the Insane (1840),” 473.
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 52 Calhoun, The Works of John C. Calhoun, vol. VI: Reports and Public Letters of 
John C. Calhoun, 460 – 61.
 53 Nancy Cartwright provides a rigorous critique of science fundamentalism 
through physics and the way this foundation is protected from what it ex-
cludes; more precisely, the law of fundamentalism is not immediately credited 
by what it excludes (i.e., like the forms of motion that are not governed by 
Newton’s Law). We can see something similar happening in Cartwright’s un-
derstanding of statistical science; see Cartwright, The Dappled World: A Study 
of the Boundaries of Science.
 54 Mary Douglas might understand this as the problem of pollution — the free 
black as a pollutant to civil society; see Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Anal-
ysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo.
 55 Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, 
281.
 56 Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, in Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected 
Readings, 5.
 57 Badiou, Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Existence, 90. 
CHAPTER 4: CATACHRESTIC FANTASIES
 1 In Troubling Vision: Performance, Visuality, and Blackness, Nicole Fleetwood 
understands the black body as troubling scopic regimes through performativ-
ity. The idea of troubling, then, indicates a certain resistance to antiblackness 
through the visual. I agree that the black body troubles but part ways with Fleet-
wood’s iteration of resistance and agency. In other words, troubling does not 
yield ontological or transformative results — rather, it translates into an incor-
rigibility that antiblack violence works to subdue. Michael Chaney also offers 
a reading of the visual and the “alternate field of vision” fugitivity engenders in 
Fugitive Vision: Slave Image and Black Identity in Antebellum Narrative. 
 2 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine, 127. 
 3 See Spivak, The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
6.
 4 Ronald Judy, (Dis)forming the American Canon: African- Arabic Slave Narra-
tives and the Vernacular, 107. 
 5 David Marriott, Haunted Life: Visual Culture and Black Modernity, 7. 
 6 Dirtiness is a metaphysical sign, one designed to configure white as morally 
pure and blackness as evil — a moral abyss. Douglas Sharp avers antiblackness, 
“needs ‘dirty’ persons to alleviate and clarify [its] own sense of moral ambigu-
ity; [it] needs a baseline in relation to which [it] can measure moral righteous-
ness and purity”; see Sharp, No Partiality: The Idolatry of Race and the New 
Humanity, 71. 
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 7 Jacques Lacan reinterprets Heidegger’s fable of the vase to argue that the noth-
ing of the vase (the empty space) provides the vase with its existence. The vase, 
then, is a material contour around nothing. According to Lacan, “This nothing 
in particular that characterizes it in its signifying function is that which in its 
incarnated form characterizes the vase as such. It creates the void and thereby 
introduces the possibility of filling it”; Lacan, Seminar VII in The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis 1959 – 1960: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 120.
 8  It is also important to note that nothing also terrorizes the Lacanian subject 
with the threat of aphanisis (the disintegration of the symbolic covering over of 
this nothing). In fantasies of the body in bits and pieces and other ruptures of 
the real, the subject tries its best to avoid this nothing at the core of its being. 
Through repression and disavowal, the subject tries to eliminate nothing, but 
is, of course, unsuccessful. I use this as a heuristic frame for understanding the 
way the human being hates (and is fascinated by) this nothing and projects 
this hatred onto black being; see Lacan, “Some Reflections on the Ego,” in The 
International Journal of Psycho- Analysis. 
 9 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 140.
 10 Toni Morrison also suggests that the Negro is a plaything for the literary imag-
ination, a putative object for the human; see her Playing in the Dark: White-
ness and the Literary Imagination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1992). 
 11 Rinaldo Walcott, “The Problem of the Human: Black Ontologies and ‘the Colo-
niality of Our Being,’ ” in Postcolonial- Decoloniality- Black Critique: Joints and 
Fissures,” 95.
 12 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 143.
 13 Hortense Spillers, Black, White, and in Color: Essays on American Literature 
and Culture, 210.
 14 See Jean Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation. 
 15 Saidiya V. Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self- Making in 
Nineteenth- Century America, 21.
 16 The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959 – 1960: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Seminar 
VII. 
 17 Please see Vicky Lebeau’s “Psycho- Politics: Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White 
Masks,” in Psycho- Politics and Cultural Desires, for an elaboration on Fanon’s 
real fantasy contra Freudian/Lacanian understandings of it. 
 18 Spillers, Black, White, and in Color, 379.
 19 In “Decline and Fall: Ocularcentrism in Heidegger’s Reading of the History of 
Metaphysics,” David Michael Levin argues that Heidegger challenged the ocu-
larcentrism, which defines modernity’s rationality, with his metaphors of vision 
and seeing — as a challenge to metaphysics. His seeing is not predicated merely 
on the eyes, but with a thinking anew. I agree with Levin’s insightful reading 
and would suggest that the seeing and not seeing of black being does not end 
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with the eyes, but with antiblack thinking, which broaches other senses, as 
well. 
 20 Illustrated journalism had become a popular mode of leisurely entertainment 
and political education by 1857. Through the use of vivid illustrations, sketches, 
and eventually photography, this medium engaged in national debates and con-
cerns. According to historian William Fletcher Thompson Jr., in The Image of 
War: The Pictorial Reporting of the American Civil War, “Recurring crisis in 
national affairs in the decade preceding the [civil] war established the market 
for news illustrations. Publishers, artists, and engravers solved the necessary 
technological problems of mass- printing woodcut engravings of hand- drawn 
illustrations. By such methods it was possible to print pictures within two or 
three weeks of the events portrayed — a ‘marvel of the times’ in comparison 
to earlier standards.” These technological advances provided artists with the 
means to portray politically salient issues efficiently. 
   Much as the minstrel shows constructed racial identity through theatrical 
production, illustrated journalism constructed racial identity through print. 
Whereas the minstrel show was often confined to a certain space, owing to the 
physical demands of the stage, illustrated journalism was not limited by the 
constraints of a physical stage and could circulate images widely and quickly. 
In Beyond the Lines: Pictorial Reporting, Everyday Life, and the Crisis of Gilded 
Age America, Joshua Brown discusses the lexicography of these images: “They 
were intended for immediate social use, conveying to the American reading 
public the people, places, and events that composed the news of the day” (6). 
Part of the “social use,” I argue, is an ontological one — a way of playing with 
nothing. 
 21 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, 105.
 22 Following Jacques Derrida’s Disseminations, we could also suggest that what 
the image is articulating is black being as spacing — the gap in between estab-
lished properties. For Derrida, this spacing constitutes nothing itself. Spac-
ing ruptures the metaphysics of presence and being, since it is a formlessness 
that preconditions the structure itself (grammar, language, semiotics). In this 
way, emancipation is a spacing of blackness. This spacing is the nothing of 
metaphysics. 
 23 David Walker, David Walker’s Appeal, in Four Articles, Together with a Pream-
ble to the Coloured Citizens of the World, but in Particular, and Very Expressly, 
to Those of the United States of America, 62.
 24 The in- between status of the speaking ape problematizes the humanistic pre-
suppositions of the communicative project in Jürgen Habermas’s work. The 
illustrators show us that perhaps the joke is on the belief in the universality of 
grammatical and syntactical rationality; not everyone could participate in the 
repository of grammatical conventions and reasoning. Thus, there is a funda-
notes to chapter Four 197
mental exclusion at the very heart of communicative rationality that African 
American history exposes; please see Habermas, The Theory of Communicative 
Action. Even if modernity’s project is unfinished (as is metaphysics’), its evo-
lution will not bridge the gap between emancipation and freedom for black 
being. 
 25 Judy, (Dis)Forming the American Canon. 
 26 Tommy Lott, The Invention of Race: Black Culture and the Politics of Represen-
tation, 7 – 9.
 27 I am thinking here of postmetaphysical works such as Agamben’s The Open: 
Man and Animal, which deconstructs the metaphysics of the binary man/an-
imal to understand something like being or existence. The deconstruction is 
the site of tremendous violence for black being — it is not productive. 
 28 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 148. 
 29 Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Against War: Views from the Underside of Moder-
nity. He reads the destructive strategies of antiblackness through Levinas’s 
critique of ontology — ontology as war. I agree with both Torres and Levinas 
that ontology is a pugnacious enterprise, but I don’t think that ethics is any less 
violent. In fact, ethics is probably more violent, since it disavows the antiblack 
violence that sustains it. In other words, antiblackness enables both ontology 
and ethics. Neither discourse is clean. 
 30 Barbara Tomblin, Bluejackets and Contrabands: African Americans and the 
Union Navy, 26. 
 31 Spillers, Black, White, and in Color, 208. 
 32 For a diacritical engagement with blackness and the question of value in its var-
ious iterations, please see Lindon Barrett’s Blackness and Value: Seeing Double. 
In particular, Barrett argues that value is a social formation, and this formation 
is always already cut by race. I would agree with Barrett, but would only add 
that the social formation is antiblackness, such that value is produced through 
antiblack axiology. 
 33 I would also agree, along with Heidegger, that technology enables enframing. 
Technology reveals the essence (essential unfolding) of the human, the revela-
tion that is the unfolding of being. Black weapons facilitate human enframing 
by revealing the nothing at the core of the human. But unlike Heidegger, this 
enframing is not a source of freedom or potential; it is a vicious aspect of an-
tiblackness. Blacks are used for the ontological evolution of the human; see 
Martin Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 
287. 
 34 See Slavoj Žižek’s The Plague of Fantasies for his discussion of interpassivity. 
For him, interpassivity is a process of transference in which the subject projects 
enjoyment onto the object — and the object carries out the projected enjoy-
ment the subject passively, vicariously enjoys. The illustrations are forms of 
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interpassive enjoyment, an enjoyment with the terror of nothing. The subject 
projects this terror onto black bodies so that one can enjoy passively from a dis-
tance. Žižek notes that this may also produce aggression if the object disrupts 
the transference. We might say that freedom dreams are a form of disruption 
that antiblackness checks with extreme aggression (111 – 13).
 35 Lewis R. Gordon, “Through the Hellish Zone of Nonbeing: Thinking through 
Fanon, Disaster, and the Damned of the Earth,” 11. 
 36 Heidegger makes a distinction between perishment, demise, and death in Being 
and Time. Dasein does not perish. Lower forms of life perish where expiration 
does not have significance or meaning for being. Dasein experiences either 
authentic death (being- toward- death) or inauthentic demise (being at an end). 
In other words, death is bound up with a relation to Being. Since I have argued 
that this is not an issue for black equipment, perishment is closer to what hap-
pens to black weapons. 
 37 Roland Barthes, Mythologies.
 38 Darieck Scott also argues for the agential potential of subjection and fantasy 
in his Extravagant Abjection: Blackness, Power, and Sexuality in the African 
American Literary Imagination. Amber Jamilla Musser suggests that maso-
chism as a set of relations, converging on the site of freedom and agency, in 
Sensational Flesh: Race, Power, and Masochism. Both Scott and Musser suggest 
that masochism can serve as a strategy or tactic of resistance to domination — 
by undermining the terms of subjection and pleasure. I, however, do not find 
agency within masochism — pleasure is no more a strategy against antiblack-
ness than voting or metaphysical romance. Pleasure reaches its limit when the 
body is literally destroyed, and pleasure in destruction just produces a dead 
black body. Antiblackness is not moved by black death or deterred through 
black pleasure.
 39 Anthony Paul Farley, “The Black Body as Fetish Object,” 533.
 40 Nahum Dimitri Chandler, X: The Problem of the Negro as a Problem for 
Thought, 8 – 9.
 41 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 116.
 42 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho- Analysis, 88 – 89.
 43 Monica L. Miller reads resistance and disruption in the look: “Highlighting 
the foreignness of the gaze upon him, Mr. Augustus points out here a real 
change in the history of self- fashion. Whereas Clay’s earlier Philadelphia se-
ries had been voyeuristic — one in which the viewer, presumably white, ridi-
cules the black pretensions to high society by eavesdropping on blacks’ social 
follies and foibles — this print is confrontational. Mr. Augustus’s ‘look’ at the 
viewer, through the monocle, magnifies concern about the viewer’s own sense 
of self and forces a comparison of this self with that of the nattily clad black 
man.” I would argue, however, that the look is rendered powerless because it is 
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fraudulent — only the eyes of the white man matter in an antiblack world. The 
confrontation, then, is between the white subject and nothing; this is what the 
image stages — not black resistance; please see Miller’s Slaves to Fashion: Black 
Dandyism and the Styling of Black Diasporic Identity, 105. 
 44 In Picture Freedom: Remaking Black Visuality in the Early Nineteenth Century, 
Jasmine Cobb argues persuasively that the black woman in the image is pre-
sented as both ignorant and buffoonish. Her inquiry is designed to present her 
as blithely unaware of her surroundings and the deadly white gaze. The prob-
lem of gender is one that compounds the issue of nihilism, since it requires us 
to think about the way gender is the structure through which black as nothing 
is represented. I would argue, however, that gender is precisely one form of 
vicious humor, since blacks do not have the privilege of gender intelligibility 
in an antiblack society. In other words, the free black woman pretends to be a 
woman (as she is pretending to be a human). This pretending was a source of 
great comedy for white spectators. Thus, her feminine comportment and styl-
ish dress are props for comedy — nothing wrapping itself up in human gender. 
 45 Gordon, “Through the Hellish Zone of Nonbeing,” 3.
 46 We might answer Spivak’s provocative query “Can the Subaltern Speak?, in 
Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader by saying that it doesn’t 
matter whether black being can speak or be heard — given that language and 
discourse will not end the metaphysical holocaust. So even if black being can 
speak, write, and be heard, onticidal destruction will continue. The black ni-
hilist must write, speak, and broach the metaphysical question to illumine the 
process of destruction. To say that the enterprise is meaningless is only potent 
if such a thing as meaning can be recuperated for black being. Meaning is lost 
along with the flesh. This is the crux of black suffering in an antiblack world. 
 47 Ivy Wilson, Specters of Democracy: Blackness and the Aesthetics of Politics in 
the Antebellum U.S. Wilson argues that political aesthetics constitutes a web 
of practices engendering subversion and inversion. I definitely understand that 
art provides a vehicle for expressivity, but an artistic practice is unable to re-
solve an ontological issue. In Specters of Democracy, the ontological problem 
of blackness is neglected, and it proceeds as if the ontological ground of black 
humanity is self- evident. It is this very self- evidence that black nihilism seeks 
to unravel. In other words, political aesthetics never broaches the ontological 
problematic, even if it forges a sense of belonging or collective affirmation.
 48 Marriott, Haunted Life, 7. 
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CODA: ADIEU TO THE HUMAN
 1 As quoted in Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Findings of Police Bias in Baltimore Vali-
date What Many Have Long Felt,” New York Times, August 10, 2016. 
 2 Rinaldo Walcott, “The Problem of the Human: Black Ontologies and ‘the Colo-
niality of Our Being,’ ” in Postcolonial- Decoloniality- Black Critique: Joints and 
Fissures, 94. 
 3 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 40. 
 4 Ashon T. Crawley, Blackpentecostal Breath: The Aesthetics of Possibility. 
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